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SUMMARY
This thesis comprises three essays in economic theory. The rst two are in the
theory of repeated games. The third is also a theoretical contribution, which mixes con-
cepts both from repeated games and the theory of incentives. The rst chapter is a novel
contribution to frequent monitoring in repeated games. The second one, studies for the
rst time, innitely repeated games where the repetitions of the stage game are random.
The last chapter, studies the provision of incentives in a principal-monitor-agent relation
with exogenous learning, where the compensation is exogenously xed. Each chapter can
be considered independently of the rest.
Chapter I studies frequent monitoring in a simple innitely repeated game with imperfect
public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time
Brownian process at moments in time of length . It shows that a limit folk theorem
can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the
highest frequency, i.e.  ! 0. The approach proposed places distinct initial conditions
on the process, which depend on the unknown action prole simultaneously and privately
decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game. The strong decreasing
e¤ect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions
shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible
in the limit. The existence of a positive monotonic relation between payo¤s and monitoring
intensity is also found.
Chapter II studies repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not
known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players
repeatedly interact share this feature; players do not know exactly when the next time they
will be called to play the stage game will be. We call this feature random/stochastic moni-
toring. We show that perfect random monitoring is always better then the classical perfect
deterministic monitoring when the playersdiscount function is convex in the time domain.
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Surprisingly, when the monitoring is imperfect but public, the result does not extend in the
same absolute sense to all frequencies of play. The positive e¤ect in the playersdiscounting
is not always su¢ cient to compensate for a potential loss in the informational content of the
public signals, due to the extra uncertainty on the repetitions of the stage game. However,
we establish conditions under which random monitoring allows e¢ ciency gains on the value
of the best strongly symmetric equilibrium.
Chapter III studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal
delegates the task of monitoring the e¤ort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter
we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the
agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principals payo¤s.
Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives.
We go around this di¢ culty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal
replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agents learning. We found that even when re-
placement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is
a loss in e¢ ciency due to the impossibility of benetting from it. Nonetheless, these strate-
gies can partially recover the principals losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower
bounds on the payo¤s that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize
the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for
di¤erent cost and impatience levels.
La Tesis se compone de tres ensayos en Teoría Económica. Los dos primeros se enmarcan
dentro de la Teoría de Juegos Repetidos, mientras que el tercero mezcla conceptos de esta
teoría con la Teoría de Incentivos. El primer ensayo es una contribución novedosa a la liter-
atura de monitorización periódica (frequent monitoring) en juegos repetidos. En el segundo
se estudia, por primera vez en la literatura, juegos innitamente repetidos en los que el
intervalo entre dos repeticiones sucesivas del juego de etapa es aleatorio. El último ensayo
analiza el problema de la provisión de incentivos en el marco de una relación principal-
agente-monitor con aprendizaje exógeno, donde la compensación que recibe el agente por
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parte del principal se ja también de manera exógena. Cada uno de los ensayos es indepen-
diente del resto.
El Capítulo I plantea un modelo de monitorización periódica en un juego repetido innito
con descuento donde la información es pública pero imperfecta. La información se modela
mediante un proceso Browniano en tiempo continuo. Los jugadores acceden a esta informa-
ción en instantes discretos de tiempo, con frecuencia . El valor inicial del proceso depende
del perl de estrategias que de forma simultánea eligen los jugadores en el momento inicial
y, por tanto, es desconocido. Los jugadores penalizan las desviaciones del equilibrio del
oponente. El resultado fundamental en este capítulo es un Folk-Theorem con información
pública imperfecta cuando la frecuencia de monitorización tiende a cero,  ! 0. Este re-
sultado es posible debido a que, a medida que se reduce el período de supervisión, se mejora
la precisión de las señales públicas, por lo que el jugador puede penalizar ecazmente las
desviaciones de su oponente, reduciendo drásticamente los benecios esperados inmediatos
a una desviación. También se prueba que existe una relación constante positiva entre los
pagos esperados y la frecuencia de supervisión.
El Capítulo II contiene una extensión del Capítulo I, pues se supone que los instantes de
tiempo en que se producen las repeticiones del juego de etapa no son conocidos, sino que
vienen determinados por algún proceso aleatorio. Denominaremos a esta situación mon-
itorización estocástica. En muchas situaciones de interés económico donde los jugadores
interactúan de forma repetida en el tiempo, los jugadores no saben exactamente cuándo
es la próxima vez que serán llamados a jugar el juego de etapa. Por citar sólo algunos;
dos empresas coludidas cambian sus estrategias dependiendo de los precios observados, que
poden oscilar de una forma estocástica. Similarmente un superior puede monitorizar un
empleado en momentos de tiempo de una forma imprevisible para esto.
El resultado principal en este capítulo es que si la función de descuento de los jugadores es
convexa respecto al tiempo, entonces los pagos obtenidos bajo monitorización estocástica
perfecta son mejores que los obtenidos en el caso clásico determinista. Por el contrario,
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cuando la monitorización es imperfecta el resultado no se extiende pata todas las frecuen-
cias . En este caso, el efecto positivo debido a la convexidad en la función de descuento
no siempre es suciente para compensar una eventual pérdida en la ecacia del contenido
informativo de las señales públicas, debida a la incertidumbre en las repeticiones del juego
de etapa. Es posible, sin embargo, aislar condiciones bajo las cuales la monitorización es-
tocástica permite una mayor eciencia en el valor del mejor equilibrio fuertemente simétrico.
En el Capítulo III se estudia una interacción dinámica principal-agente-monitor, en la que
un principal delega la tarea de supervisar el esfuerzo de un agente a un tercero, que denom-
inamos monitor. Tanto el principal como el agente se comportan estratégicamente, pero
no así el monitor, quien puede presentar varios tipos y cuyo tipo inicial se desconoce. A
través de la interacción repetida el agente puede aprender el tipo del monitor. Este proceso
de aprendizaje reduce los pagos del principal. El hecho de que la indemnización se supone
exógena, limita en gran medida el diseño de incentivos que eviten este problema. En lugar
de utilizar este mecanismo, el principal puede reemplazar al monitor para impedir que el
agente aprenda su tipo. Las estrategias de reemplazo tienen asociado un coste. Se demues-
tra que, incluso cuando el coste de reemplazo es nulo, si el monitor se revela estrictamente
preferido por ambas partes, entonces hay una pérdida de ecacia debido a la imposibilidad
de beneciarse de esta preferencia conjunta. Sin embargo, el uso de estrategias de reem-
plazamiento puede recuperar en parte las pérdidas del principal. Además, establecemos
límites superior e inferior de los pagos que el principal y el agente pueden obtener. Fi-
nalmente, se caracterizan las estrategias de equilibrio bajo control público y privado (con
comunicación) para diferentes costes y niveles de impaciencia.
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CHAPTER I
FREQUENT MONITORING IN REPEATED GAMES
UNDER BROWNIAN UNCERTAINTY
1.1 Introduction
In the general repeated games theory, it is common to assume that the period length between
each repetition of the stage game is of xed length. When monitoring is perfect, letting the
discount factor  ! 1 either by making the players more patient (a decrease in r) or by
shrinking the period length between actions (a decrease in ) are equivalent exercises. The
former approach has been preferred to prove many folk theorems and to show the existence
of e¢ cient equilibria.
When monitoring is imperfect, taking r ! 0 or  ! 0 leads to di¤erent results. The
reason is that variations in r and  have a di¤erent impact on the distribution of the
signals. By making players increasingly patient through r ! 0, Fudenberg, Levine and
Maskin (1994) were able to prove a folk theorem.1
The pioneer work in frequent monitoring is due to Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991),
in a setting where the public signals are modelled with a Poisson process. They have
shown that di¤erent but ine¢ cient results arise depending on whether  ! 1 is due to
r ! 0 or to  ! 0. In the latter case, they found that strongly symmetric equilibrium
(SSE henceforth) payo¤s above the static Nash, but not e¢ cient, can be sustained when
the jumps in the process represent "bad news", which are more likely to occur when some
player has deviated.2
1Their stronger informational assumption is called pairwise identiability, meaning that a deviation from
a given player impact on the distribution of the public signals di¤erently than any deviation from any other
player. Incentives are provided through transfers of value between the players.
2 In an innitesimal time interval, the absence of realizations of the Poisson process is innitely more likely
than the occurrence of a realization. For that reason, the same result does not extend when the information
arrivals represent "good news".
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Recent work by Sannikov (2007)3 and Faingold and Sannikov (2007) on repeated games
modeled directly in continuous time, has renewed the interest in frequent monitoring. The
latter work, in the part which is relevant here, reports a degeneracy of the set of SSE payo¤s
in a game where a known normal type long-run player faces a sequence of short run players.
By degeneracy they mean that payo¤s outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria payo¤s
set cannot by sustained in continuous time, where the noisy public information is modeled
through a Brownian process. More in the spirit of the present paper, i.e. by studying the
limit of the discrete time games, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2007) report the same degeneracy result. These results came as a surprise, since Brownian
motion is an innitesimal variation process and we would expect payo¤s at least above the
static Nash payo¤s, due to an increased precision of the signals.
This paper explores frequent monitoring in a partnership game with imperfect public
monitoring and discounting.4 It analyses the limit of the sequence of the discrete time games
indexed by . The public signal is the observed state of an arithmetic Brownian motion
(ABM henceforth) process, in intervals of length . The observation is compared against
a previously chosen threshold, based on this decision rule; players adjust their actions for
the following period.
A great deal of attention is given to SSE payo¤s, not only because of their simplicity
but also because with two-sided imperfect public monitoring, the pairwise identiability
assumptions typically fail, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. Destruction
of value through punishments is the only way to provide incentives. Nonetheless, we show
that the value of the best SSE payo¤ improves monotonically when the monitoring intensity
increases. We also provide a full characterization of the optimal decision rule for di¤erent
values of .
Finally, we show that in the limit a folk theorem can be obtained, independently on how
3This paper provides a novel and elegant characterization of the set of perfect public equilibria payo¤s
using continuous time methods.
4Essentially, the information structure is similar to the one of Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986).
Other, classical situations involving imperfect public monitoring are Green and Porter (1984) and Porter
(1983) where the market price is an imperfect signal of the quantities supplied by rms. See Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for complete surveys on repeated games.
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players discount the future and on the level of uncertainty.5
In the context of the existing literature, these are striking results. The proposed ap-
proach, places distinct initial conditions on the process, which depend on the unknown
action prole privately and simultaneously decided by the players at the beginning of each
period of the game. This modelling approach changes the results drastically.
This paper is the rst to show e¢ cient results when the time interval between obser-
vations is taken to the limit without placing assumptions on the volatility of the process.
The result is possible because the information extracted from the public signals becomes
increasingly precise about the playersactions, increasing the payo¤s monotonically.6 More-
over, the expected immediate gains associated with a deviation from the equilibrium path
become less attractive, not only because the periods between the actions becomes shorter,
but also because the expected number of periods during which a deviator can enjoy these
gains decreases.
Related Literature - Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007)7 study how monitoring intensity
a¤ects the equilibrium payo¤s of a repeated Cournot duopoly game. They report the impos-
sibility of achieving payo¤s higher than the static Nash payo¤s when the public information
arrives continuously and disturbed by a Brownian motion. Crucial for their result is the as-
sumption that the public signal observed by the players, at moments in time t = ; 2; :::,
is the state of an ABM price process divided by the length of the time interval . Such
modelling of the observed public signal becomes extremely noisy when observed at high
frequency, creating a degeneracy e¤ect on the payo¤s. The root of the problem lies on the
5By "in the limit" we mean the length of time interval ! 0, sometimes also referred to as the "highest
monitoring intensity" or "continuous monitoring". During the paper we frequently mention "an increase in
the monitoring intensity" or "an increase in the monitoring frequency"; they refer to a decrease in .
6The monotonicity results share similarities with the ones obtained in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991).
For the "bad news" case, the most e¢ cient equilibrium (not fully e¢ cient) is obtained in the limit, and there
is also a monotonic improvement on the payo¤ with the monitoring intensity. Here the most e¢ cient result
is also obtained in the limit; it is however fully e¢ cient. In the "good news" case, the degeneracy of the
best SSE reported in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce, is similar in shape to the results obtained by Fudenberg
and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), although clearly distinct in the mechanics behind it.
This issue will be discussed in more detail below.
7See also, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2009) where they bound the set of equilibrium payo¤s by placing
restrictions on how information from Brownian and Poisson components are used to provide incentives in
the most e¢ cient way.
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fact that the accumulated Brownian increments in a given time interval  are of a higher
order than the underlying time interval, making any inference about the drift of the process
ine¢ cient in the limit.
Fudenberg and Levine (2007)8 study a repeated game with a nite action space where
a long-run player of a known type faces a sequence of myopic short-run players. The public
signal is the observed state of an ABM process, which can be inuenced by the actions of the
long-run player. The long-run player would like to sustain the equilibrium associated with
a particular action, in which case the drift of the process decreases with , but she may
also deviate to get a larger expected short run payo¤, in which case the drift of the process
increase with . The results are driven by the assumption that the initial conditions on the
process are the same independently of the actions of the long-run player. When  becomes
small the distribution of the public signals cannot provide reliable information about the
long-run player actions, creating the degenerating e¤ect.9
However, they show that if a deviation by the long-run player increases the volatility of
the process; equilibria can be achieved that are arbitrary close to e¢ ciency. When deviating,
the increase on the noise of the signals favours the provision of incentives, because inference
becomes more precise, the decision rule relaxes and mistaken punishments vanish in the
limit. The limit result obtained by Fudenberg and Levine is similar to the one presented in
the present paper. However, the mechanics that lead to asymptotic perfect monitoring are
di¤erent.
The same e¢ cient result does not generalize when a deviation decrease the uncertainty
parameter, as shown in Fudenberg and Levine (2007). The reason is that to detect a
downward swift in the volatility and to keep the incentives, players incur too often in wrong
punishments.
8See also, Fudenberg and Levine (2009) where they consider di¤erent ways of passing to the continuous
time limit, i.e. binomial and trinomial approximations of the Brownian paths, linking monitoring intensity
with event frequency, by taking the limit of the former. Such construction can also be applied in the context
of the present paper, for example, by considering two binomial trees that start in di¤erent points associated
with the di¤erent initial proles of actions. The trees intercept in the second row or after.
9 It can be shown that there is some equivalence between the Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov
and Skrzypacz (2007) approaches.
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It is worth to notice, that while the variance parameter can be consistently estimated
from the path of the process (ys; s 2 (t; t+ "]), for a small but measurable ", the same
does not happen with the drift of the process.10 Even if players are able to observe the
full path of the process realized from time t to time t + , a relatively large  is needed
for the actions of the players to be statistically distinguishable. The rst observation is
on the basis of Fudenberg and Levines (2007) e¢ cient result. The second explains why
equilibrium payo¤s above the static Nash are not possible, when  decreases and players
make inference over the drift of the process, as reported in Fudenberg and Levine (2007)
and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007).
Discussion - The present paper models the public signal observed by the players at
moments in time t = ; 2; :::, di¤erently. When each player privately selects her action,
the initial condition of the process reects the aggregate of these individual decisions. Two
di¤erent actions of player i have associated di¤erent initial conditions that can be statisti-
cally distinguished from each other for high monitoring frequencies. There is a measurable
distance between an initial condition associated with mutual cooperation and an initial
condition associated with a prole of actions where a unilateral deviation has occurred.
When switching from cooperation to defection, player i causes a movement in the process
similar to a jump. When away from the limit, such jump might be hard to separate from
the aggregate of innitesimal realizations, but in the limit such movement is almost surely
caused by deviating behaviour. This is even more evident when the action space is discrete,
but is also true with a continuum of actions.
It is important to stress that the modelling proposed in this paper, and the Fuden-
berg and Levine (2007, 2009) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2009), are not competing
approaches, but rather they complement each other. These approaches are conceptually
correct, however, the degeneracy e¤ect reported when player control the drift of the process
10See Prakasa Rao (1999) for a formal treatment of the statistical methods and the information that can
be extracted from statistical inference for di¤usion processes.
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might be counterintuitive in some situations. The present paper presents a modeling ap-
proach to frequent monitoring that attempts to rationalize the intuition that more mon-
itoring cannot harm the monitor side and has positive e¤ects in terms of incentives for
cooperation and higher e¤ort.11 In particular, we are thinking in problems where the in-
formativeness of the public signals increases with the monitoring intensity. We want to
develop a theory where imperfect public monitoring, in the limit, is equivalent to perfect
monitoring.
Dickinson and Villeval (2008), show empirically that monitoring has a positive e¤ect on
individuals e¤ort. However, there is also evidence of a Freys (1993) crowding-out e¤ect,
which can lead to an equilibria degeneracy in the limit.12 This e¤ect is based on behavioral
aspects, that are not considered in the present paper, neither on the existing literature on
frequent monitoring, which rather focus on the informativeness of the signals with respect
to the monitoring intensity.
Consider the following example, in line with the present paper. In an innitely repeated
Cournot duopoly game, rms supply choices are private information, but the market price
is publicly observed.13 If one of the rms deviates, by taking a decision (in the beginning
of a given period) to increasing its own production ow, then the noisy market price should
adjust instantaneously to this new aggregate output ow. When the periods between ob-
servations of the market price are large, and only the current market price is observed, such
deviation is likely to pass undetected due to the aggregate of exogenous noisy events. How-
ever, when the current market price is observed at a high frequency the sum of exogenous
noisy perturbations on the prices becomes negligible. The e¤ect of an increase in the supply
is almost surely detected.
11See, for example, the seminal paper of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for an early defence of the disciplinary
e¤ect of monitoring. See also, Dickinson and Villeval (2008) and the references there in.
12Freys idea, is that the monitoring crowding-out e¤ect should be stronger in interpersonal relations.
On the other hand, the disciplinary e¤ect should dominate in abstract relations (more distant), where
psychological issues and intrinsic motivation aspects are absent.
13 In this paper, we show our results in a simpler game, because we want to focus on the informational
issues without adding extra complexities. The Cournot game will be discussed in Section 1.6.
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Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2009) ap-
proaches, are suitable to model situations where reliable information needs time to build-in,
in such cases an early or frequent access to this "not ready" information generates perverse
e¤ects. These papers have in common the fact that the informativeness of the public signals
increases with the lack of monitoring. Clearly, such cannot t in many economic problems
of interest.
In this sense, the present paper lls a gap in the existing literature, by enlarging the
spectrum of economic problems that can be studied using the theory of frequent monitor-
ing.14
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the repeated game model and
the public information producing process. Section 1.3 explains in detail the approach of
this paper, in particular the connection between the initial conditions of the process and
the associated distributions. Section 1.4 computes the bounds on the set of SSE payo¤s
and characterizes the optimal decision rule for varying . Section 1.5 focuses on the limit
case and presents the main results of this paper. Section 1.6 discusses extensions to the
continuous time case and to games with a continuous action space. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Repeated Game Model
We explore frequent monitoring in a simple partnership game with two long-run players.
The history of the game is the following. At moments in time t = 0;; 2; :::, players
can choose from two di¤erent e¤ort levels ait = 1 or ait = 0. In the former case, player i
is providing e¤ort E, in the latter case she is shirking S. More formally, let Ait = f0; 1g
denote player is 2 N = f1; 2g non-empty and compact action space with generic element ait
representing an action, and denote At = A1tA2t as the set of action proles endowed with
the product topology of the individual action spaces, with generic element at = (a1t; a2t)
denoting a prole of actions.
14 In fact, recent development on the theory frequent monitoring has allowed to study interesting departures
from the canonical repeated game framework. For example, Fudenberg and Olszewski (2008) study the limit
of an innite horizon nitely repeated game with random asynchronous monitoring, while Osório-Costa
(2008) study innitely repeated games, where the repetitions of the stage game are not deterministic.
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Independently of their private e¤ort decisions, players at moments in time t = ; 2; :::,
observe the realized total output yt+ generated during these time intervals of length .
Given a prole of actions at chosen at time t, the public signal observed at time t+ (the
total output),15 is driven by the following arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM henceforth)
process,16
yt+ = yt + 
Z t+
t
dZs; with Zt = 0 and t = 0;; 2; :::; (1)
where yt  20 (a1t + a2t) is the initial condition of the process at a given time t, a function
of the unknown prole of actions. The parameter , gives a measure of the volatility or
noise of the process and 0 is a productivity measure.
The uncertainty is generated by the standard Brownian motion fZs; s  0g. Notice,
that information about the evolution of the total output is produced continuously, in every
innitesimal instant of time a new realization of the process is available. The monitoring
frequency  and the frequency of signals are di¤erent; in some sense our goal is to equate
the monitoring frequency to the signal frequency.
All the relevant information about playersactions is contained in the initial condition
of the process at each moment in time t = 0;; 2; :::. Since players cannot revise their
actions during the interval of length , we removed the drift of the process (1). In this way,
we also eliminate any trend in the process, which in our setting is irrelevant for the study
of the problem.17
Notice, that the public process is a martingale with respect to some ltration, i.e.
E (yt+jyt;  0) = yt. The transition density of the process places equal mass above
and below the initial condition, i.e. above and below its mean.18
15We could have also considered the possibility that in the end of each period of length , players observe
the full path of the process fys; s 2 (t; t+]g realized from t to t+. This case provides more information
to the monitor. It can be shown, that when compared with the case where only the state of the process
is observed, a lower threshold is required to sustain a particular equilibrium. Consequently, it always has
larger associated payo¤s. Note, however, that in the limit both cases are equivalent.
16The ABM assumption is made for simplicity. All results are valid for the geometric Brownian motion
and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
17With di¤erent initial conditions, the process (1) with drift leads to the same results. In that case, the
threshold would be some function preserving the distance to the initial condition. For example, for the ABM
process with drift, the threshold would be the function b+ (yt; t) t, where b is the threshold associated with
an ABM process without drift and  (yt; t) t is the drift of the process. Both approaches lead to the same
distribution of the public signals.
18Examples of other processes with the proposed specications are,  (yt; t) = 0 for the geometric Brownian
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Let, player is 2 f1; 2g realized payo¤ (ex-post) from the partnership be given by,
ri (ait; yt+)  yt+=2 
 
20    ait;
where 0 >  > 0 and yt+ is the realized output from the partnership, which is divided
equally between the players independently of the e¤ort that they have supplied.19 The
second term on the right-hand side (RHS Henceforth) denotes the cost of providing e¤ort
for player i. The expected payo¤ (ex-ante) of player i 2 f1; 2g from the partnership is then,
i (at)  E (ri (ait; yt+) jyt) = 0 (a1t + a2t) 
 
20    ait:
Under the expected utility hypothesis, this is the relevant expression for studying the prob-
lem.
In resume, at each moment in time t = 0;; 2; :::, players repeatedly play the stage
game,
E , 1 S , 0
E , 1 ;    (0   ) ; 0
S , 0 0;  (0   ) 0; 0
Shirking is a dominate strategy for both players. The minimax value of the game coincides
with the stage game Nash payo¤s and equals 0 for both players. For convenience we assume
2 > 0. This game has the same structure as a prisonersdilemma, and can be treated as
such.
A great deal of attention will be given to the SSE payo¤s. A strongly symmetric public
strategies, is when after every public history the same action is chosen by both players.20
More generally, a strategy is public if at any moment t it depends only on the public histories
and not on player is private history. Given a public history, a prole of public strategies
motion, and  (yt; t) =  (y0   yt) for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
19We assume that public signal is not only an action dependent function but also represents the evolution
of the aggregate output of the partnership. Other formulations of the public signal could have also been
considered, provided that they would depend on both playersactions. It is also important that ri (:) does
not depend on a i explicitly.
20A public history, a time t, is a sequence of realizations of the observed state of the process, denoted
by ht = (yt ; yt 2; :::; y0) 2 Y t, with h0 = Y 0  ?. The sequence of player is private e¤ort choices, is
player is private history.
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that induces a Nash equilibrium on the continuation game from time t on, is called a perfect
public equilibrium (PPE henceforth). Moreover, if the other player  i is playing a public
strategy, player is best reply can only be a public strategy.
Players discount the futures according to a common discount factor, assuming exponen-
tial discounting   e r, where r is the discount rate.
1.3 The Initial Conditions and the Distribution of Public
Signals
As discussed in the introductory section, the proposed approach places distinct initial con-
ditions on the process, which depend on the unknown action prole simultaneously and
privately decided by the players in the beginning of each period of the game. Since this is a
critical issue, in this section we examine in more detail the monitoring technology employed
in this paper.
To keep the notation simple, from now on we drop the t index, and denote with a 
when it refers to an end of period object, and without index when referring to the beginning
of the period.
The signal space is continuous; players use a threshold b decision rule to distinguish
realizations suggesting cooperation from realizations suggesting defection.21 The cut-o¤
value creates a partition of the signal space; in signals suggesting cooperative behaviour
fy > bg, which we call "good" signals, and signals suggesting defective behaviour fy  bg,
called "bad" signals.
In general, for a given initial condition y  20 (a1 + a2), the probability that the state
of the public process (1) appears below b in the end of the period of length  is
Pr (y  b) = 

b  20 (a1 + a2)

p


;
where  (:) is the standard zero mean and unit variance Gaussian distribution.
We assume that players know the value of parameter  and the type of uncertainty
21See, for example Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), where they show that a threshold decision rule is the
best test to detect unilateral deviations. Later, we will focus on the optimal threshold value for varying
parameterization of . For now we contend with an arbitrary threshold, and we will abstain from referring
its dependence on  as well as other parameters of the model.
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they are facing.22 This way they can compute the above probability and the impact of a
deviation on the distribution of the public signals.
Depending on the unknown prole of actions that arise from each players private e¤ort
decision ai2N , we have di¤erent initial conditions for the public process. In the partnership
game there are four possible proles of actions: the strongly symmetric prole a  (1; 1), the
asymmetric proles a0  (1; 0)  (0; 1) and the Nash prole aN  (0; 0), which is trivially
self-enforceable.23
(i) When we want to enforce the SSE prole a  (1; 1) we have, the initial condition or
ex-ante output, y = 40. Then probability of punishment is given by
FEE  F 1;1 (b;)  

b  40

p


:
This is type I error probability; even though no player has deviated, punishment will be
exerted when a low realization of the process is observed.24 We want to protect this prole
against a potential deviation, a0  (0; 1)  (1; 0). In this case, the prole a0 has associated
an initial condition y = 20, and a probability of punishment given by
FES  F 1;0 (b;) = F 0;1 (b;)  

b  20

p


:
Analogously a type II error is given by 1  FES .
(ii) The most asymmetric equilibria payo¤s for player i, require a initial prole of play
a0  (1; 0)  (0; 1), we denote the probability of mistaken punishment as
GES  G1;0 (b;) = G0;1 (b;)  

b  20

p


:
Notice, that when considering to deviate, player i would do it in the rst period, because it
is when the worst prole is due. The deviation by the player i that is providing high e¤ort,
22The assumption that players know the variance of the process is not as strong as it seems. According to
the discussion in the introductory section, since the focus is on the limit case and this is equivalent to full
path observation, players can estimate the true value of  consistently in a very small but measurable time
interval ".
23Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) pairwise full-rank condition typically fails for strongly symmetric
equilibria. There is no loss in generality when placing no distinction between the proles (1; 0) and (0; 1),
and denoting them as a0. Also note that to keep the notation standard, until now, a has denoted a general
action prole. With a slight abuse of notation, a now denotes the strongly symmetric e¤ort prole.
24We refer to a type I error as the event of punishing a non-deviator, and a type II error as the event of
not punishing a deviator.
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leads to the prole aN  (0; 0). The initial condition is then y = 0, and the probability of
punishment given by
GSS  G0;0 (b;)  

b  0

p


:
Notice that, depending on the initial prole we want to sustain, di¤erent thresholds
have to be computed. For that reason we distinguish between b and b. Then, FES and
GES do not have the same value, since they have associated di¤erent decision rules. We
employ the distributions GES and GSS , when our goal is to enforce a path that starts with
the prole (1; 0), while FEE and FES are employed when enforcing (1; 1). The former set
of distributions, will be used only in Section 1.5, to prove the main result of this a paper.
Observe that the actions decided independently at the beginning of the period by each
of the players are clearly printed in the initial conditions of the process, as they should. At
the end of the period of length , the initial condition associated with a given prole of
actions appears disturbed by some noise. Lowering , we are decreasing the uncountable
number of innitesimal contributions to the noise, leading to a more likely observation of
the process around its initial condition. An observation of the process far from the initial
condition is then a sign of a deviation.
If we want to generalize this methodology to other more complex environments, this
correspondence between actions taken and the associated expected public signal observed
in the end of the period has always to be present.
Active Coordination
When the game is a repeated partnership, it is natural to assume that the process is reset
at the end of each period, after players have observed and split the realized output, starting
again in the point associated with the new action prole decided simultaneously by both
players. However, the same assumption does not t in some other contexts. For example in
the repeated Cournot game, it is not reasonable to assume that the process is reset every
period, since it represents the market price. In this case, the new equilibrium actions have
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to be adjusted to take into account the observed state of the process.25 Although di¤erent,
these two possibilities can be studied within the same methodology. To illustrate this point
consider the following example.
In the Cournot duopoly game the public process observed at time  is the market price,
P = P + 
R 
0 dZt, where P = (   q1   q2). Suppose that at time 0 the game starts
with both players supplying the monopoly quantities, i.e. qi = =4.26 The expected market
price (and initial condition) is then P = =2 and the threshold value is some b < =2.
Let the end the period realized market price be, P = P + z. If P  b, players
play their punishment actions, with respect to the observed state of the process. For
simplicity, consider the Nash punishment; in the following period each player will supply
qi = (+ z) =3.
On the other hand, if P > b, for the next period, the 50/50 monopoly quantities will be
chosen, taking into account the state of the process, hence, requiring each player to supply
the quantities qi = (+ z) =4 with a necessary adjustment in the decision rule for the
next period, i.e. b = b+ z.
We will call this type of tacit coordination in a dynamic setting active coordination,
since it requires players to adjust their equilibrium path actions taking into account the
observed state of the process. Players do not reset the value of the process, rather they
reset the uncertainty.
1.4 The Best Strongly Symmetric Equilibria
This section furnishes the reader with a set of general results that are independent of the
monitoring intensity, which are particularly useful for the following section when we focus on
the limit case. It also presents a characterization of the optimal decision rule associated with
the value of the best SSE of the innitely repeated partnership game. In some occasions,
the results presented are standard in repeated games; a brief description will be presented,
25The martingale condition guarantees that such a procedure does not change the properties of the dis-
tribution of the public signals.
26 In the Cournot duopoly game under imperfect public information, it is never optimal to produce exactly
the monopoly quantities, but rather an amount slightly larger (except in the limit). This issue and others
are discussed in more detail in section 1.6.2. Take this example as an illustration.
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su¢ cient to keep the exposition self-contained.
Since the game is symmetric there is no loss in generality when studying a single player
incentives, hence we remove players indexes.
The equilibrium prole we want to sustain in a SSE is a  (1; 1). A prole where a
single player deviates is denoted as a0, and the Nash prole denoted as aN . These proles
have associated the stage game payo¤s, , 0 and 0, respectively. See the expected payo¤s
matrix in section 1.2. The public information is produced continuously and is generated
by the ABM process given in (1), with initial conditions depending on the unknown action
prole.
Since the public information process can virtually return any value in R, we apply
the Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti (1986, 1990) bang-bang result to compute the best SSE
payo¤. Punishments are not executed in terms of a deterministic number of time periods as
suggested by Porter (1983) and Green and Porter (1984) but rather in a probabilistic sense.
As we shall see, since the distribution of the public signals is not convex, see Porter (1983),
optimality requires an innite punishment length and both approaches do not di¤er. In
some other problems, in particular when the minmax value di¤ers from the Nash value, the
di¤erences might be substantial.
The expected continuation value of the game is some convex combination between the
expected normalized payo¤ v, when play starts with the observation of a good signal, and
the expected normalized payo¤ v, when play starts with an observation of a bad signal.27
The Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti result allows us to write playersproblem in a very
tractable way, and to use recursive dynamic programming methods to search for the expres-
sions for the values of v and v that are exclusively represented as functions of the parameters
of the model.
To nd the expression that characterizes the best SSE payo¤, we need to solve the
27Since later we will allow players to correlate their actions on some public signal, v and v are extreme
points of the set of SSE payo¤s. This set is the collection of all payo¤s that can be achieved with strongly
symmetric public strategies, i.e. when both players choose the same action after every public history. See
also the discussion after Lemma 1.
14
following dynamic programing problem, which by symmetry is the same for both players:
v = (1  ) +   1  FEE v + FEEv ; (2)
v  (1  )0 +   1  FES v + FESv ; (3)
v = (1  ) 0 +  [pv + (1  p) v] ; (4)
p 2 [0; 1] : (5)
Expression (2) is the value of the relation when both players always provide e¤ort. While
both players provide e¤ort, each receives the immediate discounted normalized expected
payo¤ associated with mutual e¤ort, as well as a discounted expectation over the expected
values v and v, associated with the two types of signals that might be observed. The rst
constraint (3) is a enforceability condition. It has a simple interpretation; the expected
value of the game associated with mutual e¤ort has to be at least as good as the expected
value of the game associated with a potential unilateral deviation, even if this deviation
just last one period. When satised, (2) and (3) enforce the prole (1; 1).
Expression (4) is the value of the punishment phase, where p is the probability with
which the relation remains in this stage. A value p = 1 means perpetual punishment and a
p = 0, requires a single punishment period. Since (0; 0) is a Nash equilibrium, punishment
is trivially enforced.
Condition (5), requires p to be a probability. Consequently, we must have v 2 [0; v] 
[0; v).
Expression (4) can be solved for v to obtain
v =
 (1  p) v
1  p : (6)
Plugging v into (2) and (3) and making the latter hold with equality. We obtain the
enforceability condition
1

  F
ES   FEE0
0     P = p: (7)
We must have P taking a value in the interval [0; 1] in order for (7) to bind. If there is no
way to obtain a value of P  1, no equilibria other than the innite repetition of the static
Nash can be sustained, i.e. v = 0. When this turns out to be the case, in particular in the
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limit, we say that the set of SSE payo¤s degenerates. When P < 0, we dont have such a
problem, as we will see below, we can adjust the optimal decision rule in order to obtain a
value of P 2 [0; 1].
After replacing (6) and the enforceability condition (7) into (2), we can solve the latter
for v to obtain the expression of the best SSE
v =    F
EE
FES   FEE
 
0    : (8)
Similarly, replacing (7) and (8) into (6), we obtain
v = v   (1  )

0   
FES   FEE : (9)
Expression (8) and (9) characterize the value of the upper and lower bounds on a set of
SSE payo¤s respectively.
The following result establishes conditions on the threshold b in order to obtain the
largest value v, constrained by the fact that (7) holds with equality and it is feasible.
Lemma 1 Under (1), the strategy that achieves the best SSE payo¤ v, requires perpetual
punishment the rst time the process is observed below b (). Where b ()  b  bp is
called the optimal threshold and solves v = 0, i.e.
FES   FEE0 = (1  )  0    =; (10)
and
bp = 30 + 2 ln
 
=0

=20; (11)
is an upper bound on the optimal decision rule.
The result tells us that, independently of , among all the feasible punishment schemes,
perpetual punishment is the optimal one, i.e. expression (8) returns the largest SSE payo¤.
This is the case, because the ABM is a Gaussian process and the distribution of the public
signals is not convex in its entire domain.28
28For a discussion of this issue in the context of repeated games, see Porter (1983).
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The equality (10) gives an implicit function to compute b. The value b establishes
the right balance between gains and losses associated with right and wrong inference about
playersactions, while keeping incentives satised. Moreover, if an optimal decision rule b,
exist it must take a value smaller than bp. Later, we will see that in this region b is the
unique value that satises (10). When a solution b to (10) does not exists, no other cut-o¤
decision rule can enforce the prole (1; 1).
The upper bound bp imposes any particular restriction in the choice of b, other than
guaranteeing uniqueness. In the interval ( 1; bp], we have @FES=@b  @FEE=@b, i.e. the
likelihood ratio, is larger or equal to one. An alert of deviation is more likely to occur when
somebody has deviated. The likelihood di¤erence FES FEE is non-negative and increases
with b.
Notice that the two point set f0; vg associated with (10) in Lemma 1 is self-generating,
since the continuation values N and v are elements of the set. However, if we allow for
public correlation, we can convexify the set

N ; v
	
, and we can say that any payo¤ in
the interval

N ; v

can be sustained as a PPE of innitely repeated partnership game.
It is worth noticing, that when we consider sets of the type [v; v] with v > 0, public
correlation is required in order for the set to be self-generating. The reason is that the
continuations associated with the value of the game that starts with e¤ort, and the value
of the game that starts in the punishment phase must be in [v; v].
The important point here is that such a generalization allows the set of SSE to be an
interval. Moreover, Proposition 7 of Section 1.5 will be shown to hold, not under optimal
behaviour but for more general sets of the type [v; v]  [0; v].
However, not explicitly mentioned and in order to keep the notation simple, the solution
b depends on all the parameters in the model, i.e. 0, , r,  and . In particular, since the
values of FEE and FES are endogenously determined, expression (8) necessarily depends
on how much players discount the future, through b.
The function P is strictly convex in b with a minimum value at point bp. When P (bp) <
1, then there must be two threshold values, say b1 and b2, that satisfy P (b1) = P (b2) =
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1. The decision cut-o¤ value is not unique. Suppose, b1  b2, with associated strongly
symmetric payo¤s v1  v2 respectively. In this case, it is not admissible to choose a
threshold other than the one associated with the larger strongly symmetric payo¤, i.e. b1
dominates b2.
Denition 2 Given a value P , we say that a threshold value b is admissible when it has
associated the largest payo¤ v. If in addition P (b) 2 [0; 1] we say that such threshold is also
feasible.
Expression (11) establishes an upper bound on the optimal decision rule, but also guar-
antees that any threshold below bp is admissible. However not all b  bp are feasible,
in particular, if the unrestricted minimum value P (bp) is larger than one, we cannot en-
force the prole (1; 1). The set of feasible and admissible thresholds is then dened as
fb  bp : P (b) 2 [0; 1]g  [b; bp].29
Even though that there might exist a continuum of feasible threshold values, since
@v=@b < 0, we are mainly interested in the optimal choice b. Depending on the parameters
of the problem, for su¢ ciently large  the set of feasible threshold values might vanish.
In pure strategies, the value of  such that, 0 = maxb v or equivalently 1 = minb P ,
corresponds to the monitoring frequency after which the prole (1; 1) cannot be enforced
any more. Denote this monitoring intensity by .
Lemma 3 The value  is the solution for  of (10) at the point (11).
Since Brownian signals are Gaussian, we cannot obtain  in close form. The result tells
us how to obtain this value implicitly.
It is worth noticing that v
 
b
 


= v
 
bp
 


= 0, then b
 


= bp
 


. At  = ,
if we take a threshold value b 6= bp   = b  , then v  b 6= bp   = b   < 0 or
equivalently P
 
b 6= bp   = b   > 1. For  >  the set of feasible thresholds vanish,
and no other equilibrium than the innite repetition of the static Nash can be obtained.
29We could have dened admissibility in di¤erent terms. Notice that the function v is strictly concave
in b, taking a unique unrestricted maximum value at some bv 2 ( 1; bp], that is necessarily smaller than
v. When at the point bv we have v (bv) > 0 there are two threshold that satisfy the optimality condition
v (b1) = v (b2) = 0. The lower of these two thresholds is the admissible one. The set of feasible and admissible
threshold would be fb  bv : v (b)  0g  fb  bp : P (b) 2 [0; 1]g.
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The monitoring intensity  has the following asymptotic properties; when  or r goes
to1 we have ! 0, while if  ! 0 we obtain ! ln (0= (0   )) =r, and if r ! 0 we get
 ! 1. Consequently, providing that  and r are bounded, the interval  0; is always
guaranteed to be nonempty, i.e.  > 0.
By Lemma 1, if a solution b  bp to (10) exists, it is an optimal threshold b. The follow-
ing result establishes that such a solution, indeed exists, and it is unique and di¤erentiable
in the interval
 
0;

. The value  depends on all the parameters of the model, and it is
the lowest observational frequency of the public process, that can support some nontrivial
equilibrium in the innitely repeated partnership.
Lemma 4 For all  2  0;, with  > 0, a solution b () 2 ( 1; bp) to (10) exists, is
unique and di¤erentiable.
Intuitively, depending on the parameters of the model, might take a larger or a smaller
value. For a given , the threshold b () adjusts to keep (10) holding with equality. When
 2 ;1 we cannot guarantee existence and di¤erentiability of the function b ().
Shirk becomes a dominate strategy for both players. While, if  2  0; we can nd a
di¤erentiable function b (), for all  in this interval, which makes (14) hold.
It is worth noticing that when r ! 0, i.e. the players become very patient, the value
v ! . The best SSE payo¤ is full e¢ cient. This happen because the distribution of the
public signals is Gaussian and has unbounded support. So as r decreases so does the optimal
threshold relaxes, taking lower values. The punishment probability decreases. In the limit,
r ! 0, leads to b !1. Such result suggests a folk theorem in the limit as r ! 0. We do
not elaborate more on this issue because the result depends on the unbounded support of
the Gaussian distribution. The proof of such result involve a characterization of the rate at
which incentives for low e¤ort decrease, when r ! 0, and the rate at which FEE ! 0.
The Optimal Threshold - Numerical
Lemma 1 shows that v is obtained using the most severe punishment. Such punishment
has associated with it an optimal decision rule whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma
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Figure 1: The optimal threshold as a function of .
4. Now we will attempt to provide the intuition behind some properties of the resulting
decision rule.
Figure 1, illustrate the optimal threshold value as a function of , for the partnership
game, and for di¤erent parameterization of  and r, when 0 = 3 and  = 2.
Notice that the value  increases either when players get more patient or the public
signal becomes less noisy, see Figure 1.
The more impatient the players are (larger r) the tighter the monitoring must be in
order to create e¤ort incentives.30 This can be seen in Figure 1, when we increase r from
0:1 to 0:2, keeping  xed.
When we consider the noise parameter of the public process , it is not always true that
large uncertainty leads to a lower threshold. For high monitoring intensities this is the case,
30By "tighter monitoring" as opposed to "relaxed monitoring", I mean a higher threshold value. The
larger the threshold the more likely players are to detect deviations, but they are also more likely to make
wrong judgements.
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but when the monitoring frequency is low a tighter threshold might be required even if the
uncertainty level is higher. The reason is that the incentives for deviation increase with 
but also with noise of the signals. In Figure 1, when  = 6 and  is around 2:3, we observe
a larger threshold when  = 3.
The strict convex shape of the threshold function with respect to  2  0; is caused
by two e¤ects that operate in the same direction. As the monitoring intensity increases, i.e.
 becomes small, the public signals become more informative about the other player private
action. On same time, the expected immediate gains from deviating behaviour decrease. For
innitesimal , the public signals get extremely informative and the expected immediate
gains from deviation become negligible; for that reason the optimal threshold approaches
20, the value to where the output would fall in case of perfect monitoring, this happens
independently of the values that  and r can take. Such a result is formally shown in
Lemma 5 of Section 1.5.31
When the monitoring intensity decreases, the sum of innitesimal variations of the
process become more likely to generate a "bad signal". Wrong punishments in the equi-
librium path are then more likely, for that reason the cut-o¤ threshold relax, but in a
decreasing way, because at the same time the expected immediate gains from a deviation
become more attractive. At a certain point, after reaching its minimum value, the optimal
threshold starts increasing at an increasing rate, creating the convex shape. This happens
because the expected gains from deviation become increasingly attractive and the decision
rule has to become tighter in order to keep players with incentives. Finally, for large values
of   , there is no threshold value that can sustain mutual e¤ort; in pure strategies,
shirk becomes dominant.
1.5 Monitoring Frequency and Limit E¢ ciency
In this section we look at the limit value of b and we will show that under Brownian
uncertainty, monitoring intensity always has a positive e¤ect on the payo¤s. Finally, we
31 It can also be shown that @b=@!  1 when ! 0 and @b=@!1 when ! , however such
results are not particularly relevant.
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will present a -limit folk theorem. These results are independent of how much players
discount the future and of the uncertainty level.
1.5.1 The Limit Value of the Optimal Threshold
We start by studying the limit value of the optimal decision rule b. The question is; where
the optimal threshold converges as monitoring become more and more frequent? Figure 1
above provides an illustration, the following result formalize it.
Lemma 5 When  ! 0 the optimal threshold b () converges to 20, i.e. the expected
signal associated with the deviation with less impact on the distribution of the public signals.
Because di¤erent action proles have associated di¤erent initial conditions, that are
measurable separable from each other, in the limit the signals becomes perfectly informative
about players actions. We have asymptotic perfect monitoring. Then b () must converge
to the point where under perfect information, after a deviation, the realized deterministic
output would be observed.
For the setting of our particular game, the result simply states that b ! 20, in the
limit. However, the result can be more general; b must converge to the expected signal
associated with the deviation with less impact on the distribution of the public signals. This
is true even if the game has a continuous action space.
As mentioned before, the functional form of b cannot be obtained in close form, but
clearly must depend on all the parameters of the model. For that reason, it is nontrivial
to verify the rate at which b converges to 20. A wide number of numerical simulations
suggest that this convergence must occur at a rate lower than or equal to
p
. Suppose
that the optimal threshold function has the following structure: b () = 20   k (:)
with  > 0, where k (:) is some function of the all parameters of the model and converges
to some bounded value. While choosing   1=2 we can show that e¢ cient and feasible
results hold in the limit. On the other hand, when choosing an  smaller than 1=2 we
can bound b from below, but the enforceability condition (10) fails. These results seem to
suggest that b ! 20 at a rate of 0:49(9). We do not develop this idea further, because of
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its complexity and because such result is of little relevance for the propose of the present
paper. Nonetheless, the remark is left here.
1.5.2 Monotonicity of the Best SSE Payo¤
A relevant questions, is how the value of v change with ? The following result establishes
monotonicity between the value of the optimal upper bound on the set of SSE payo¤ and
monitoring intensity. The result holds for any monitoring intensity  2  0;.
Proposition 6 For  2  0;, the best SSE payo¤s v increase monotonically with the
monitoring intensity, i.e. with a decrease in .
In our setting, the monotonicity of the best SSE payo¤ to the monitoring intensity,
suggests that more frequent the monitoring is larger are the payo¤s. More monitoring is
then preferred to less monitoring. The result is a consequence of the increased precision
of the public signal when  becomes small. In a di¤erent context, Kandori (1992) shows
a similar result, where an exogenous improvement in the precision of the public signals
expands the set of PPE payo¤s.
Figure 2 illustrate the strict monotonic improvement in the best SSE payo¤s towards e¢ -
ciency as the monitoring increases, in line with the statement of Proposition 6. Monotonicity
is present independently on how players discount the future r, and the noisy parameter .
1.5.3 The -Limit Folk Theorem
Figure 2 illustrates the value of the best SSE payo¤ v, associated with the thresholds in
Figure 1, converging to the full e¢ cient outcome . In this Section we are not only interested
on the best SSE payo¤ v, but we want to know to where the full set of equilibria converges
in the limit as ! 0.
For simplicity, we focus on the case with unfavorable asymmetric payo¤s for player 1,
the other asymmetric case follow by symmetry.
According to Lemmas 1 and 4 of Section 1.4, we have the relation v > v = 0, for all
 2  0;, with  depending on the parameters of the model, and v = v = 0, for all
 2 ;1, i.e. the innite repetition of the static Nash payo¤.
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Observe that a threshold that is slightly larger than b, but below bp, still satises the
enforceability conditions (10) with slack and at the expense of a lower SSE payo¤. On the
other hand values lower than b cannot enforce the prole (1; 1). The threshold b gives us
exactly the point that maximizes v according to Lemma 1. As we will see, limit e¢ ciency
does not require an optimal value for b, as in the limit, the same results hold with a larger
threshold that is both feasible and admissible.
The punishment stage is not absorbing anymore; returning to the e¤ort path is then
possible. Consequently, we have the following relations, v  v  v > v = 0 with
b < b < bp for all  2  0;. This is the strategy employed in the proof of the main result
of this paper; if v !  and v  v, then v must converge to  as well.
In the Lemmas 1, 3, 4 and 5, we developed a great knowledge about the threshold that
sustains the best SSE payo¤. About the optimal threshold associated with an asymmetric
path that starts with the prole (1; 0), the question is more delicate.32 Nonetheless, following
the discussion after Lemma 5, such threshold b must converge to 0, the initial condition
associated with no e¤ort from both players. However, there is no guarantee it that such
convergence occurs from below, such would depend on the particular path in question.
Additionally, any choice b 2 (0; 0) must be feasible and admissible, at least in the limit
! 0.
Recall, that FES and GES do not take the same value, since they have associated
di¤erent decision rules. We use the distributions GES and GSS when our goal is to enforce
a path that starts with the prole (1; 0).
In order to show that a folk theorem holds for the partnership game we apply the
techniques of decomposition on tangent half spaces and the linear programming algorithm
developed by Fudenberg and Levine (1994) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994). Let
Eset (r;), denote the set of PPE payo¤s that can be sustained for a given discount rate
r and a monitoring intensity , and denote M set (; r) the set of equilibrium payo¤s that
32Notice that in general an asymmetric path, does not need to start with the prole (1; 0), only the most
asymmetric ones. However, such assumption is enough for our goal. It is also not necessarily true that the
optimal moment for a deviation is the rst period, but it is must be when the prole (1; 0) is due.
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result from such decomposition. This approach is preferred, since the set Eset (r;) is
typically hard to characterize. Clearly, since the set M set (; r) is a bound on the set of
PPE, we have Eset (r;) M set (; r).
It is worth to notice that in our setting, the set M set (; r), is not a limit set for r ! 0,
since the distribution of the public signals depend on the optimal decision rule, which
depends on r. A decrease in r expands the size of the bounding set M set (; r) as well as
the set Eset (r;).
Proposition 7 (The -limit folk theorem for the partnership game) Providing that
the r and  are bounded, every feasible and individual rational payo¤ of the innitely re-
peated partnership game can be sustained as an equilibrium when ! 0.
To obtain an e¢ cient result in the limit we just need FEE ! 0, FES ! 1, GES ! 0 and
GSS ! 1. When ! 0, any e¤ect that r could have on players payo¤ is shadowed by the
perfect informativeness of the public signals and the innitesimal time period that a player
can benets from shirking behavior. In other words, under Brownian uncertainty when the
monitoring intensity is taken to the limit, the public signals become perfectly informative
about playersactions. Moreover, the e¤ect of discounting r becomes irrelevant because any
deviation is detected almost surely in the following innitesimal time period.33 In the limit
the potential gains from deviating behaviour are negligible. Exception is when r ! 1, in
which case player do not discount.
We also need a bounding condition on the noise parameter .
The increased informativeness of the Brownian public signals for high monitoring in-
tensity is the key aspect. It is due to the measurable distance between di¤erent initial
conditions of the process.34 Such a distance in a process of innitesimal variation plays a
33 In order for an e¢ cient result to be sustainable, the probability of detection FES and/or GSS need
not to vanish in the limit. We cannot say much about the limit value of these probabilities, since they
depend on the exact form of b () and b () which are unknown to us. These simple conditions on the
informativeness of the public signals are su¢ cient to keep players with incentives to provide e¤ort in the
limit. Fudenberg and Levine (2007) discuss the necessity of similar conditions for the existence of an e¢ cient
limit equilibrium.
34 In the context of the partnership game, by measurable distance, we are referring to 20 = j20   40j =
j0  20j :
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Figure 3: M set (; r), for  = 3 (smallest set) to ! 0 (largest set).
crucial role and makes destruction of value along the equilibrium path converging to zero
with . Another important e¤ect that occurs for small  is the decrease in the expected
immediate gains from a deviation. The reader is referred to the discussion in the end of
Section 1.4 above, where these e¤ects are analyzed in some detail.
Figure 3, illustrates the expansion of M set (; r), for decreasing .
Wrong inference about players actions vanish in the limit. Relevant uncertainty arises
only if players cannot observe the public process during some measurable time interval.
Then the accumulated sum of innitesimal normal events may be misleading, which is more
likely, the larger the time interval during which the process was left unattended.
The mechanics of the repeated games plays a role in the result. That is, actions are
decided by players at the beginning of each period, at the end of the period the state of the
process is observed, uncertainty is reset,35 new actions are taken for the following period
35Uncertainty reset is equivalent to saying that either the value of the process is reset or players actively
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and so on. Under Brownian uncertainty, when we shrink the time interval of this cyclical
process to the limit, what Fudenberg and Levine (2007) call "fast play", signals become
"almost" perfectly informative about the true prole of actions. Almost, in the sense that
we still have some innitesimal variation, and because we are also not able to determine
the identity of the deviator.36
The results presented in this paper also hold if we consider other well known Gaussian
processes of innitesimal variation, as for example, the geometric Brownian motion or the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Finally, as discussed in section 1.3, without any extra condi-
tions on the information structure, these results can be generalized to others games with
more complex structures.
1.6 Possible Extensions - Some Comments
In this section we briey discuss two important extensions associated with the methodology
presented in this paper. The rst is how the results from a continuous time analogue
partnership game would di¤er from the discrete time version. Another important extension
would be to see how the approach of the present paper would perform if players have a
continuum of actions available. This is important since the methodology of the present
paper exploits the jumping e¤ect caused by a discrete deviation.
1.6.1 The Continuous Time
A number of technical issues arise when trying to dene a continuous time version of the
exercise presented in this paper, namely the limit of a sequence of discrete time games.
These problems are related with the time associated with the response to a deviation. For
example, if we assume that punishments occur immediately after a deviation at a given
time t, in continuous time such moment in time is not well dened (neither the immediate
time before). For any s > t we can always nd an s0 that is smaller than s. One possibility
coordinate. See the discussion on active coordination in Section 1.3.
36 Information about the identity of the deviator is on the basis of strong folk theorems under perfect
monitoring, see for example Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), as well as Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)
for a folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring.
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to deal with this situation is to assume that punishments occur on the same time as the
deviation. In technical terms, such assumption can solve the problem of the denseness of
the real numbers. In game theoretical terms, such is not compatible with the assumption
of nonanticipatory strategies. An information structure with these characteristics does not
correspond to a well-posed problem with strategic interaction. Some of these issues, and
others, have been addressed in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) and Bergin and MacLeod
(1993). One possibility discussed in these contributions, is to allow for a " delay on the
punishments. Equilibrium payo¤s are found as in a "-subgame perfect equilibrium (see
Fudenberg and Levine (1986)).
Without specic assumptions of this kind we cannot dene a continuous time analogue
of the problem discussed in this paper. Even though, there is no guarantee that equilibria
and strategies in continuous time match with the discrete time version, in particular for
more complex equilibrium paths, other than the SSE path.
1.6.2 A Game with a Continuous Action Space
When the action space is discrete in the limit, deviations from the equilibrium path are
similar to jumps in the process. Since Brownian paths are continuous but not smooth, such
defective behaviour is detected almost surely, in the limit. In this section we briey discuss
the innitely repeated Cournot game. This game is of interest since it has a continuum of
actions available for each player and so deviations can be of innitesimal magnitude. We
will see that the same results presented in the previous Sections keep holding.
We apply the bang-bang result for the strongly symmetric equilibrium in the spirit of
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990).37
In brief, the stage game expected payo¤s (ex-ante) are given by i (q1; q2) = qiP (Q),
where P (Q) is the inverse demand function and Q = q1 + q2 is the aggregate supply.
Firms, always have the possibility of staying out of the market and producing nothing. For
simplicity and without loss generality, production costs are zero and rms face no capacity
constraints, i.e. qi 2 [0;1).
37 I thank Andrzej Skrzypacz for providing me with the material needed to compute and understand the
mechanics of the best SSE payo¤s in the Cournot game.
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The stage game best strongly symmetric equilibrium is achieved when each rm supplies
half of the monopoly quantity. Denote this quantity as qMi .
The two rms decide their supply quantities simultaneously and independently at mo-
ments in time t = 0;; 2:::, and observe the market price (the public signal) at times
t = ; 2:::. The public signal is given by (1).38 Now, yt+ is the end of period observed
market price, and yt  P (Qt) is the initial condition of the process, it reects the aggregate
of individual private supply decisions chosen by each rm at the beginning of the period t.
For the case where P (Q) = 1  q1  q2 and  = r = 0:1, Figure 4 shows the value of the
best SSE for varying . In particular when  becomes small, the best SSE payo¤ converges
to the value 1=8, the payo¤ of the perfect monitoring 50=50 monopoly split. The numerical
approximation suggests that the same e¢ cient limit results shown for the nite action space
case (Proposition 7) also holds with a continuous of actions. A monotonic improvement in
38The observed state of the ABM price process may take negative values. This feature of the model is
irrelevant for the issue we wish to study and there is no loss in generality when considering such a process.
A geometric Brownian motion process would be more adequate, but generates other technical problems.
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the payo¤s is clear when  becomes small, similar to the statement of Proposition 6.
It is also interesting to contrast the evolution of the optimal threshold b, against the
expected signal of the process P (Q), for varying . Figure 5, shows that as  gets small,
the threshold value becomes tighter, in a similar fashion to the discrete actions case. In
the limit converging to the expected signal associated with the most collusive equilibrium
P
 
QM

= 1=2, as can be seen in Figure 5, reecting the decreasing uncertainty when! 0.
This result is just an extension of Lemma 5, for games with a continuous action space; in
the limit the optimal threshold b () must converge to the expected signal associated with
the deviation with less impact on the distribution of the public signals. With a continuous
action space, such a deviation is innitesimal.
The discussion suggests that all the results presented in Section 1.5, also hold when we
consider games with a continuous action space. This is the main point that present Section
attempts to highlight.
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1.7 Final Comments
In the simple setting of a repeated partnership game, this paper shows that a folk theorem
can be achieved in the limit (the time interval between actions and observation of the
process tends to zero), when the public signal observed by the players is the state of an
ABM process and the initial conditions associated with di¤erent e¤ort proles are distinct.
We also found a monotonic improvement on the payo¤s with the monitoring intensity.
Under Brownian uncertainty a degeneracy of the equilibrium in the limit or the opposed
e¢ cient scenario as shown here, depends crucially on the modelling adopted. Whereas
the former approach tends to t better in problems where the precision of the signals
increases with the time interval between observation of the process, as shown in the work
of Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), the present
approach is more appropriate in situations where the informativeness of the signals improve
with the monitoring intensity.
Reality evolves continuously, however, in economics, and contrary to other sciences, it
is hard to think of situations where information is continuously available. An example
could be the listed price of very liquid stocks or certain commodities that are available at
high frequencies, but not continuously. Nevertheless, if such a possibility were available, this
paper shows that the most e¢ cient outcomes would be achieved by continuously monitoring
the state of process.
The reason why continuous monitoring of the available information is not seen in real
economic problems is because it is costly and may not compensate the potential benets. In
practical applications when a partner continuously monitors the other, she probably cannot
devote her time to other activities, such as contributing with e¤ort to the partnership. In
practice, what we observe are agents monitoring at discrete moments in time. In many
occasions these monitoring events might be random, in the sense that an agent does not
know the exact moment in time when the monitor is going to observe the public signal.
Osório-Costa (2008) studies repeated game problems of this kind.
Quoting Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 780), "If detecting such behavior were costless,
32
neither party would have an incentive to shirk, because neither could impose the cost of his
shirking on the other."
Even though the economic reality apparently nds no place for continuous monitoring,
it is important to stress the importance of the results presented here. Although its focus
was in the limit, this paper connects, monitoring frequency with their associated payo¤s
and decision rules. While the impatience level of the players has typically been presented as
an exogenous element in the repeated games theory, monitoring frequency has an enormous
appeal to be endogenously determined by the problem at hand. This allows repeated games
theory in discrete time to study problems in a richer fashion.
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1.9 Appendix - Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1. After have solved the system composed by (2), (3) and (4), we
obtained v, v and P = p, given respectively by (8), (9) and (7).
We want to show that v increases monotonically with a decrease in b. Di¤erentiate v
with respect b we obtain
@v
@b
=    0    FESFEEb   FEEFESb
(FES   FEE)2 ;
which is always negative, since for the Gaussian distribution, FESFEEb   FEEFESb > 0,
for all b. Where, the partial derivatives of FEE and FES with respect to b are denoted
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respectively as FEEb  @FEE=@b and FESb  @FES=@b. Consequently, we want b smaller as
possible but constrained to satisfy (5) and (7). For that we need to know how b changes with
p, in particular we are interested in nd under which conditions @b=@p  0. By Implicit
di¤erentiating (7), we obtain
@b
@p
=   
0   
FESb    FEEb 0
:
This derivative is negative if
FEEb =F
ES
b = e
4b0 1202
22 < =0: (12)
The RHS is a number between 0 and 1. The LHS is continuous and monotonic in b, when
b = 30, it reaches the value 1, which does not satisfy the inequality. When b !  1, the
LHS goes to 0, which satisfy the inequality. By continuity of the LHS in b, there exist be a
value b  30 below which the inequality holds. This value is given by
bp = 30 + 2 ln
 
=0

=20;
and it is an asymptote line of @b=@p.
The value bp is also the unique value that minimizes the LHS of (7) with respect to b.
To show it, notice that (12) when holding with equality is equivalent to @P=@b = 0. The
second order condition is
@2P
@b2
=  F
ES
bb    FEEbb 0
0    ; (13)
where, the second derivatives of FEE and FES with respect to b are denoted respec-
tively as FEEbb  @2FEE=@b2 and FESbb  @2FES=@b2. This derivative is always strictly
positive. To see it, notice that FEEbb (b;) =   (b  40)FEEb =2 and FESbb (b;) =
  (b  20)FESb =2. Replace these expressions in (13) and use the rst order condition
given by (12) when holding with equality, to obtain
@2P
@b2
=
202FEEb
2 (0   ) > 0;
which is always strictly positive. So, bp is the value that minimizes P , but notice that this
is an unconstrained minimum. For that reason, P might take a negative value at bp, or
36
even be larger than 1. In either case, condition (7) is not satised since p 2 [0; 1]. While in
the latter case we cannot enforce the prole (1; 1), in the former, we can decrease b below
bp until P be at least equal to 0, i.e. feasible, because @b=@p < 0 for b < bp. But in this
direction, the value of b that maximizes v and satisfy (7) can be pushed even lower, increase
P until 1. The value p = 1 is the optimal feasible choice, that keeps (7) holding with
equality. Such value of b  bp is the optimal threshold b and the optimal punishment is
v = 0, i.e. perpetual punishment.
Proof of the Lemma 3. When  2  0; we always have b < bv < bp, with
bp  argminb P , bv  argmaxb v and b  fargmaxb v : v = 0g. Then, at  = ,
P (bp) = 1() v (bp) = 0 and P (bv) = 1() v (bv) = 0, implying that the three optimiza-
tion problems have to satisfy the same constraint. Consequently, bp
 

  argminb P =
bv
 

  argmaxb v.39
Since P is strictly convex, the minb P gives a rst order condition, that can be written
as
FEEb =F
ES
b = =
0;
where bp given in (11) solve the equality. At  = , P has a minimum with respect to b at
some point, then v must have a maximum with respect to b at the same point. It can be
shown that v is strictly concave with a unique maximum, to simplify lets assume it. After
some arrangements the rst order condition of maxb v can be written as


FESFEEb   FEEFESb

= (1  ) FESb   FEEb  ;
where bv solves the equality. Because at , we must have bp = bv the two rst order
conditions must be satised at the same value. Manipulating both equalities we obtain
FES (bp)   FEE (bp)0 = (1  )  0    =;
which is (10), with b replaced by bp, given in (11). The value of  that solves this equality
is .
39Otherwise, for  > , we have b > bv > bp. However, in this region neither of these value is dened in
any feasible sense, since (10) cannot be satised anymore.
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Proof of Lemma 4. We extend the usual local implicit function theorem to hold in
the convex interval
 
0;

. Lemma 3 tell us how to nd the value . Moreover, for bounded
 and r, a value of  > 0 always exist. Rewrite the equality (10) in the following way and
denote it as I (b;), i.e.
I (b;)  FES   FEE0   (1  )  0    =: (14)
Since FEE , FES and  are continuous and di¤erentiable with respect to  2  0; and
b 2 ( 1; bp], so thus the mapping I (b;) is continuous and di¤erentiable.
From, Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, for any 0 2
 
0;

there is exactly one b0 2 ( 1; bp]
such that I (b0;0) = 0. If 0 >  there is no such value of b0, and if b 2 R, b0 is not
unique, because P given by (7), is strictly convex with a minimum at bp. Consequently,
point (i) of Sandbergs (1981, p. 146) global implicit function theorem is satised.
Additionally, we need to verify that I (b;) is locally solvable in the neighborhood of the
point (b0;0) and then by continuity of b (), Sandbergs theorem holds for all  2
 
0;

.
The condition for local solvability is @I (b0;0) =@b 6= 0, implying that I (b0;0) = 0. The
di¤erentiability condition is written as
FESb    FEEb 0 6= 0;
where, the partial derivatives of FEE and FES with respect to b are denoted respectively
as FEEb  @FEE=@b and FESb  @FES=@b. In the proof of Lemma 1 we have seen that
this equation is satised for all b0 6= bp, with bp given by (11). However, to improve on the
value of the best SSE payo¤ we are interested in b0  bp, implying that @I (b0;0) =@b  0.
Notice, that b0 = bp (and consequently @I (b0;0) =@b = 0) only at  = . But for all
0 2
 
0;

, we always have, b < bp (and consequently @I (b0;0) =@b > 0). Then for each
point inside the interval
 
0;

there is a unique continuous di¤erentiable function b () on
an open ball around (b0;0) that locally satises I (b;) = 0.
Now, apply Sandbergs implicit function theorem; by continuity of b (), for each S 2 A
there is a T 2 B, where A and B are families of compact subsets of  0; and ( 1; bp)
respectively, b (S) is compact as well and belongs to T . Then, there is a unique, continuous
and di¤erentiable function b () such that I (b;) = 0 for all  2  0;.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Since @v=@b < 0 is always true, lower the value b, larger the
value v, see the proof of Lemma 1. Moreover, by Proposition 6, v improves monotonically
as  gets small, the largest value v is reached in the limit ! 0. Our problem is then to
nd the lowest feasible value of b that maximizes v, in the limit, and on same time satises
(10) and its derivatives with respect to . We rewrite (10) here
FES   FEE0 = (1  )  0    =:
The RHS goes to 0 with . So in the limit the LHS must also go to 0 with . The
upper bound bp ! 30 when  ! 0, so we dont need to consider values of b > 30. For
b! x 2 (20; 30], we have FES ! 1 and FEE ! 0. Then LHS goes to     N > 0, the
enforceability condition (10) is satised but with slack. So the limit value of b () must
be lower.
For b ! x 2 ( 1; 20), we have FES ! 0 and FEE ! 0, both the LHS and the RHS
goes to 0, but we need to check for indetermination, since the LHS might go faster to 0
than the RHS. Di¤erentiate both sides with respect to  we obtain
  b  2
0
23=2
p
2
e 
(b 20)2
22  +
b  40
23=2
p
2
e 
(b 40)2
22 0 = r
 
0    =: (15)
When b ! x 2 ( 1; 20), the limit on LHS is smaller than the limit on the RHS, i.e.
0 < r (0   ). Meaning that the LHS of (10) is smaller than the RHS, i.e. we lose
enforceability. So, when ! 0 we cannot have b! x 2 ( 1; 20).
Consequently, we must have lim!0 b () = 20. The order at which it converge must
be such that (10) and (15) hold with equality.
Proof of Proposition 6. Start by dening v () = fmaxbbp v (b;) : I (b;) = 0g
and write the Lagrangian L (b;) = v (b;)  I (b;). By Lemma (4) the solution b ()
is a continuous and di¤erentiable function of ; assume the same holds for the Lagrangian
multiplier . Then by the envelope theorem for constrained maximization problems we can
write @v () =@ = @L (b;) =@. Our goal is then to show that
@v ()
@
=
@v (b;)
@
  @I (b
;)
@
< 0 (16)
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where  is obtained from solving @L (b;) =@b = 0. Expression (16) has the following three
components, which we develop to
@v (b;)
@
=  F
ESFEE   FEEFES
(FES   FEE)2
 
0    ;
@I (b;)
@
= FES    FEE 0  
r

 
0    ;
and  =  
 
FESFEEb   FEEFESb

(0   ) =  FES   FEE2
FESb    FEEb 0
:
Where, we have denoted FEE  @FEE=@, FES  @FES=@, Fb  @FEE=@b and FESb 
@FES=@b when evaluated at b = b. Replacing these expressions in (16), and after some
algebra we obtain 
FES   FEE0  FESb FEE   FEEb FES  >  r  0     FESFEEb   FEEFESb  ;
using the expression (10), we can simplify further to get
(1  )  FESb FEE   FEEb FES  >  r  FESFEEb   FEEFESb  :
Notice that FEE =   (b   40)FEEb =2 and FES =   (b   20)FESb =2, then we are left
with
(1  )FEEb FESb 0= >  r
 
FESFEEb   FEEFESb

:
The LHS is always positive. The RHS is always negative, since for the Gaussian distribution
FESFEEb   FEEFESb > 0 for any  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let x : Y ! R2 be the vector of normalized continuations,
with generic element xi (y) dened as
xi (y)  
1   (wi (y)  vi) ; (17)
with y 2 Y and where wi : Y ! R is the usual players i continuation payo¤. With just
two signals Y  y; y	, denote xi  y  xi and xi (y)  xi respectively.
Our goal is to maximize the score k (a; ) = maxx(y) :v by choosing a vector x (y) that
enforces a in the direction   (1; 2), i.e. satisfying
vi = i (a) + E [xi (y) ja] ; 8i (18)
vi  i
 
a0i; a i

+ E

xi (y) j
 
a0i; a i

; 8a0i 2 Ai; 8i (19)
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and
0  :x (y) ; 8y 2 Y: (20)
The transformation (17) allow us to enforce action proles independently of the discount
factor . However, we have no guarantee that the resulting continuation values are either
in the set of PPE Eset (; r), or even feasible (In the limit M set () = limr!0Eset (r;)).
Let H (; k)  v 2 R2 : :v  k (a; )	 be the half-space that decomposes the payo¤ v
in the direction  with the maximum score k (a; ).
Suppose i > 0, for i = 1; 2. We start by enforcing the prole a = (1; 1). By choosing
xi =   (0   ) =
 
FES   FEE and xi = 0, we make (19) hold with equality, but not (20).40
We obtain
:v  k ((1; 1) ; ) = (1 + 2)

   F
EE
FES   FEE
 
0    = (1 + 2) v:
To enforce the prole a = (1; 0), we set x1 = (0   ) =2
 
GSS  GES, x1 =   (0   ) =2  GSS  GES
and x2 (y) =  1x1 (y) =2. Both (19) and (20) hold with equality, and we have
:v = k ((1; 0) ; ) =  1
 
0   + 20:
Now, suppose 2 > 0 > 1. (i) Consider rst 2   1 > 0. The prole a = (1; 0) can be
enforced with both (19) and (20) holding with equality. Setting x1 = GES=
 
GSS  GES,
x1 =  
 
1 GES =  GSS  GES and x2 (y) =  1x1 (y) =2 for y = y; y.
(ii) Consider now the case  1 > 2 > 0. Constraint (19) holds with equality if we
choose x1 = x2 = 0, x1 = (
0   ) =  GSS  GES and x2 = (0   ) =  FES   FEE, then
:v  k ((1; 0) ; ) =  1
 
0   +20+1  1 GES 0   
GSS  GES+2
 
1  FES 0   
FES   FEE :
(21)
Since
 
1 GSS > 0 for large  1 > 0 we obtain k ((1; 0) ; ) < k ((0; 0) ; ) = 0. By
symmetry we can get the other boundaries of the M set set.
The condition that establishes that the best strongly symmetric equilibrium v is larger
than the best symmetric equilibrium is v > =2. Developing further we obtain
FES   FEE0 > 0   : (22)
40 If (20) holds with equality, we say that x (y) for y = y; y, orthogonally enforces a in the direction . In
this case a transfer of value between the players at prices  is possible.
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Otherwise, the symmetric equilibrium obtained by alternating play, between (1; 0) and (0; 1)
would be better.
So far, we have found the maximum score k (a; ), in a direction  that enforces the
prole a. Now, we can write the half-space H (; k)  v 2 R2 : :v  k (a; )	, that
decomposes the payo¤ v in the direction , with associated maximum score k (a; ). Given,
the graph of the set of feasible and individual rational payo¤s and by symmetry, we have
two relevant half-spaces.
Suppose that (22) holds, then the upper left boundary of the set M set (; r) is given by
the line (21) passing through the payo¤ point (0; 0), i.e. v2   1v1=2 satisfying
 1
 
0   + 20 + 1  1 GES 0   
GSS  GES + 2
 
1  FES 0   
FES   FEE = 0:
Which we can solve to obtain the condition on the direction , i.e.
 1
2
=
 
GSS  GES   1  FEE0    1  FES
(0   ) (1 GSS) (FES   FEE) :
The upper left boundary is then given by
v2 
 
GSS  GES   1  FEE0    1  FES
(0   ) (1 GSS) (FES   FEE) v1: (23)
The upper right boundary is given by the line that pass through the points (  (0   ) ; 0)
and (v; v). Consequently, the direction  must satisfy
(1 + 2) v =  1
 
0   + 20;
i.e.
 1
2
=   
0   v
v + 0    :
Then, the upper right boundary on the limit set is written as
v2  2
0   
v + 0   v  
0   v
v + 0   v1: (24)
The interception of the lines (23) and (24) occurs at the point
(vu1 ; v
u
2 ) =
0B@ 20 v+0 v
0 v
v+0  +
(GSS GES)((1 FEE)0 (1 FES))
(0 )(1 GSS)(FES FEE)
;
(GSS GES)((1 FEE)0 (1 FES))
(0 )(1 GSS)(FES FEE)
20 
v+0 v
0 v
v+0  +
(GSS GES)((1 FEE)0 (1 FES))
(0 )(1 GSS)(FES FEE)
1CA :
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By symmetry we obtain the lower right point
 
vl1; v
l
2

= (vu2 ; v
u
1 ). Together with (v; v) and
(0; 0), when (22) holds, these points are enough to characterize the limit set M set (; r).
We want now to take the limit  ! 0 of these points. In the Lemmas 1, 3, 4 and 5,
we developed a great knowledge about the threshold that sustain the best SSE payo¤. In
particular, in the limit it must converge to 20 from below, moreover any threshold in the
region (20; 30) is also feasible, since enforceability condition keeps holding. About the
optimal threshold associated with the an asymmetric path starting with the prole (1; 0),
it must converge to 0 following the discussion after Lemma 5. To simplify and in order to
avoid issues related with the order of convergence, it is enough to chose some b 2 (20; 30)
and some b 2 (0; 0), which are feasible and admissible choices. In the limit, enforceability
conditions holds with slack, but we still obtain perfectly informative signals, i.e. when
 ! 0, we have FEE ! 0, FES ! 1, GES ! 0 and GSS ! 1. Consequently v ! ,
vu1 = v
l
2 ! 0 and vu2 = vl1 ! (20   )=0, which are the critical points of the set of
feasible and individual rational payo¤s. The choices b and b are independent of r, for that
reason we dont need to take r ! 0 to obtain the folk-theorem, because that e¤ect operates
on the discount factor through  ! 0. Moreover, condition (22) holds in the limit, since
by assumption 2 > 0, proving the result.
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CHAPTER II
REPEATED GAMES AT RANDOM MOMENTS IN TIME
2.1 Introduction
Many economic situations where agents repeatedly interact are studied as repeated games.
While the research in repeated games has focused exclusively on the case where the rep-
etition of the stage game is deterministic at equally spaced moments in time, this paper
considers the possibility that the stage game is played at random and not at equally spaced
moments in time. Many economic interactions of interest are in fact similar to repeated
games, but not necessarily repeated with some known frequency. Players do not know and
do not control, ex-ante, the moments in time in which they are going to play again.
For example, during a working day, an agent might not know exactly at which moment
he is going to be monitored by his superior. Even after being monitored, the agent still
holds the same uncertainty, since the superior might visit him again at any instant after
the last monitoring event. Similarly, two colluded rms need not adjust their actions to the
end of a calendar day/month. Exogenous variations, such as the market price, demanded
quantities, variations in input price, entry prospectus of new competitors, or the arrival of
other types of information, might require these rms (through explicit communication or
by common observation of the same events/signals) to adjust their actions more than once
during a given day/month, or even not to do it at all.
Accepting this possibility, from a technical point of view, we ask what changes have to
be introduced in the usual repeated games methodology in order to accommodate such a
possibility? In particular, from the perspective of e¢ ciency, we are concerned with how
the payo¤s change when there is uncertainty about the time repetitions of the stage game.
This paper attempts to answer these questions, not only when the monitoring is perfect,
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but also when it is public and imperfect.12
We show that, under perfect monitoring, uncertainty about the repetitions of the stage
game improves payo¤s in comparison with the usual deterministic case. This is always
true when playersdiscount function is convex in the time domain. Even though their true
discount rate remains unchanged, playersdecisions are based on a smaller discount rate,
which we call the expected discount factor e¤ect.
Surprisingly, when the monitoring is imperfect but public, the result does not generalize
in the same way. The positive e¤ect of the playersdiscounting it is not always su¢ cient to
compensate for the adverse e¤ects on the distribution of the public signals for all frequen-
cies of play. Nonetheless, we establish conditions under which random monitoring allows
e¢ ciency gains on the value of the best Strongly Symmetric Equilibrium (SSE henceforth),
when compared with the deterministic approach.
We end the paper with a set of examples that attempt to illustrate the e¤ects of random
monitoring in terms of e¢ ciency.
It is not the goal of this paper to write a general theory of repeated games played
at random moments in time, rather to present and discuss a set of issues with particular
relevance for applied work.
The study of random monitoring, as done in the present paper, would not be possible
without the recent advances in the theory of frequent monitoring. After the seminal work
of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), renewed interest in frequent monitoring has re-
emerged, in particular due to Sannikov (2007).3 More similar to the former work, Fudenberg
1When monitoring is imperfect but public, player commonly observes noisy public signals about other
playersactions. For example, Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986) consider the case where the output of a
partnership is a noisy signal of playersactions. Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) look at the case
where the market price is an imperfect signal of the quantities supplied by rms. See Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for complete surveys of the problems and methods used to solve
repeated games.
2The case where the stage game is repeated at unknown and not equally spaced moments in time, we call
random/stochastic monitoring. When the stage game is repeated at known and equally spaced moments in
time, we call it deterministic monitoring. These concepts should not be confused with perfect or imperfect
monitoring. Perfect monitoring can be either random or deterministic. The same happens with imperfect
monitoring.
3 In the same spirit, studying games in continuous time see Faingold and Sannikov (2007) and Faingold
(2006).
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and Levine (2007, 2009), Osório-Costa (2008) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2009),
study the limit of a sequence of discrete time games parameterized by  (the time interval
between repetitions of the stage game). These papers were mainly concerned with the limit
case, although they sowed the seeds for studying repeated games with arbitrary monitoring
intensities.
In the present paper we do not focus on a particular monitoring intensity, but look for
the entire spectrum of monitoring frequencies where repeated play can improve over the
stage game static Nash payo¤s.
We can divide the limit results into two types, depending on whether we improve on the
stage game static Nash or not. In the latter case, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) show
that the value of the best strongly symmetric equilibrium degenerates at the limit when the
realizations of the public process represent bad news. The lack of observed public signals
becomes innitely likely at the limit. Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009) and Sannikov and
Skrzypacz (2007) present similar limit results when the public signal is Brownian rather
than Poisson. Their degeneracy e¤ect is due to a degradation of the information content of
the public signals for high monitoring intensities.
Not all results obtained point to a degeneracy. When the realizations of the public
process are interpreted as bad news, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) have shown that
equilibrium payo¤s above the static Nash, but not fully e¢ cient, can be sustained in the
limit. It is, however, at the limit where the best results can be obtained. Under Brownian
signals, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Osório-Costa (2008) show that full e¢ ciency can
emerge at the limit. In the latter paper, players control the drift of the process and di¤erent
action proles have di¤erent initial conditions associated. In the former contribution, a
deviation increases the volatility of the process.4 In either case, in the limit, signals become
perfectly informative about playersactions. Asymptotically, public monitoring converges
to perfect monitoring.5
4Fudenberg and Levine (2007), also show that if a deviation has the inverse e¤ect on the noise parameter
it is possible to obtain payo¤s above the static Nash, but not fully e¢ cient.
5 In Section 2.5, we provide numerical illustrations of these results.
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Fudenberg and Olszewski (2009) present an interesting model that shares some simi-
larities with the present paper. They study a repeated game with stochastic asynchronous
monitoring which leads to a private monitoring problem. However, they focus on the limit
case. They show that at the limit, synchronous and asynchronous monitoring are equivalent
if the signals are Poisson. However, when the signals are Brownian, in some cases, the limit
value of the asynchronous games might be lower.
In the present paper, monitoring is stochastic and synchronous, and we are interested in
more general monitoring intensities as well as in perfect and public monitoring information
structures. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper that studies the implications
of the uncertainty on the repetitions of the stage game in innitely repeated games.
Stochastic repetitions of the stage game (with a Poisson process) are also addressed in
Faingold (2006). Such an assumption is motivated by technical reasons; Faingold is mainly
concerned with limit reputational e¤ects in games with imperfect monitoring.
The dynamic uncertainty aspect of the present model is novel, not only in the repeated
games literature, but also in contract and agency problems. Nonetheless, we can establish
some links with other previous works.
This paper shares similarities with the literature on stochastic monitoring or costly state
verication in static settings. Starting with the seminal work of Townsend (1979), where he
found that random verication can be Pareto superior to deterministic monitoring in most
cases, where the monitoring threat, and not necessarily the monitoring action, are su¢ cient
to provide players with incentives. Border and Sobel (1987) characterize e¢ cient stochastic
and self-enforcing monitoring, assuming commitment.6 A repeated version of Border and
Sobels model is studied by Monnet and Quintin (2005). The di¤erence from the present
paper is that the monitoring uncertainty occurs in the stage game, that is played at equally
spaced moments in time.
6Optimal stochastic monitoring strategies in static environments are also studied by Mookherjee and Png
(1989), who look at the case of risk-aversion, and Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who study an investment
problem where perfect information can be achieved with costly monitoring activity. See also, Khalil (1997),
which shows that the lack of commitment leads to a higher probability of monitoring.
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Because monitoring is in general a costly activity, once we identify when random mon-
itoring is superior to deterministic monitoring, or the other way around, we can select the
monitoring technology that achieves larger payo¤s for the same monitoring frequency (i.e.
the same expected costs), or from another perspective, we can x the payo¤ and search for
the less costly monitoring structure.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the repeated game model and
some general notation. It also extends the notion of equilibrium for random monitoring
settings. Special attention is given to the expected discount factor e¤ect. Section 2.3
focuses on perfect monitoring and the rst results are presented. Section 2.4 studies the
public monitoring case. We look at the distribution of the public signals and we characterize
the value of the best SSE payo¤. Finally we establish the conditions for e¢ ciency gains
under random monitoring. In Section 2.5, we illustrate our ndings for some important
models in frequent monitoring. Section 2.6 concludes. The proofs of the results presented
in the main text can be found in Appendix 2.8.
2.2 The Model and the Expected Discount Factor
In this section, we describe the repeated game model that can harbour both the deterministic
and random monitoring cases.
At moments in time t0; t1; t2; :::, each player i 2 N  f1; 2; :::; ng chooses an action ai
from some nite action space Ai. Where t0 = 0 is the known moment in time when players
play for the rst time, t1 is the moment in time when players play for the second time, and
so on. Denote A = ni=1Ai as the set of action proles endowed with the product topology
of the individual action spaces, with generic element a = (a1; :::; an) denoting a prole of
actions. Actions are taken at the beginning of each period, but payo¤s are collected at the
end. It is also at these moments in time t1; t2; :::, that the resulting prole of actions chosen
7Under random monitoring, the monitoring events are i:i:d: random variables with support in some
interval. When, in expected terms, the time length between observations matches the deterministic and
equally spaced case; we use the terminology "same monitoring frequency (or intensity)". In expected terms,
the monitoring events happens the same number of times. This is important when monitoring is costly,
because the expected costs will be the same.
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at the beginning of each period is observed, perfectly or with noise.8
When monitoring is deterministic, let tk   tk 1  , with k  1. In the case where
monitoring is random, tk  tk 1  x is a random variable following some distribution G (x).
The support of this distribution, is chosen such that EX (tk   tk 1jtk 1) = . In other
words, we choose the value  > 0, so that it solves
EX (x) =
Z 
0
xdG (x) = : (25)
Then, in the stochastic setting,  is the expected monitoring intensity or the expected
time interval between repetitions of the stage game. We do this in order to later perform
meaningful comparisons between the deterministic and the stochastic monitoring cases.
Then, G (x) is a continuous di¤erentiable distribution with support on the interval
 
0;

,
and  > 0 satises (25), i.e. during the time interval
 
0;

, a monitoring event occurs
with probability one; however, it is not known when.
It is usually assumed that the stage game is repeated at predetermined moments in
time and that players discount the future according to a common discount factor, which
is a convex function of time. For that reason, and without loss in generality, we assume
exponential discounting.9 When monitoring is deterministic
  e r:
The value r 2 (0;1) denotes the discount rate. We will not make assumptions about the
value of  and we also consider the possibility of this parameter being a random variable.
Then the discount factor is no longer a deterministic but rather a stochastic function of
time. The expected discount factor is denoted and equal to
EX (
x) 
Z 
0
e rxdG (x) : (26)
8As usual, an appropriate normalization will turn the payo¤s of the innitely repeated game into the
same units as the stage game.
9The qualitative features of the results will not have changed if we have assumed hyperbolic discounting
tk  1= (1 + rtk) or t  1= (1 + r)tk .
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Under the expected utility hypothesis, player is ex-ante expected payo¤, denoted as
i (a), is the relevant element for studying the game. The stage game payo¤s are inde-
pendent of the monitoring intensity, i.e. independent of . The e¤ect of the time interval
between actions operates through the common discount factor and the distribution of the
signals.
Denote the signals space as Y , with generic element y. Depending on the stochastic
process considered, the set Y changes. Typically, optimal behavior requires a partition the
signal space into two types of signals; the set of signals that are interpreted as or suggest
cooperative behavior, denoted as Y +, and signals that suggest deviating behavior, Y  .
When the strategy requires the game to start with the prole a, let p ()  Pr (y 2 Y  j; a)
be the probability with which a bad signal is observed at the end of the period. In the
case of a deviation from the equilibrium path, q ()  Pr (y 2 Y  j; (a0i; a i)) denotes the
analogous probability.
The publicly observed history is htk  yt0 ; yt1 ; :::; ytk 1	, with ht0  ?. Each player i
also has a private history htki 

yt0 ; at0i ; y
t1 ; at1i ; :::; y
tk 1 ; at1i
	
, made up of the collection of
observed public signals and the privately chosen actions. A pure strategy for player i is a
mapping i from the set of all possible histories Hi  [1k=0 (Ai  Y )tk , into the set of pure
actions Ai.
When monitoring is perfect, the signals are perfectly informative about the chosen prole
but they do not provide information about the identity of the deviator.10 In such a setting
we are looking at strategy proles   (1; :::; n) that form a subgame perfect equilibria
(SPE Henceforth). Under imperfect public monitoring, we look at strategy proles that are
perfect public equilibria (PPE Henceforth).11
10This is a more restrictive notion of perfect monitoring, but does not pose restrictions on the existing
folk theorems. In two player games they are equivalent.
11A strategy is public if it depends only on the public histories and not on the private history of player
i. Given a public history, a prole of public strategies that induces a Nash equilibrium on the continuation
game from that time on, is called a perfect public equilibrium (PPE). Moreover, if the other players  i are
playing public strategies, player is best reply can only be a public strategy.
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2.2.1 Deterministic Monitoring
In this case the repetitions of the stage game are deterministic, with known length .
Then a deterministically repeated game can be of perfect monitoring or imperfect public
monitoring. We tailor this Section for the latter setting, since the former can be seen as
just a particular case.
Player is innite sum of ex-ante normalized expected payo¤s from the repeated game,
under the strategy prole , is given by
vi () =
 
1  X1
k=1
(k 1)EY
h
i

a(k 1)j; ; h(k 1)
i
:
Notice that the expectation is taken with respect to the full signal space Y and is conditional
to the observed public history and the strategy prole .
With a partition of the signal space into two sets, of good and bad news signals, we
can write the usual enforceability denition, extended with an equilibrium condition on the
set of continuations W . That is, we restrict the continuations to elements of the set of
equilibrium payo¤s V (; r). Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) we now
dene an equilibrium.
Denition 8 A prole a 2 A is enforceable with respect to r and , on W  V (; r), and
v (a;w;; r) is an equilibrium payo¤ prole, if there exists a mapping w : Y ! W , such
that, for each player i and a0i 2 Ai,
vi (a;w;; r) =
 
1  i (a) + EY [wi (y) ja;] ;
and
ai = arg max
a0i2Ai
 
1  i  a0i; a i+ EY wi (y) j  a0i; a i ; :
In the denition, we bundle together enforceability and self-generation. The main pro-
pose of this denition is to compare it with the analogous denition for the case where
monitoring is random.
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2.2.2 Random Monitoring
As mentioned before, the sequence of times t1; t2; ::: might be unknown with each value tk,
k  1, being repeatedly drawn from some distribution.12
Denition 9 We say that a repeated game is of random monitoring if the time repetitions
tk1 of the stage game are stochastic.
As in the deterministic case, a repeated game of random monitoring can be of perfect or
imperfect monitoring, depending on the informativeness of the observed signals. Random
monitoring refers to the uncertainty of the time repetitions of the stage game. The di¤erence
will be clear from the context.
Since the repetitions of the stage game are not known when the game starts at time
t0  0, from a strategic point of view, we should expect it to discipline the deviator. We
will see that in contexts of imperfect monitoring this might not be true.
Random monitoring brings uncertainty to the time domain of the repeated game. For
that reason we put together uncertainty about the public signals and about the time repe-
titions of the stage game. These two types of uncertainty are not independent. The reason
is that the distribution of the public signals also depends on time. For example, when the
public signals are Brownian the probability of an extreme event increases with the time
interval . For the Poisson process, the larger the time interval, the greater the number of
events that are likely to be observed.13
Notice that the length of each time interval is independent of the length of the previous
or subsequent interval. The i:i:d: assumption allows us to write x = xk  tk   tk 1, for
all k  1. Fix a k, for tk 1   tk 2, tk 2   tk 3, ..., t1   t0 in which we can compute each
12We abstain here to discuss on how players are informed about the time to play the stage game. Rather
we focus on studying the associated expected payo¤s. However, we can think of a public signal or some sort
of communication.
13For the special case of exponential distributed signals, the larger  is, the higher the likelihood that an
event occurs.
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discount factor independently, according to
E
 
tk 1

= EX

(tk 1 tk 2)+(tk 2 tk 3):::+(t2 t1)+(t1 0)

=
Yk 1
j=1
EX (
x) = EX (
x)k 1 :14
Then, when the repetitions of the stage game are random, the normalized expected dis-
counted stream of payo¤s is given by
ev () = (1  EX (x))X1
k=1
EX (
x)k 1EXEY

xi
 
atk 1 jx; ; htk 1 :
Notice that now, the expectation is also taken with respect to the time interval between
repetitions of the stage game, which are stochastic. The idea is that, once at time tk 1,
the observed public signal ytk 1 at tk, depends on the length of the time interval, which is
stochastic. More precisely, the distribution of the public signals has a stochastic parameter
tk   tk 1. For that reason we cannot separate discounting from the observed signal, within
each period.
Consequently, we write an analogous version of Denition 8, to encompass the stochastic
monitoring case.
Denition 10 A prole a 2 A is enforceable with respect to r and  = EX (x), on fW eV (; r), and ev (a;w;; r) is an equilibrium payo¤ prole, if there exists a mapping ew :
Y ! fW , such that, for each player i and a0i 2 Ai,
evi (a;w;; r) = (1  EX (x))i (a) + EXEY [x ( ewi (y) ja; x)] ;
and
ai = arg max
a0i2Ai
(1  EX (x))i
 
a0i; a i

+ EXEY

x
  ewi (y) j  a0i; a i ; x :
Notice now, that the value of the repeated game after the rst play of the game is an ex-
pectation not only over the distribution of the public signals but also over the distribution of
the repetitions of the stage game. We cannot separate the discounting from the continuation
value. This is the main di¤erence with the canonical deterministic representation.
14We can obtained the same result if, instead, we compute the recursive interacted conditional expectation
Et1
 
Et2
 
:::Etk 1
 
Etk
 
tk tk 1 jtk 1
 jtk 2 :::jt1 jt0 = E (x)k, for tk = tk 1 + x, with the expectation
taken w.r.t. the i.i.d. random variables x.
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Denitions 8 and 10, in this Section, are general enough to accommodate both perfect
and imperfect monitoring in deterministic and stochastic environments.
We now raise the following questions about random monitoring in repeated games: Is
it good for the provision of incentives? What are the e¤ects on the distribution of the
public signals? Does the set of continuations and equilibrium payo¤s di¤er, i.e. eV (; r) 6=
V (; r)? Depending on whether we consider perfect or imperfect public monitoring, the
following Sections attempt to provide an answer to these questions.
2.3 Perfect Monitoring
Under perfect monitoring with random repetitions of the stage game, due to the time uncer-
tainty, the crucial aspect is the discount factor. The particular case of perfect monitoring,
is also covered by Denitions 8 and 10. When the stage game is repeated at predetermined
and equally spaced moments in time, players discount the future according to . On the
other hand, when the repetitions are not predetermined, the discount factor to apply is
EX (
x). In the previous section we have seen the di¤erence between these discount factors.
Before going further, we shall add some more notation while we review some important
concepts in repeated games. Denote i (a) as an arbitrary players i stage game payo¤on the
equilibrium path, and i (a0i; a i) as the players i payo¤ of the most protable stage game
deviation from a. Let the pair, i (a) and i (a0i; a i), form the most attractive deviation
along the equilibrium path, for all i 2 N and all a0i 2 Ai.
In line with Denition 8, if for each action prole a there are credible continuation
promises w (a) 2 V (; r) such that for each player i 2 N , and all a0i 2 Ai,
vi =
 
1  i (a) + wi (a)   1  i  a0i; a i+ wi  a0i; a i ; (27)
then the prole a is enforceable on V (; r) and the payo¤ prole v 2 V (; r) can be
sustained as a pure-strategy SPE.15
The same concept can be generalized with random monitoring, by simply substituting
 for EX (x) in (27). With a slight abuse of notation, let eV (; r)  Rn (V (; r)  Rn)
15As in Denition 8, we directly assume that any value v and w (a) belongs to V (; r), for that reason
we do not mention the "largest self-generating property" of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s.
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denote the set of pure-strategy SPE payo¤s under stochastic (deterministic) monitoring,
with the generic element ev (v).
We now present our rst result. Fix a monitoring intensity  = EX (x), in deterministic
or random terms. Suppose we have a particular pure-strategy SPE payo¤ prole v 2 Rn
that can be sustained both by monitoring randomly, i.e. v 2 eV (; r), and by deterministic
monitoring, i.e. v 2 V (; r). Then we ask; to sustain v as an equilibrium payo¤, which
monitoring technology allows a higher discount rate?
Proposition 11 Given a monitoring intensity  = EX (x), to sustain a particular pure-
strategy SPE payo¤ prole v, deterministic monitoring requires a lower discount rate than
random monitoring, if x 2 (0; 1) is strictly convex in x.
The result states that the same payo¤ v can be achieved with higher impatience levels
when the repetitions of the stage game are stochastic. Random monitoring enlarges the
spectrum of impatience where a given equilibrium payo¤ can be sustained. This is a striking
result in the theory of repeated games.
Intuitively, uncertainty in the time domain disciplines potential deviating behavior.
Now, more impatient players prefer to stay on the equilibrium path, rather than deviating
and obtaining an expected gain of uncertain duration.
Moreover, we stress that it is commonly assumed that players discount the future in a
convex way, according to either an exponential or a hyperbolic discount function. For that
reason, it is hard to think of situations where the convex condition of Proposition 11 fails.
Under perfect monitoring, only when x is not strictly convex or when the distribution of
the random time is degenerate, does the result not apply.
While, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on pure strategies, the results of Proposition
11 can be immediately extended for behavioral/mixed or correlated strategies.
Example 12 Suppose that X  U  0; is uniformly distributed with  = 2, implying
that EX (x) =  as required in Proposition 11. In the deterministic monitoring case, a
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folk theorem in pure-strategies for the prisonersdilemma of Table 1 below,16 with 0 = 3,
 = 2 and  = 1, can be obtained providing that playersdiscount rate r  0:4055. For the
same expected monitoring frequency, the same folk theorem can be obtained with random
monitoring, with a higher discount rate er  0:4371. Similarly, if we allow players to use
public correlation, we can obtain a folk theorem for discount rates er  1:4107, rather than
r  1:0986.17
Proposition 11 and the numerical example show that a folk theorem under random
monitoring can be sustained with a higher discount rate.
We can also reinterpret Proposition 11, by saying that there are payo¤s which cannot
be sustained under deterministic monitoring, but which can be sustained as pure-strategy
SPE if the repetitions of the stage game are unknown to the players. The following result
formalizes this intuition.
Corollary 13 When the convex condition of Proposition 11 holds, given a discount rate
r and an expected monitoring intensity , there are pure-strategy SPE payo¤s that can be
sustained only under random monitoring, while the converse is not true.
The result tells us that, depending on r and , the set of SPE obtained with determin-
istic monitoring is a subset of the set of SPE obtained with stochastic monitoring, that is
V (; r)  eV (; r). To see this more clearly, consider the following example, which is a
continuation of Example 12 presented above.
Example 14 Using Corollary 13, we can reinterpret the above numerical example. Suppose
r = 0:42 > 0:4055, with deterministic monitoring we are able to sustain a great number
of equilibria but not a folk theorem. However, with stochastic monitoring, since 0:42 2
(0; 0:4371], we can sustain any feasible and weakly individual rational payo¤ prole. With
16We say that a folk theorem exists if any feasible and strictly individual rational payo¤ can be supported
by a strategy that forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the innitely repeated game. For folk theorems
with discounting in innitely repeated games, see the classical papers of Friedman (1971) and Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986).
17This example is adapted from Mailath and Samuelson (2006, sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.6).
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public correlation, if r = 1:3 > 1:0986, we simply sustain the innite repetition of the
stage game Nash equilibrium.18 However, when monitoring is random, we obtain a full folk
theorem since 1:3 2 (0; 1:4107].
It is worth noticing that, when the monitoring is random, the players true discount
factor does not change. However, under the expected utility hypothesis, their decisions are
based on a larger discount factor (the expected discount factor). This reects the intuition
behind these results. The uncertainty about the moment when the stage game is repeated
brings uncertainty about the value of gains that a potential deviator may contemplate;
in expected terms they get smaller. The continuation value of the game becomes more
important. In some sense, the e¤ect is similar, as if the players had become "more patient".
We call this e¤ect, the expected discount factor e¤ect.
Denition 15 For xed r and  = EX (x), we say that there is an expected discount factor
e¤ect when EX (x) > .
One aspect of the expected discount factor e¤ect, that we did not explore in great detail
in this section, is that it tends to be stronger for lower frequencies of monitoring, i.e. larger
values of . This fact will be useful to interpret some of the results in the following Sections.
In short, random monitoring strictly improves on deterministic monitoring in contexts
where signals are perfectly informative; this is the conclusion of the present Section.
2.4 Imperfect Public Monitoring
In the previous Section, we have seen that stochastic monitoring favors the provision of
incentives in contexts of perfect monitoring. This was due to the expected discount factor
e¤ect, and holds for any feasible expected monitoring intensity . However, the result
does not generalize in the same straightforward sense when monitoring is imperfect. The
di¤erence is that the informativeness of the public signals might be adversely a¤ected by
the uncertainty on the repetitions of the stage game for some monitoring intensities.
18Stahl (1991) discusses the discontinuity on the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤s with public
correlation in detail.
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C D
C ;    (0   ) ; 0
D 0;  (0   ) 0; 0
Table 1: The PrisonersDilemma Stage Game Payo¤s.
In order to study the e¤ects of random monitoring in repeated games with public signals,
for simplicity, we present our results for a classical prisonersdilemma, whose payo¤s are
shown in Table 1.19
We assume 0 >  > 0 and 2 > 0, so that defection is a dominat strategy for both
players. The minimax value of the game coincides with the stage game Nash payo¤s and
equals 0 for both players.
Our focus is on the strongly symmetric equilibrium (SSE henceforth); where the same
action is chosen by both players after every public history. That is, we want to sustain the
innite repetition of the prole (C;C).
The di¤erence between perfect monitoring (studied in the previous section) and an
imperfect public monitoring is that, at each moment in time t1; t2; :::, players simultaneously
adjust their actions, but also observe a public signal which provides noisy information about
the action prole resulting from each players private choices.
2.4.1 The Best Strongly Symmetric equilibrium
The expression that gives the value of best SSE of the prisonersdilemma of Table 1 is
well known. However, in order to accommodate the random monitoring case, we need to
consider some specicities. This is the goal of this section.
In the canonical deterministic monitoring setup, of length, the probability of observing
a bad signal when the prole (C;C) has been chosen, is given by
p () 
Z
Y  
f (y; a) dy; (28)
19We restrict our analysis to a simple setting. We do this in order to concentrate on random monitoring
and associated informational e¤ects, without extra complexities. Such a restriction does not diminish in any
way the point this paper wants to address. The analysis extends to other games.
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and in the case of a deviation, i.e. the proles (C;D) or (D;C),
q () 
Z
Y  
f
 
y;
 
a0i; a i

dy: (29)
Where, f (y; a) and f (y; (a0i; a i)) are the densities of the distribution of public signals in
the cases of mutual cooperation and unilateral defection, respectively.
An observation of a realized signal, inside the support Y  , is interpreted as a bad signal.
For example, when signals are Brownian; with one threshold Y    ( 1; b], and with two
symmetric thresholds: Y    ( 1; b][ [b;1) when the extreme realizations are bad news,
and Y    [ b; b] when small magnitude observations are bad news.20 When the signals
follow a Poisson process; Y    [0; x] in the bad news case, and Y    [x;1] in the good
news case (with x =  if monitoring is deterministic).
Clearly, we should expect q () > p (), meaning that a deviation has an higher prob-
ability of generating a "bad signal".21
When monitoring is stochastic, the realizations of the public signal are not independent
of the random time at which they are observed. Only when a random monitoring event
occurs, do players observe the realized signals and collect their payo¤s, which are discounted
to the present from that moment in time. For that reason, we cannot separate discounting
from the distribution of the public signals. Then, the punishment "probabilities" have to
be adapted, where
ep ()  Z 
0
Z
Y  
e rxg (x) f (y; a) dydx; (30)
and
eq ()  Z 
0
Z
Y  
e rxg (x) f
 
y;
 
a0i; a i

dydx; (31)
denote "expected discounted punishment probabilities". Here g (x) is the density function
of the random repetitions of the stage game, and e rx  x is the discount factor that
20Fudenberg and Levine (2007) show that when defective behavior impacts on the volatility of the process,
the optimal monitoring technology uses two thresholds. With no impact on the drift, these thresholds are
symmetric.
21For more demanding informational conditions on the public signals, see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994), and Fudenberg and Levine (1994).
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follows the same probability law. The equal  in (28), (29), (30) and (31) emphasizes the
fact that the monitoring intensities are the same in expected terms.
Even though discounting and signals are convolved, as in (30) and (31), to nd the
expression of the value of the best SSE, we are still able to apply the recursive dynamic
programming methods developed by Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti (1986, 1990).
In the deterministic case, the expected continuation value of the game is some convex
combination between the expected normalized payo¤ when play starts with the observation
of a good signal, and the expected normalized payo¤ when play starts with an observation
of a bad signal, i.e. (1  p ()) v + p () v. However, when monitoring is stochastic, the
"expected continuation value" cannot be separated from discounting, i.e. (1  ep ()) ev +
ep ()ev. Then it makes more sense to speak about an "expected discounted continuation
value", as in Denition 10 of Section 2.2.
Lemma 16 (i) Under deterministic monitoring of frequency , the value of the best SSE
is given by
v () =    p ()
q ()  p ()
 
0    ; (32)
with
1

  q ()   p ()
0
0    =  () ; (33)
and while  ()  1.
(ii) Under random monitoring of expected frequency , the value of the best SSE is given
by
ev () =    ep ()eq ()  ep ()  0    ; (34)
with
1
EX (
x)
  eq ()   ep ()0
EX (
x) (0   ) = e () ; (35)
and while e ()  1.
Expressions (32) and (34) characterize the value of the best SSE payo¤s, under deter-
ministic and random monitoring, respectively. Notice that, when monitoring is stochastic,
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the expression for the value of the best SSE payo¤ in (34) depends directly on the dis-
count rate r. This is a consequence of the fact that discounting and realized signals are not
independent.
We should note that it is natural to interpret  () and e () as probabilities, taking
values on the interval [0; 1]. Such is the case when y takes a continuum of values, as in
the case of Brownian signals, where optimality requires  () = e () = 1. However, the
Poisson signals are discrete, in particular when signals follow an exponential distribution,
so at any given moment in time players only see if an "event" has occurred or not. For
this reason, the left-hand side of (33) and (35) may take negative values when we force
optimality. Nonetheless, with  () or e () taking negative values, we always have ev () 2
[0; EX (
x) ev ()]  [0; ev ()) and v () 2 0; v ()  [0; v ()), as it should. For this
reason, and without loss in generality, we ignore this technical issue in order for Lemma
16 to be general enough to harbour the Brownian and the Poisson cases.22 In fact, when
 () or e () go below zero, this means that one punishment period is too severe. An
intertemporal transfer of value is needed to compensate for this fact.
2.4.2 E¢ ciency Gains with Random Monitoring
In Section 2.3, we have seen that for any feasible monitoring intensity, perfect random
monitoring always allows e¢ ciency gains with respect to perfect deterministic monitoring.
Even when playerstrue discount rate remain unchanged, their decisions were based on a
small discount rate. We call this the expected discount factor e¤ect, which was the key for
the obtained results.
Under random public monitoring, the expected discount factor e¤ect is still present and
with the same intensity. The di¤erence is that, now, the uncertainty of the repetitions of
the stage game may also adversely a¤ect the distribution of the public signals. For this
reason, it is not clear if public random monitoring is better than the canonical deterministic
case.
22We can go around this issue by correlating the punishment decision. However, this case is not free of
technical issues either. In particular, optimality requires players to ignore a bad signal with a probability
that converges to 1 as ! 0.
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The following result establishes conditions under which public random monitoring allows
e¢ ciency gains on the value of the best SSE. The superscript "" denotes optimal behavior.
Proposition 17 Given a monitoring intensity  = EX (x) and a common discount rate
r, in the innitely repeated prisoners dilemma described above, the value of the best SSE
ev (), is larger than the value of the best SSE v (), in either of the following cases;
(i) When e ()  1,  ()  1, and
eq () =ep ()  q () =p () : (36)
(ii) When e ()  1 and  ()  1.
In part (i), random monitoring leads to an e¢ ciency gain equal to ev () v (), while
in scenario (ii), the e¢ cient gain is equal to ev (). In the former, the prole (C;C) can be
enforced with both random and deterministic monitoring. Then, it is condition (36) that
determines when random monitoring is superior in payo¤ terms. In the latter scenario, the
prole (C;C) can only be enforced with random monitoring.
Outside the cases stated in Proposition 17, either deterministic monitoring is more
e¢ cient or no monitoring technology can improve over the static Nash.
Notice that ev () and v () are also upper bounds on the set of SSE payo¤s. When
ev ()  v (), we can also say that the set of SSE payo¤s of an innitely repeated game
played at random moments in time is larger.
The consistent improvement of stochastic monitoring over deterministic monitoring
shown in Section 2.3, cannot be generalized in the same way under public monitoring.
Proposition 17, establishes conditions where e¢ ciency gains are possible, for xed  and r.
It does not say that random monitoring is better for all feasible .
The expected discount factor e¤ect was the key factor for the strong results of Section
2.3. Condition (36) is also positively a¤ected by the expected discount factor e¤ect. How-
ever, there is another e¤ect associated with random monitoring which might be positive or
negative, i.e. the informational e¤ect on the distribution of the public signals.
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In order to separate the expected discount factor e¤ect from the informational e¤ect
in condition (36), we need to compute the undiscounted punishment probabilities under
random monitoring, i.e.
ep ()  Z 
0
Z
Y  
g (x) f (y; a) dydx;
and
eq ()  Z 
0
Z
Y  
g (x) f
 
y;
 
a0i; a i

dydx;
respectively, in the cooperative and unilateral defection cases. These probabilities take into
account the amount of uncertainty about the repetitions of the stage game, but do not
incorporate discounting. So we have the pure informational e¤ect.23
Denition 18 We say that random monitoring has a positive informational e¤ect when
eq () =ep () > q () =p () : (37)
Otherwise, the informational e¤ect is negative or adverse.
We know that q () > p () and eq () > ep () for all . The denition says,
that if, by randomly repeating the stage game, the di¤erence between eq () and ep (),
decreases with respect to the di¤erence between q () and p (), then signals become less
informative for a given monitoring intensity .
It is worth noticing that random monitoring tends to move eq () and ep () in the
same direction when signals are Poisson; in the bad news case eq () < q () and ep () <
p (), because the punishment probabilities are concave in the  domain; while in the
good news case, we observe eq () > q () and ep () > p (), due to the convexity in
. However, this fact is not crucial for the relation between the values of the SSE in part
(i). Moreover, under Brownian signals this might not always be the case.24
Corollary 19 When the ratio (37) is satised, then (36) holds.
23The product of the disaggregated expected discount factor and informational e¤ect is not equal to the
total e¤ects, because the convolution with discounting generates cross e¤ects. However, the approximation
is su¢ ciently close, since cross e¤ect are typically of innitesimal magnitude.
24When signals are Brownian, typically eq () > q () and ep () > p (), but for some monitoring
intensities these relations might not be satised.
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Providing that e ()  1 and  ()  1 are satised, when both the expected discount
factor e¤ect and the informational e¤ect play in the same direction, we must have a payo¤
improvement.
However, condition (37) might fail, but we are still able to improve with random mon-
itoring. It all depends on the strength of both e¤ects, which in this case, play in opposite
directions. For this reason, the statement of Corollary 19 is a su¢ cient condition for random
monitoring to improve on deterministic monitoring.
For example, in the Poisson good news case of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), in
the Osório-Costa (2008) model and in the Fudenberg and Levine (2007) volatility sensitive
model, the inequality (37) is never satised, because the punishment probabilities are convex
in . If payo¤ improvements are possible, either in the sense of Part (i) or Part (ii) of
Proposition 17, this is due exclusively to the expected discount factor e¤ect, which becomes
stronger as  increases.25
With respect to the convexity of punishment probabilities, we typically have p () <
ep () and q () < eq (). The expectation causes an adverse e¤ect since, under optimal
behavior, p () is relatively more convex than q (). For this reason eq () =ep () de-
creases with respect to q () =p (), because ep () increases relatively more than eq ().
However, when the events represent bad news, for su¢ ciently large = and, condition
(37) can be satised and we observe a positive informational e¤ect. This is due to the
decreasing concavity of the punishment probabilities with . In this case ep () < p ()
and eq () < q (). While for small , ep () decreases relatively less than eq (), when
 is large, we might observe that ep () decreases relatively more than eq (), causing the
positive informational e¤ect.
The preceding discussion provides the intuition for the informational e¤ect under random
public monitoring, which is crucial to understand when improvements in the sense of Part
(i) of Proposition 17 are possible. However, there is another important way in which random
25An increase in r or  increases the relative convexity between EX
 
e rx

and e r, enhancing the
expected discount factor e¤ect.
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monitoring improves on deterministic monitoring, i.e. in the sense of Part (ii) of Proposition
17. This case occurs for monitoring intensities where ev ()  0  v (), i.e.
eq ()   ep ()0
1  EX (x)  
0      q
 ()   p ()0
1   : (38)
This condition tends to hold in some cases, typically for large , i.e. when the expected
discount e¤ect is stronger. However, such a conclusion needs more careful consideration.
We can approximate the inequality (38) in a similar way to that done with the ratio
(37). The goal is to separate the discount factor e¤ect from the informational e¤ect, in
order to get a more intuitive condition. After some algebra, the chain of inequalities (38)
is approximately,
EX (
x)
1  EX (x)
 eq ()   ep ()0 & 0     
1  
 
q ()   p ()0 ; (39)
since EX (x) eq ()  eq () and EX (x) ep ()  ep ().26
There are two relevant factors that play a role when we consider random monitoring
improvements in the sense of Part (ii) of Proposition 17. First, the expected discount factor
e¤ect, always improves the LHS of the inequality (39), with respect to the RHS. Second, the
relative magnitude of the di¤erence between eq ()   ep ()0 and q ()   p ()0,
which has implicit a relative informational e¤ect. Independently of how the punishment
probabilities change with , we must have eq ()   ep ()0 > 0. This is a necessary
but not a su¢ cient condition, for random monitoring to improve in the sense of Part (ii)
of Proposition 17. Otherwise, the LHS of (39) would never be above 0    > 0. However,
such might not be su¢ cient, because the relative increasing e¤ect of EX (x) = (1  EX (x))
with  might not be strong enough to compensate for the decrease in eq ()   ep ()0
when  gets large.
Since the expected discount factor e¤ect always improves in absolute and relative terms,
for Part (ii) of Proposition 17 to hold for small , it is because eq ()  ep ()0 is larger
than q () p ()0 or they do not di¤er substantially, in order for the expected discount
factor e¤ect to operate. For large  the expected discount factor e¤ect is the main driving
force.
26The cross e¤ects are typically of innitesimal magnitude.
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In short, improvements of the kind of Part (ii) of Proposition 17, require some degree of
informativeness of the random monitoring signals with respect to deterministic monitoring
signals. A loss of informativeness might occur with random monitor, but it should not be
too large. We conclude that improvements in the sense of Part (ii) are not so informationally
demanding as improvements in the sense of Part (i) of Proposition 17.
Although we have tried to provide a general treatment, each process and each model
has its own specicities, a specialized treatment might be required for a more detailed
understanding.
While the Poisson model is still tractable, the Brownian case is not. For this reason, in
the next Section, through a series of examples, we will illustrate some of the issues discussed
in the present section.
2.5 Numerical Examples - The PrisonersDilemma
In this section we illustrate, using numerical examples, potential e¢ ciency gains due to
random monitoring. For the case when monitoring is imperfect but public, we study when
e¢ ciency gains in the models of frequent monitoring, where payo¤s above the static Nash are
possible in the limit; the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) bad news case, the Fudenberg
and Levine (2007) model, where deviations change the volatility of the process, and the
Osório-Costa (2008) model, where di¤erent payo¤proles lead to di¤erent initial conditions.
The main concern of these papers is on the limit case, i.e.  ! 0. Here, we look at how
these models behave for more general monitoring frequencies.
To illustrate this;
(i) We consider that at each moment in time t0; t1; t2; :::, players repeatedly play the
prisonersdilemma stage game of Table 1, with 0 = 3 and  = 2.
(ii )The minimax value of the game coincides with the stage game Nash payo¤s and
equals 0 for both players. The full e¢ cient SSE payo¤ equals 2 for each player.
(iii) We assume that x  U  0; with  = 2, implying that EX (x) = . The
uniform distribution is interesting, not only for its simplicity, but also because it maximizes
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the entropy of random monitoring for distribution with bounded support.
(iv) We set the discount rate, r = 0:1.
2.5.1 Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) - Bad News Case
In this section we replicate the work of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) for monitoring
intensities other than the limit case. For simplicity, we consider that at the end of the time
interval of length , players can only observe one of two possible signals; either an event
has occurred, or it has not. Consequently, signals are exponentially distributed.27
If an event is publicly observed, the relation enters the punishment stage, returning from
it after having observed some public signal.28
In the bad news model, when both players cooperate, events arrive at rate , while if
there is a unilateral deviation "bad news" arrives with a higher intensity  >  > 0.
In this case, the value of the best SSE payo¤ improves monotonically with the monitoring
intensity, converging to some value above the static Nash as reported by Abreu, Milgrom
and Pearce.29 This fact is illustrated in Figure 6.
Independently of the monitoring frequency, the smaller the ratio = is, the larger the
payo¤s that can the achieved. Figure 6 shows that when = is small, we observe that
random monitoring is superior to deterministic monitoring, in some interval of monitoring
frequencies, in the sense of Part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 17. While, when = takes larger
values, deterministic monitoring is superior for all .
Notice that random monitoring can achieve larger payo¤s for all feasible monitoring
intensities if we let =! 0.
When monitoring is random, the value of the best SSE varies with the discount rate
r.30 However, the discount rate has a more important e¤ect on the measure of the set
of monitoring frequencies that sustain payo¤s above the static Nash. A larger value of r,
27This allows us to avoid the integer problem of a Poisson process, associated with the number of events
that have occurred in the time interval .
28The resource to public correlated signal, that recommends players to stay in the punishment stage with
some probability, instead of ignoring a bad signal with some probability, is chosen to make the enforceability
condition binding. To be general enough, we decided to correlate on the punishment stage, allowing for
intertemporal transfers within that stage.
29Osório-Costa (2008) reports a similar monotonic result when the public signals are Brownian.
30Recall that r directly enters in (34) through the stochastic discount factor.
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Figure 6: Random monitoring e¤ect on the SSE payo¤ in the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce
(1991) bad news model.
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reduces this set. This is true for random and deterministic monitoring.
Due to space constraints, we do not go through the "good news" model of Abreu,
Milgrom and Pearce in detail. In this case, it is the lack of observed movements in the
public process that are interpreted as "bad signals".31 This is a degenerating type model,
in the sense that at the limit, no equilibrium, other than the innite repetition of the static
Nash, can be sustained. However, away from the limit, it is possible to obtain improvement
in the sense of Part (ii) of Proposition 17, for = su¢ ciently large, enlarging the spectrum
of monitoring intensities with payo¤s above the static Nash.
2.5.2 Fudenberg and Levine (2007) - Volatility Sensitive Model
When a defection changes the volatility parameter of the di¤usion process, it is possible
to obtain non-trivial payo¤s at the limit. Fudenberg and Levine (2007) show that when a
deviation causes a signicant increment on , full e¢ cient results can be obtained at the
limit. In this case, extreme values of the process suggest defective behavior. However, when
a deviation decreases the uncertainty parameter, limit payo¤s above the static Nash, but
not fully e¢ cient, are possible. Small realizations of the process are bad news. Figure 7
illustrates these two cases.
Even though random and deterministic monitoring converge to the same limit, for any
parameterization of the model, random monitoring cannot improve in any sense of Propo-
sition 17. The expected discount factor e¤ect cannot compensate the informational loss of
the public signals when monitoring is random.
The asymptotic e¢ cient result obtained by Fudenberg and Levine is similar in shape to
the one presented in Osório-Costa (2008). However, their intuition is di¤erent, as we shall
see.
Fudenberg and Levine (2007), and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), also explore frequent
monitoring when playersactions exclusively change the drift of the process. Since di¤erent
proles of actions have the same associated initial condition, the set of SSE degenerates,
31Where  and  >  > 0 denote the intensity of good news arrival, when there is a unilateral deviation
and when both players cooperate, respectively.
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Figure 7: Random monitoring e¤ect on the SSE payo¤ of the Fudenberg and Levine (2007)
model. Defection increases the volatility (upper pair of curves). Defection decreases the
volatility (lower pair of curves).
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Figure 8: Random monitoring e¤ect in the Osório-Costa (2008) model.
for high monitoring intensities.
Away from the limit, random monitoring cannot improve in any sense of Proposition
17.
2.5.3 Osório-Costa (2008) - Distinct Initial Conditions Model
In this setting, low observations of the public signal are interpreted as a "bad signals".
There is a cut-o¤ point that separates "good" from "bad" signals. Osório-Costa (2008)
provides a detailed characterization of such a decision rule. In this model, di¤erent unknown
proles of actions, chosen at the beginning of each period, give rise to di¤erent initial
conditions. E¢ cient results are obtained at the limit and payo¤s improve monotonically
with the monitoring intensity. The monotonicity is similar in shape to the one described
above for the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) bad news model. (See Figures 6 and 8)
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Independently of the monitoring frequency, the smaller the uncertainty parameter  is,
the larger the payo¤s that can the achieved. Random monitoring is superior according to
Proposition 17 Part (i), in a given interval, that enlarges as  increases and vanishes for a
su¢ ciently large . Figure 8 shows improvements of this type when  = 6 but not when
 = 12. Improvements in the sense of Part (ii) of Proposition 17 are also possible, as we can
see in Figure 8, both for  = 6 and 12, enlarging the spectrum of monitoring intensities that
can sustain non trivial equilibria.32 However, when  gets larger, deterministic monitoring
becomes the most e¢ cient monitoring technology for all feasible .
When there is an interval of monitoring intensities for which random monitoring is
superior in any sense, that interval does not vanish for varying r. However, its measure and
location does. Clearly, low values of r have positive e¤ects on the payo¤s.
2.6 Final Comments
In this paper we study a dynamic version of stochastic monitoring in repeated games with
moral hazard. Players are uncertain about the moment in time when they will be the
object of monitoring or, in other words, they are uncertain about when the next stage of
the repeated game is going to be played.
We found that perfect random monitoring is always better than the classical determin-
istic repetition approach. On the other hand, under public random monitoring the results
are not so strong. However, in some circumstances, it is possible to enlarge the spectrum
of monitoring intensities where payo¤s above the static Nash can be sustained. Proposition
17 identies the conditions for random monitoring e¢ ciency improvements.
In the imperfect monitoring case, the analysis is restricted to SSE. It would be interesting
to study the e¤ects of random monitoring in asymmetric equilibria.
Finally, we stress the potential of applications that random monitoring presents in the
context of dynamic incentives, mechanism design, or even new developments in dynamic
game theory.
32The optimal decision rule in the deterministic and the random monitoring case cross twice or once,
respectively, for improvements of the type of Part (i) or (ii) of Proposition 17.
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2.8 Appendix - Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions.
Proof of Proposition 11. Assuming all the conditions for pure-strategy SPE are sat-
ised; in the deterministic monitoring case, enforceability of the prole a, with respect to
continuations in V (; r), requires that
  sup
i2N and a0i2Ai
i (a
0
i; a i)  i (a)
i (a0i; a i)  i (a) + wi (a)  wi (a0i; a i)
 ;
which is obtained from solving (27). Where a0i 2 Ai is the most protable deviation for player
i 2 N , along the equilibrium path. With i (a0i; a i)  i (a) and wi (a)  wi (a0i; a i)  vpi
where vpi  min
a i2A i
max
ai2Ai
i (ai; a i) is is minmax payo¤. Fix the continuation values w (a)
and w (a0i; a i) and assume that they are also in eV (; r). Similarly, when monitoring is
random, we solve (27) with  substituted by EX (x), to obtain that EX (x)  . Set
 = , then for the same equilibrium payo¤ v in V (; r) and in eV (; r), the expected
discount factor under random monitoring is higher than the deterministic discount factor if
EX (e
 rx)  e rEX(x) = , which is always true by Jensens inequality when x is convex
in x, since  = EX (x) > 0. Then, we can increase r in EX (e rx) to er > r, such that
EX
 
e erx = e rEX(x) = . Consequently, V (; r)  eV (; r) and w (:) 2 eV (; r).
Proof of Corollary 13. When x 2 (0; 1) is strictly convex in x and EX (x) = ,
by Jensens inequality we have EX (x) > . Then there might exist equilibria where
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EX (
x) >  > , for some common combination of r and . The converse requires
 > EX (
x), which cannot be true if the convex requirement of Proposition 11 holds.
Then V (; r)  eV (; r) for a same r and .
Proof of Lemma 16. We will show the result for part (ii), part (i) follows the same
lines. To nd the expression that characterizes the best SSE payo¤, we need to solve the
following dynamic programing problem, which by symmetry is the same for both players:
ev = (1  EX (x)) + (1  ep ()) ev + ep ()ev; (40)
ev  (1  EX (x))0 + (1  eq ()) ev + eq ()ev; (41)
ev = (1  EX (x)) 0 + EX (x) [eev + (1  e) ev] ; (42)
e  1: (43)
With ep () and eq () dened respectively in (30) and (31). An observation of a realized
signal, inside the support Y  , is interpreted as a signal of defective behavior. See the
examples in the main text.
Expression (40) is the value of the relation when both players cooperate. Each player
receives the expected normalized payo¤ associated with mutual cooperation, plus a dis-
counted expectation over the expected values ev and ev, associated with the two types of
signals that might be observed. The constraint (41) is an enforceability condition. The
expected value of the game associated with mutual e¤ort has to be at least as good as the
expected value of the game associated with a potential unilateral deviation. By Denition
10, when satised, (40) and (41) enforce the prole (C;C).
Expression (42) is the value of the punishment phase, where e is a number smaller than
or equal to 1. See the technical discussion in the main text. We can look at e as the
probability of a correlated public signal which recommends that the relation remain in the
punishment stage, but not exclusively. A value e = 1 means perpetual punishment, while
e = 0 implies a single punishment period. When e < 0, a future compensation is required
because of the excessive past punishment period. Providing condition (43) holds, we have
ev 2 [0; EX (x) ev]  [0; ev). Since (D;D) is a Nash equilibrium, punishment is trivially
enforced.
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Expression (42) is solved for ev to obtain
ev () = EX (x) (1  e) ev
1  EX (x) e : (44)
Plug ev () into (40) and (41), with the latter holding with equality. We obtain (35), i.e.
1
EX (
x)
  eq ()   ep ()0
EX (
x) (0   ) = e () :
By (43) we must have e ()  1 satisfying (35). Otherwise, no equilibria, other than the
innite repetition of the static Nash, can be sustained, i.e. ev () = 0.
Replacing (44) and (35) into (40), we can solve for ev to obtain the expression of the best
SSE
ev () =    ep ()eq ()  ep ()  0    :
Finally and for completeness, replacing ev () into (44), we obtain
ev () = EX (x) eq ()   ep ()0eq ()  ep () 1  e ()1  EX (x) e () ;
which cannot be lower than 0, while e ()  1 exists.
Part (i) is essentially the same with EX (x), ep () and eq () replaced by , p ()
and q (), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 17. (i) When, for a given monitoring intensity  = EX (x)
and a common discount rate r, we have e ()  1 and  ()  1, then both ev ()  0
and v ()  0, i.e. both SSE payo¤s attain values at least weakly above the static Nash.
Then the prole (C;C) is enforceable with random and deterministic monitoring, and we
need to compare the value of the best SSE payo¤, i.e. ev ()  v (). The comparison
between expressions (32) and (34), after some arrangements, gives condition (36).
(ii) When, for a given monitoring intensity , and discount rate r, under optimal behav-
ior, we have e ()  1 and  () > 1, then ev () > ev ()  0 and v () = v () = 0.
That is, with deterministic monitoring in pure strategies, only the innite repetition of the
static Nash is enforceable. While random monitoring, allows for payo¤s at least above the
static Nash. Then ev ()  0 = v (), i.e. random monitoring improves over deterministic
monitoring.
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Proof of Corollary 19. The expected discount factor e¤ect always favors random
monitoring, if, in addition, the informativeness of the public signals increases, then condition
(36) necessarily holds. However, condition (36) might be satised even when (37) is not. The
reason is that the expected discount factor e¤ect might be stronger than the informational
adverse e¤ect in the public signals.
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CHAPTER III
REPEATED INTERACTION AND THE REVELATION
OF PLAYERS TYPE: A PRINCIPAL-MONITOR-AGENT
PROBLEM
3.1 Introduction
Inside rms, delegation is a common and natural practice as the organizational structure
grows large. Delegation is the assignment of authority from one organizational level to a
lower one. In the manufacturing industry, it is common to employ a monitor to supervise
the activity of a set of blue collar workers. Still, the high rank manager remains accountable
for the outcome of the monitors and the agent actions which a¤ect the rms performance.
A distinct structure of delegation occurs in the auditing industry and banking/nance
supervision, typically an auditor/supervisor is sent to the client o¢ ce to look at his accounts
and other documents that might provide useful evidence about the clients behavior. The
payo¤ of the auditing company or the supervising authority can be measured in monetary
or in reputational terms. In either case, the auditor/supervisor actions a¤ect the value of
these variables.
A monitor is an individual with personal characteristics which interfere with his pro-
fessional performance. Returning to the manufacturing industry example, when a worker
e¤ort is observed with noise, two di¤erent monitors may disagree on whether a given output
realization is a signal of high or low e¤ort.1
The table below shows the actual e¤ort choices made by a worker and the possible
interpretations that a particular monitor can make when these choices are not perfectly
1There are some connections to subjective performance evaluations. See for example Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (1994), Bull (1987), MacLeod (2003) or MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). The main issue here is
how a low signal of the agent e¤ort is interpreted in terms of actual e¤ort choice.
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observable.
Monitor Perception
Worker
Choice
High E¤ort Low E¤ort
High E¤ort Correct Type I Error
Low E¤ort Type II Error Correct
For example, some monitors might be more permissive or tolerant with respect to their
subordinates than others. Such is not necessarily a bad character trait. However, they are
more likely to be the object of strategic behavior from the workers, because they tend to
incur more often in type II errors. Strict or demanding individuals are also not necessarily
better or worse in professional terms. They tend to incur more often in wrong type I
judgements, but at the same time, they bring more discipline to the relation.
Typically, after a sequence of low performance observations, the monitor might decide
to punish the particular worker in question. These punishments can take several forms; one
is the possibility of ring the individual. In spite of this, to satisfy their natural tendency
for low e¤ort, workers may explore the monitors personal characteristics and limitations,
patterns of behavior and working methods. This information might be of strategic relevance,
allowing them to revise their initial prior beliefs and readjust their behavior accordingly.
Repeated interaction facilitates this potential corrosive learning, with negative impact on
the rms performance.
In the auditing/supervision industry there are monitoring standards that have to be
followed. However, di¤erent supervisors may di¤er with respect to specic aspects and
working methods. Bernard Mado¤, known to have run the largest Ponzi scheme in world
history, describes in the following way his experience with two di¤erent supervisors from
the SEC at di¤erent moments in time in the following way:2
Mado¤ stated that Mr. X was "doing things that make no sense to us at all."... Mr. X
"talked tough, but didnt look at anything".
2The words in italics were taken from the description of an interview conducted by Inspector General H.
David Rotz and Deputy Inspector General Noelle Frangipane with Bernard Mado¤ on June 17, 2009 about
interaction between Mado¤, his company and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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Mado¤ ... recalled Mr. Y was the supervisor.... Mr. Y, "knew what he was looking at
and that was it."
In Mado¤s words it is clear that Mr. Ys working methods were di¤erent from the
ones employed by Mr. X. More relevant for us is that Mado¤, through observation of the
both supervisorsactions, was able to rank them in terms of the likelihood of uncovering
his Ponzi scheme. In fact, Mado¤ recognized that if the 2006 exam conducted by Mr. X
had been conducted by Mr. Y, the Ponzi scheme would have been found. Translated to the
setting of the present paper, Mado¤ would have more incentives to continue with his Ponzi
scheme if he learns that the supervisor is of Mr. X type.
In general terms a fund manager that is rewarded with a performance fee would have
more incentives to build a risky portfolio if he knew in advance what risk measures a par-
ticular supervisor would pay more or less attention to. Similarly, an unscrupulous manager
would feel more tempted to enter into illicit activities of a given kind if he knew beforehand
that the auditor would pay little or not attention to issues of that nature.
Blue collar workers and most managers are typically paid according to a at compen-
sation. Bonus or performance stimulus are possible in the case of good performance, but
typically they do not share the losses. This fact limits, to a great extent, the provision of
incentives. Monitoring is then the mechanism that disciplines these agents.
This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic prin-
cipal delegates the task of monitoring the e¤ort choices of an agent to a third party. The
latter we call the monitor. His actions are fully characterized by his type. Exogenous cir-
cumstances require the delegation of the monitoring activities, without which trade would
not be possible. The agent is strategic and has a natural tendency to supply low e¤ort.3
Through repeated interaction and the observation of the monitors actions with respect
to the e¤ort signal, the agent may learns his type, which in our setting represents the exi-
bility of the monitor towards the observations of the realized output. The agent strategically
3The model history is particularly tailored to capture the rm versus blue collar workers type of relations.
With appropriate changes in the text, the generalization for the auditing and nancial supervision problems
is immediate.
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lowers his e¤ort if he nds that the monitor is tolerant. We show that this revelation process
damages the principals payo¤. When the principal strategic inuence is restricted to de-
ciding exclusively on whether or not to trade with the agent, we are able to characterize
the worst case scenario.
In order to solve the principals problem, we formalize the idea of replacement strategies,
i.e. the principal replaces the monitor when she nds it convenient, paying a cost but
disrupting any learning that the agent might have acquired.4 When the replacement costs
are null, she obtains the largest possible payo¤s that can be achieved with replacement
strategies. We are thus able to establish upper and lower bounds on the payo¤s that
both parties can achieve independently of the information structure, for di¤erent degrees of
impatience.
In any realistic setting, replacement strategies cannot fully solve the principals problem
when contrasted with a reference measure. Surprisingly, this is true even if replacement
costs are zero and high e¤ort is always played in equilibrium. The reason is that, for the
replacement mechanism to work, the parties cannot benet from the potential revelation of
a tolerant monitor - which in our setting is preferred in payo¤ terms when incentives are
met, since he incurs less often in mistaken punishments.
Nonetheless, replacement strategies turn out to be useful to solve the principals prob-
lem, reducing the losses associated with the agent learning and enlarging the spectrum
of discounting, where equilibrium e¤ort can be sustained. The success of these strategies
depends crucially on the replacement costs and on the agent impatience.
We also characterize the sequential equilibrium under public and private monitoring, for
varying replacement costs and impatience levels. When the noise signal of the agent e¤ort
is publicly observed the principal is able to make more precise replacement choices, because
she knows exactly the moment in time at which the agent learns that the monitor type is
tolerant. However, when the realized output is the agents private monitoring, this piece of
information is not available anymore; she has to infer the informational state of the relation.
4Holmström (1982) and Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) in di¤erent contexts show the existence
of a similar revelation e¤ect. They also mention the possibility of permanent replacement as a potential
mechanism to solve the problem.
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For that reason her replacement choices are always limited either by being premature, in
the sense that the agent is still uninformed, incurring in an unnecessary cost, or by being
late, in the sense that the monitor type is already revealed and the agent is providing low
e¤ort. Consequently and not surprisingly, replacement strategies are payo¤ inferior under
private observation than under public monitoring.
This paper contributes to the theory of incentives by presenting replacement strategies
as a mechanism to solve problems where an agent might acquire information with strategic
value that penalizes the principals payo¤s. This paper provides recommendations on how
a principal should optimally rotate a monitor in situations of this type. Such a solution
is particularly relevant in situations where compensation is exogenously determined, lim-
iting the provision of incentives to a great extent. In multiagent situations, the power of
replacement strategies is amplied.
Discussion on the Main Assumptions - There is a set of persistent facts which this paper
attempts to capture. They justify important specicities of the present paper and, in some
sense, novel departures from the existing literature.
We introduce a distribution of monitor types, di¤ering with respect to their exibility
towards the observations of the noisy e¤ort measure. These individuals are not necessarily
the ideal choice. The scarcity of "perfect proles", the subjectivity and not necessarily well
dened characteristics of an "ideal type" are not easy to identify, together with restric-
tions and biases in the recruiting process might lead to a selected candidate that is simply
perceived as the best of a limited pool of screened individuals.5
Firms are aware of these limitations, but they also know the necessity of hiring these
individuals for the regular functioning and expansion of their businesses.6 These arguments
rationalize the existence of the monitor in our model.
5The classical "secretary problem" and its multiple extensions provides su¢ cient intuition about the
recruiter screening di¢ culties. See Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983).
6Leibenstein (1987) discusses a great number of ine¢ ciencies that exist inside organizations.
83
We restrict the role of compensation as an incentive mechanism. The assumption paral-
lels the vision of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) of monitoring as a way of providing the agent
with incentives.7 The monitoring role is motivated by the independence between compen-
sation and performance. Job insecurity is the mechanism that disciplines the relation.
This environment comes as natural in many economies and industrial sectors where
base salaries are determined by social norms and political or legal aspects.8 It also captures
rigidities observed in the labor markets. When unsatised with an employees performance,
the employer is more prone to re him than to decrease his compensation.
We assume that independently of the performance, once employed, the worker receives
the promised end of period compensation. This is a "no-slavery" condition that the principal
must respect ex-post. Punishments are executed after the compensation is paid.
The strategic aspect of rmsbehavior tends to be mainly directed towards their cos-
tumers and competitors. In relation with its employees, rms usually pay the agreed
compensation and only fail to do so in special circumstances (e.g. nancial di¢ culties,
bankruptcy, etc.) that have little to do with incentives. A failure in commitment with an
employee is not only seen by all the other employees but also spreads outside the rms halls.
Reputational considerations of this kind provide theoretical foundations for this assumption.
We abstain from discussing potential renegotiation from the initial agreement. This
allows us to focus on the main issue of this paper without extra complexities.
Related Literature - The revelation of a players type is not a new issue. However, it
has never been applied to a principal-monitor-agent relation with the kind of structure as
in this paper.
In a setting where incentives are driven by career concerns, Holmström (1982a) shows
that an individuals ability is revealed over time through observation of his performance.
7See also Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) where they link wages, unemployment, monitoring and e¢ ciency.
The worker incentives for high e¤ort are also induced by the fear of being red.
8Clearly, this is not an universal fact, it is easy to nd exceptions, in particular in white-collar jobs where
the employee has attributes/skills, recognized by both parties, that endow him with bargaining power or
in tasks where performance and compensation are linked in a very sensitive way. Even in these cases, we
should also expect a market reference measure to base the negotiations. See Kennan and Wilson (1989) for
a survey on strategic bargaining models between unions and rms and for empirical studies.
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On the limit, this result holds no matter how noisy the performance measure is and no
matter how much the agent tries to bias the principal beliefs.9
Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) recently showed that if monitoring is imperfect,
the type of player that is building a reputation is revealed in the long-run. Either the
opponent players will become convinced that the reputation builder strategy will not change
or they will come to learn his type. The former case cannot be an equilibrium; otherwise
the reputation builder would take advantage of that fact to deviate from the potentially
costly reputational action. In equilibrium, the revelation of the true reputation builder type
occurs almost surely.10
One common characteristic that is reported in these papers is that the revelation of
the players type has negative payo¤ consequences for the revealed player. In order to deal
with the problem, a solution that has been proposed by these authors is the permanent
replacement of the player whose type is initially unknown, disrupting any potential for
learning.11 Such a costless solution does not t and is hard to motivate in many economic
problems. The present paper extends these ideas for di¤erent informational structures, in
a simple setting where the replacement possibility is costly.
The literature in three party relations, principal-supervisor-agent, is in particular con-
cerned with the resolution of the potential breakout of collusive arrangements between the
agent and the supervisor. Tirole (1986) points out that problems related with the moni-
tors conicting interests might arise. See also La¤ont and Tirole (1991) and Kofman and
Lawarree (1993) for further developments and extensions on this literature. In this paper,
we are not concerned with delegation e¤ects of this kind. Instead, we focus our attention
9Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) present an explicit theory of predation where an incumbent rm attempts
to bias the learning process of an entrant rm about the market protability. See also Mirman, Samuelson
and Urbano (1993).
10See Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2007) where they establish analogous results for the case where the
uninformed player is long-lived. See also Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson (2008). Revelation issues due
to repeated interaction are also common in dynamic games with incomplete information; Renault (2009)
provides a survey on the topic.
11Cole, Dow and English (1995) and Phelan (2006) model situations where the government type in power
is not permanent. These situations are easy to motivate. See also Mailath and Samuelson (2001), where
they study a problem where a competent rm might become inept, this mechanism keeps the competent
rm with incentives and is an equilibrium.
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on the negative e¤ects associated with the revelation of strategic relevant information.
This paper is also related to the theory of self-enforced contracts where the provision of
incentives is guaranteed by the sensitivity of the continuation value of the innitely repeated
game to changes in the players actions. Future rewards and punishments provide the
incentives for present behaviour.12 Some important contributions to the large and growing
literature in relational contracts are Klein and Le­ er (1981), Bull (1987), and MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989), all these papers assume perfect monitoring; while Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007), assume
imperfect monitoring. The present paper is in the spirit of the former set of contributions
since we assume a di¤erent spectrum of monitoring imperfections.
Levin (2003) shows, that an optimal relational contract has an equivalent stationary
representation that achieves the same payo¤s. Because of the uncertainty about the moment
in time when the monitor type is revealed (if it is revealed) and due to the replacement
possibility, multiple alternations between informational sates are possible. For that reason,
Levins result does not generalize to our model; we have to solve the dynamic problem with
dynamic constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the general model structure and
discusses the learning process. Section 3.3 discusses the principal worst case scenario in de-
tail and denes the reference measure. Section 3.4 introduces the possibility of the monitor
being replaced and considers the costless replacement solution. Section 3.5 characterizes
the equilibrium replacement strategies under public monitoring. Similarly, Section 3.6 char-
acterizes the case where the agent privately observes the noisy e¤ort signals. Section 3.7
concludes. Proofs for the results in this paper can be found in Appendix 3.9.
3.2 The Model
We model a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation that incorporates both elements of
adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is motivated by the existence of a monitor,
12The present paper mixes concepts both from the theory of repeated games and the incentives theory. See
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for complete surveys of the former theory,
and see for example Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) and Salanié (2005) for surveys of the latter theory.
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whose type is initially unknown to the agent and to the principal. We assume that the
monitor has no incentives to choose an action that is against his type. Consequently, the
monitors actions are revealing. The problem can then be treated as one of dynamic moral
hazard where nature rst selects the monitor type.
The Principal and the Agent - Both parties are risk neutral. The timing of the relation
is the following: at the beginning of each period t = 0; 1; 2:::, the principal o¤ers the xed
market compensation wt 2 R+ in exchange for the agent e¤ort. The latter has the option to
accept or refuse it. Once accepted, the agent privately chooses an e¤ort level et 2

eL; eH
	
;
where eH denotes high e¤ort and eL denotes low e¤ort, and eH > eL  0. The e¤ort level
eH is exogenous and it is the highest e¤ort that the agent can physically supply per period.
The low e¤ort level eL will be endogenously determined below.
At the end of each period, before players choose their actions, the realized output yt 2 R
is observed by the monitor and the agent.13 The principal might observe it or not, depending
on the information structure considered. The realized output is a noisy measure of the
agents e¤ort, i.e. yt = bet + "t where "t is stochastic with E ("t) = 0 and b 2 R+ is a
productivity parameter. High (low) e¤ort choices make higher (lower) outputs more likely.
The principals ex-post payo¤ is the realized output subtracted from the wage paid to
the agent. The principals ex-ante expected payo¤ is then
jpt = bet   wt; (45)
with j = L when et = eL and j = H when et = eH .
Independently of the observed output, the principal has necessarily to pay the wage wt
corresponding to that period. We look at the principal as having one period commitment.
She has, however, the option of not starting the relation with the agent or terminate it, if
she nds convenient.
In exchange for the compensation paid at the end of the period, the agent su¤ers a
disutility from e¤ort equal to cet, where c 2 R+ is the marginal cost of e¤ort. The agent
13There is no loss in generality when allowing for potentially negative output values.
87
payo¤ is given by
jat = wt   cet; (46)
with j = L when et = eL and j = H otherwise. Assume b > c; to assure an expected
positive surplus.
Notice that there is no uncertainty about the agents per period payo¤. The principal
holds all the idiosyncratic production risk.
If there is no trade both parties obtain their respective outside options denoted as vp
and va. There is a wide range of interpretations that can be given to the values va and vp,
we let these values to be exogenous.14
In the stage game, low e¤ort is preferred by the agent but not by the principal. In order
for the agent to always have an incentive to participate, we assume La > 
H
a > va. The
principal stage game payo¤ follows the relation Hp > vp  Lp . We assume that the last
inequality binds, i.e. vp = 
L
p . This assumption simplies the problem later. However, it
has implications on the stage game.
eH eL ?
E Hp ; 
H
a vp; 
L
a vp; va
NE vp; ceH vp; ceL vp; va
The principal is the row player, who has the option of employing E or not employing the
agent NE. The agent is the column player, together with the e¤ort choices he has the
option of not trading with the principal, denoted as ?, guaranteeing the outside option va.
With the assumption vp = 
L
p , instead of a single pure strategies Nash equilibrium (NE;?)
we have two, i.e.
 
E; eL

and (NE;?). None of these equilibria guarantee the principal
more than the outside option. The equilibrium (NE;?) is not interesting for either party
but the equilibrium
 
E; eL

is preferred by the agent. The assumption is without loss of
generality because, in the repeated relation, we want to sustain the repetition of the outcome
14These values can be easily endogenized at the cost of a more complex problem. For example; vp could
represent the value of a new relation with another agent, subtracted from the associated searching costs. A
similar interpretation can be done for va.
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associated with the equilibrium
 
E; eH

.15
The Monitor - The monitors task is to supervise the agent e¤ort. He has autonomy to
punish the agent when he observes a low output realization and subsequently reports this
event to the principal.
The employed monitor can be of two types  2 T ; S	, with  2 R and beHt > beLt 
S > T .16 The type S occurs with probability  2 (0; 1) and the type T with the
remaining probability. Here S denotes a "strict" monitor, i.e. an individual that is more
likely to perceive a low output realization as a signal of low e¤ort. The strict type considers
a low output realization every signal yt  S , i.e. Y S 

yt : yt  S
	
, and a high output
realization otherwise. A less strict monitor, call it "tolerant", is denoted by T . This type
attempts to capture a more exible individual towards the output observations, so low
output realizations are less likely to be interpreted as signalling low e¤ort. For a tolerant
monitor any output in the set Y T  yt : yt  T	 is a signal of low e¤ort.
Consequently, when the agent provides high e¤ort, low output is observed with di¤erent
probabilities depending on whether the monitor is "tolerant" or "strict",17 i.e.
Pr
 
yt 2 Y T jet = eH
  pT and Pr  yt 2 Y S jet = eH  pS ;
respectively. High output is interpreted with the remaining probabilities.
Similarly, when the agent chooses low e¤ort, the output is low with probabilities
Pr
 
yt 2 Y T jet = eL
  qT and Pr  yt 2 Y S jet = eL  qS ;
depending on whether the monitor is "tolerant" or "strict", respectively.
To shorten notation, given the prior beliefs about the persistence of each type, we dene
15Notice that the lower bound on e¤ort supplied by the agent becomes endogenously determined, i.e.
eL =
 
w + vp

=b.
16The choice of two monitor types is made for simplicity. The model is robust to the introduction of more
types and a continuum of e¤orts choices. The addition of more types simply increases the complexity of the
problem.
17Without loss of generality we can consider another interpretation for , such as, for example, the state
of nature. Clearly the story of the problem would have to be adjusted accordingly. Another interpretation is
to look at  as a monitoring technology, rather than an individual. The latter interpretation was suggested
by Jacques Crémer. Nonetheless, we prefer to look at the monitor as a human.
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the "expected" type E  S + (1  ) T .18 In this case, the "expected" probability of
observing low output when the agent is providing high and low e¤ort are respectively
pS + (1  ) pT  pE and qS + (1  ) qT  qE : (47)
Since S > T we have Y T  Y S , then for a same e¤ort choice, a low output interpre-
tation is more likely when the monitor type is "strict",
pS > pE > pT > 0 and qS > qE > qT > 0: (48)
Within the same type, high e¤ort has associated a lower punishment probability
qT  pT ; qS  pS and qE  pE : (49)
Putting together the inequalities (48) and (49) we obtain, without specifying an order, that
qT and pS must lie in the interval
 
pT ; qS

.
We ignore any payment made to the monitor by the principal and we do not specify
the monitors payo¤ functions. We assume that a "tolerant" monitor has no incentives to
misbehave pretending to be of a "strict" type and vice versa. The value of  not only denotes
the type of monitor but also determines his behavior. The presence of the monitor is crucial,
otherwise no trade would be possible and both parties would get their outside options. We
see the monitoring task as more complex, specialized and with more responsibilities than
simply observing output realizations. This assumption justies the presence of the monitor
even when the principal observes the realized output.
The Revelation Probabilities - The output observation carries a signal concerning the
e¤ort supplied by the agent. The monitors reaction to the signal conveys information
about his type to the agent. It is then natural to expect that a strategic agent would
take advantage of this aggregated information. This is the intuition behind the revelation
process.
18Outside the expected utility hypothesis, a more conservative approach would require the initial e¤ort
choice to be based on S rather than on E . There is no ambiguity about the likelihood of both types.
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Denition 20 Conditional on no punishment, in the event

T < yt  S
	
we say that a
revealing signal has occurred.
In the two types setting that we build in this paper, revealing information occurs only
when the true type is T . In this case the agent can update his believes and consequently
revises his e¤ort.
For simplicity, the event that the agent learns that the monitor is S coincides with a
punishment decision. Consequently, learning that the monitor is strict is irrelevant. Such
is a consequence of punishment exclusively based on ring the agent.19
With two types, after observing a revealing signal and updating his beliefs there is
nothing else for the agent to learn, so the type of monitor is fully revealed.
Remark. If we added more types, conditional on no punishment, the agent would be
learning more information about the monitor type with positive probability in every period.
With punishment schemes based on the termination of the relation, the true value of  could
never be perfectly learned; the punishment disrupts this process.20 However, the agent need
not know exactly the type of monitor in order to discover protable deviations.
In every period of the relation with probability
Pr
 
 = T

Pr
 
yt 2 Y T \ Y S jet = eH
  (1  ) r
the agent observes a revealing signal that excludes the type S with probability one (in the
spirit of Bayesian updating).21 The larger the value of (1  ) r, the smaller the expected
number of periods needed for a revealing signal to occur. In case of low e¤ort eL, the agent
19For such a case to be interesting, we would have to dene an extra e¤ort level, i.e. after the agent learns
that the monitor is strict, he would adjust to a higher e¤ort level. That would require the denition of more
probabilities. Additionally we would have to consider other punishment schemes, e.g. review or forgiving
strategies. See Footnote 20.
20 If the punishment allows for forgiveness and there is unbound recall, the learning process will not be
disrupted. It will continue after the punishment has been completed. In this case,  might become common
knowledge after a su¢ ciently large number of periods. In this case, the agent can also learn the value of 
from below, by updating the lower bound on the distribution of monitor types. (A possibility that we are not
considering here) This would accelerate the convergence to common knowledge. See Cripps, Ely, Mailath and
Samuelson (2008). Such a setting requires di¤erent strategic considerations.
21 In general, this is di¤erent from saying that there is a signal clearly revealing the type of monitor. The
former case does not necessarily lead to common knowledge, while the latter does. Here, with only two
types, by exclusion both situations are equivalent. See the remark after Denition 20.
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Figure 9: The model - Relation between revelation and punishment probabilities.
might observe a revealing signal with probability (1  ) s. We assume that s  r, this is
the case for most distributions of interest. Consequently, when the agent provides low e¤ort
he accelerates the potential revelation process, but at the same time he is also more likely
to be punished.
Since beL  S , we can relate the punishment and the unconditional learning probabil-
ities, i.e. pS = pT + r and qS = qT + s. We can also write pE = pT + r and qE = qT + s.
Without knowing the relation between qS   qT and r; we cannot rank qT and pS : Figure 9
provides an illustration.
Actions, Histories and Strategies - The Nash equilibria of the stage game gives low
payo¤s for the principal. Through the provision of intertemporal incentives, we can achieve
payo¤s above the set of stage game Nash equilibria.
For convenience, we consider strategies where a low output observation triggers the
immediate termination of the relation. Both parts are then left with their outside options.22
The punishment scheme interferes with the learning process, see Footnote 20. The important
22 In the real world principal-agent relations punishments are usually not so severe. Typically, a ring
decision is only made after a sequence or a certain number of low output interpretations. Radner (1985),
Rubinstein (1979) and Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) study strategies with a similar structure.
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aspect is that these punishments are mutual and occur with positive probability along the
equilibrium path, causing destruction of value, and consequently bounding the equilibrium
payo¤s away from full e¢ ciency. Even the reference value is not fully e¢ cient. Instead of
searching for a mechanism that implements an optimal e¤ort level without surplus losses,
we acknowledge the existence of ine¢ ciencies. This assumption is without loss in generality
and is motivated by tractability issues. Moreover, we assume that punishments based on a
"money-back guarantee" cannot be contracted.23
The potential revelation of the monitor type creates an extra layer of ine¢ ciency and
damages the principals interests. Our goal is to search for solutions that attempt to elimi-
nate or minimize this latter e¤ect on the principals payo¤s.24
Both the principal and the agent discount the future according to some  2 (0; 1).
Once the principal and the agent decide to participate, the monitor is hired and the
parties take their actions. At any given moment in time t; an agents action is an e¤ort
choice et 2

eL; eH
	
. A principals action is a replacement choice rt 2 f0; 1g ; where rt = 0
means not replacing the monitor and rt = 1 otherwise. A monitors action mt 2 f0; 1g is a
choice between punishing or not, respectively mt = 1 and mt = 0.
Given the actions and the observed output up to time t; a history of play is built.
Depending on the information structure considered, di¤erent private histories players will
accumulate. The history of output realization at a given time t is hty  fy0; y1; :::; yt 1g.
The monitor history of actions is htm  fm0;m1; :::;mt 1g and is public observed in any
setting, for that reason we are able to keep the recursive structure. The principal and
the agent condition their actions on this public observed history, even holding private and
23We assume that the only way to provide incentives is through mutual punishment. Alternatively, given
the one-sided moral hazard structure of our problem, in theoretical terms we could consider other ways of
providing incentives that are less costly for the parts, i.e. by transfers of value between the parties involved
in the relation. Even with noisy signals about playersactions Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) (see
also Fudenberg and Levine (1994) and Sannikov (2007)) have shown that, in problems of this type and with
arbitrarily patient players, we can obtain any feasible and individual rational payo¤s that are fully e¢ cient.
However, for our particular problem, transfers of value from employees to employers as a punishment scheme
are not usually observed in reality.
24 In a bilateral risk neutral setting, when the agent owns or receives all the surplus from his work, it
is possible to obtain full e¢ cient payo¤s. The agent has no incentive to deviate from high e¤ort. See for
example Stiglitz (1974).
93
di¤erent pieces of information.25 This way we can apply the dynamic programming methods
developed in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). The principal and the agent private
histories are htp  fr0; r1; :::; rt 1g and hta  fe0; e1; :::; et 1g respectively.
Throughout the paper we focus on two information structures. In either case both the
agent and the monitor observe the realized output. When the principal also observes the
realized output, we say that monitoring is public; then the public history is hty [ htm, the
principals private history is hty [ htm [ htp and the agents private history is hty [ htm [ hta.
When the principal does not observe the realized output we say that the signals are the
agents private monitoring : then the public history is htm, the principals and the agents
private histories are respectively htm [ htp and hty [ htm [ hta.
A pure strategy for player i 2 fa; pg is a mapping from the set of i0s private histories
into the set of i0s pure actions. When the distribution of signals generated by the e¤ort
choices has full support, a perfect public equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. In order
to be general enough to deal with private monitoring structures, we work with the latter
concept.
Notation - Players select the same action for every period of the repeated game until the
monitor type is revealed or the monitor is replaced, in which case a new action is selected;
for that reason we remove the time index t. Instead, we distinguish between the uninformed
state, denoted with the superscript 0; and the informed state, denoted with the superscript
1. The punishment event is an absorbing state.
3.3 The Reference Value and the Revelation of the Monitor
Type
In this Section we restrict the principals strategic role other than deciding on whether or not
to hire the agent and stoping the relation if she nds it convenient. This strategic structure
is particularly interesting since it highlights the destructive e¤ect that the revelation of the
25Kandori (2002) points out the di¢ culties that arise when dealing with private monitoring when a recur-
sive structure is absent. Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) present the rst folk theorem
for private monitoring with communication. See also Gossner and Tomala (2009) and Mailath and Samuelson
(2006) for surveys on the subject.
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monitor type has on the principals payo¤. This is the principals worst case scenario.
The agent incentives are provided by the xed market compensation and the uncertainty
about the monitor type. The latter incentives might disappear as the game unfolds. With
positive probability the agent might learn that the monitor type is tolerant and adjust his
e¤ort accordingly.
Given the strategic restrictions on the principals behavior, whether she observes the
realized output or not becomes irrelevant.
The Repeated Relation Payo¤s - For i 2 fa; pg, denote 0i as the stage game payo¤ in
the uninformed state 0, i.e. before the monitor type has been revealed. This value depends
on the e¤ort choices made by the agent, i.e. 0i 2

Li ; 
H
i
	
. Similarly, in the informed
state 1, i.e. when the monitor type has been found to be tolerant, the stage game payo¤s
are 1i 2

Li ; 
H
i
	
. Let v0;1i denote the normalized expected value, for i 2 fa; pg, where the
rst superscript refers to the e¤ort choice made in state 0 and the second superscript refers
to the e¤ort choice made in state 1.
Lemma 21 Suppose the agent and the monitor observe the realized output. The innitely
repeated normalized expected payo¤ when the agent chooses

e0; e1
	
=

eH ; eL
	
is
vH;Li =
(1  )Hi + pEvi
D
+  (1  ) r
D
(1  )Li + qT vi
1   (1  qT ) : (50)
for i 2 fa; pg, where D  1    1  pE   (1  ) r :
Expression (50) has two components, the rst ratio on the right-hand side is i0s ex-ante
expected value of the uninformed state, when the agent provides high e¤ort. The second
part on the right-hand side is i0s ex-ante unconditional expected value of the informed state,
when the agent provides low e¤ort.
From expression (50) we can obtain the payo¤ associated with low e¤ort and high
e¤ort in any informational state, vL;Li and v
H;H
i respectively. In the former case, replace
respectively pE ; r and Hi for q
E ; s and Li . (Such an expression, for the case where i = a,
can be found in the Proof of Proposition 23, expression (68).) The latter case is obtained
95
by replacing respectively qT and Li for p
T and Hi in (50). (This is expression (56) of
Denition 24, below.)
The e¤ort choices

e0; e1
	
=

eL; eH
	
are never optimal. In other words, low e¤ort and
an associated high probability of punishment while uninformed, is not compatible with a
later high e¤ort when the agent learns that the monitor is tolerant. In our setting, it can be
shown that vL;Ha is always dominated by the payo¤s of some other strategy for all  2 (0; 1).
The Agent E¤ort Incentives - As discussed in Section 3.2, the principal pays the promised
end of period compensation independently of the observed performance. The principal in-
tertemporal incentives are then satised by assumption. The same does not happen with
the agent who has a natural tendency to supply low e¤ort. When the agent is su¢ ciently
impatient the market compensation may not be enough to sustain high e¤ort in both in-
formational states. He provides high e¤ort while uninformed and low e¤ort once informed.
It might even be the case, for larger impatience levels, that the agent nds it is in his best
interest to provide low e¤ort in any state.
We say that the agent e¤ort choice

e0; e1
	
is self-enforceable26 when

e0; e1
	
= arg sup
e02feL;eHg; e12feL;eHg
v0;1a : (51)
The e¤ort choices

e0; e1
	
can be part of a non trivial equilibrium if, in addition, they
guarantee that the principal has incentives to hire the agent. Before that, the following
remark is in order, respecting to the methods employed to solve the dynamic problem that
we are modelling.
Remark 22 With two potential informational states, we can decompose the repeated rela-
tion into two relevant subgames. The whole game that starts in state 0 and extends for an
unknown number of periods until the monitor interprets a low output realization, suggesting
low e¤ort. In this case the relation terminates. The state 1 subgame is initiated if the
monitor type is revealed to be T .
26Throughout the paper we say that the agent has incentives to choose

e0; e1
	
(or the agent incentives
are satised). In the theory of incentives, expression 51 is an incentive compatible constraint.
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When the informational state moves to state 1; the agent might change his behavior. To
solve the game, we rst nd the best strategy for the agent in any of the potentially innitely
repeated state 1 subgames and then search for the best strategy for the game that starts in
the uninformed state 0. The approach is similar to backward induction; the di¤erence is the
timing uncertainty associated with the beginning of the informed state subgame.
The Principal Participation - We require the ex-ante condition v0;1p > vp as necessary
for the principal to have interest in trading with the agent, i.e. the principal will only
participate if she can do strictly better than in the stage game. However, this does not
guarantee the principals participation in the informed state 1 subgame. We denote the
value of this subgame as v:;1p . In the worst case scenario, i.e. the agent provides low e¤ort
in the informed state, we want
v:;Lp =
(1  )Lp + qT vp
1   (1  qT )  vp: (52)
Otherwise, the principal would prefer to terminate the relation once the agent is informed.27
For the principal to have incentives to stay active, the agent cannot provide e¤ort below a
certain value. For that reason, in Section 3.2, we assumed that vp = 
L
p . Intuitively once
informed, if the agent decides to supply low e¤ort, there is a minimum e¤ort level that
keeps the principal interested in participating.
With this restriction on the agents e¤ort, the principals participation condition v0;1p >
vp is su¢ cient. When v
0;1
p = vp, the principal will not trade with the agent. This is the case
when the agents dominant strategy is to provide low e¤ort in both informational states, i.e.
vL;Lp = vp. The principal does not contract with an agent who has no incentives to provide
high e¤ort at least during the uninformed state.28
The Agent Participation is always guaranteed by the assumption La > 
H
a > va. In any
scenario the agent guarantees at least va.
27Termination of the relation after an informative signal can be part of an equilibrium. Here, we want to
rule out such a possibility.
28We thus disallow strategic behavior from the low e¤ort agents, so as to provide high e¤ort in just one
period of the relation, which would push the principals payo¤ above vp in expected terms. The principal
participation decision is based on the agents incentives, which the principal knows because  and other
relevant parameters are common knowledge. We want to improve over the stage game payo¤ vp.
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Putting together the principals and the agents participation conditions, we obtain the
constraints on the agent binary e¤ort set
w + vp
b
= eL < eH <
w   va
c
; (53)
with eL endogenously determined and eH exogenous but constrained. The former value is
higher when the principal has a high outside option, the market compensation is high or
the productivity of the labor is low. Also intuitive is the upper bound on high e¤ort, which
depends positively on the market wage but negatively on the agents outside option and the
cost of e¤ort.
Equilibrium Behavior - Given that high e¤ort is supplied in the uninformed state, let
+ denote the discount threshold above which the agent prefers to supply high e¤ort once
informed that the monitor type is T . Given the principals strategic limitation,   de-
notes the discount threshold below which the agent prefers to provide low e¤ort in any
informational state.
Proposition 23 When  2  ; + ; the agent chooses e0; e1	 = eH ; eL	. The interval
 ; +
  [0; 1) and is nonempty if
qT
 
Ha   va

> pT
 
La   va

(54)
and
s
 
Ha   va

> r
 
La   va

: (55)
Independently of the informational state, when  2 0;   the agent provides low e¤ort,
while if  2 +; 1 the agent provides high e¤ort.
The agent provides low e¤ort in the informed state if  < +. Given this behavior, it
is a dominant strategy to supply high e¤ort in the uninformed state if    . Condition
(54) and (55) establish that the intersection of these intervals is nonempty, while condition
(54) alone guarantees that + < 1.
Since La > 
H
a > va, condition (54) states that it is not enough for q
T to be larger than
pT , it has to be su¢ ciently large. If that is the case, for a su¢ ciently patient agent, the
market compensation is su¢ cient to sustain high e¤ort.
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Similarly, inequality (55) requires that the likelihood of an output observation inside the
informative region to be much greater in the case of low e¤ort. This condition is easier to
interpret when added to condition (54). In this case we have qS
 
Ha   va

> pS
 
La   va

.
Low e¤ort accelerates the potential revelation of the monitor type, but at the cost of a higher
likelihood of punishment. In other words, since a tolerant type occurs only with probability
(1  ) 2 (0; 1), the acceleration of the revelation process turns into an acceleration of the
punishment event, independently of the true monitor type. This explains why the agent
chooses

e0; e1
	
=

eH ; eL
	
for  2  ; +, but also why e0; e1	 = eL; eH	 is always a
dominated strategy.
Proposition 23 identies three distinct potential behaviors depending on how the agent
discounts the future. When  2 +; 1, the agent provides high e¤ort, ignoring any signal
regarding the monitor type. The agent prefers to su¤er the extra disutility c
 
eH   eL
imposed by high e¤ort in every future period of the repeated game rather than to provide
low e¤ort and increasing the probability of punishment from pT to qT . The reference
payo¤ vH;Ha is dominant and the principal obtains the payo¤ v
H;H
p > vp. In the opposite
direction, if  2 0;  , the agent incentives are not satised and the principal prefers not
to participate since vL;Lp = vp.
The interesting possibility occurs for "intermediate" impatience levels, i.e.  2  ; +.
The agent prefers to provide high e¤ort while uninformed, reducing the punishment like-
lihood, waiting to nd if the monitor type is tolerant, in which case he deviates to low
e¤ort and obtains larger expected gains. There is a prize for the agent if the informed state
occurs. In this case the principal obtains vH;Lp > vp.
The Reference Payo¤s - Since there is the potential of mistaken punishments on the
equilibrium path, there is no way to achieve full e¢ cient payo¤s. To perform payo¤ com-
parisons we dene the reference payo¤s, i.e. the payo¤s that attain the highest possible
aggregate surplus for a given .
Denition 24 The reference payo¤ is the value that the principal and the agent would
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obtain if the agent provides high e¤ort independently of the informational state, i.e.
vH;Hi =
(1  )Hi + pEvi
D
+  (1  ) r
D
(1  )Hi + pT vi
1   (1  pT ) : (56)
for i 2 fa; pg :
The reference payo¤s require high e¤ort always to be chosen by the agent, Which is
why the outcome is less ine¢ cient. Instead of attempting to eliminate this ine¢ ciency we
acknowledge it,29 our goal is to minimize the principals payo¤ losses due to the revelation
of the monitor type.
It is important to stress, that vH;Hi is an equilibrium payo¤ only when  2

+; 1

. For
that reason, for any  < +, the value vH;Hi only plays the role of a reference measure.
Nonetheless, the sum vH;Ha + v
H;H
p W achieves the largest total surplus.30
In the present paper we focus on replacement strategies. However, compensation incen-
tives can sustain the surplus W for impatience levels below +. This is why compensation
incentives are equivalent to transfers of value from the principal to the agent, leaving the
total surplus unchanged. Later, we will see that there are perverse e¤ects associated with
replacement strategies other than the replacement costs.
Payo¤ Comparisons - The agent observation of the realized output cannot harm him
in payo¤ terms. Moreover, independently of the information that the principal might hold
and given the strategic limitations that we imposed on her behavior, we should expect her
payo¤ to be penalized by the agents strategic behavior. The following result establishes
the relation between the reference payo¤s of Denition 24 and the payo¤s vH;Li of Lemma
21 for the interesting case  2  ; +.
Corollary 25 For  2  ; +  [0; 1) we have;
(i) vH;La > v
H;H
a ;
29A full e¢ cient solution would require vH;Ha = 
H
a and v
H;H
p = 
H
p . For that to be possible, the signals
had to be perfectly informative in case of high e¤ort, i.e. pT = pS = 0. Another way to obtain such a result
is to employ punishments based on transfers of value between the principal and the agent, see Footnote 23.
We choose pT > 0 and pS > 0, to deal with the possibility that nature and/or noisy information may disturb
the decision process.
30Expression (56) can be obtained along the same lines as in the Proof of Lemma 21. Alternatively, in
expression (50), simply replace respectively qT and Li for p
T and Hi .
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(ii) vH;Lp < v
H;H
p :
(iii) Under condition (54), W > vH;La + v
H;L
p for all  2 [0; 1).
When the agent learns that the monitor type is tolerant and  2  ; +, the principal
su¤ers payo¤ losses. Since the parties in the relation have opposing interests, the result
obtained in part (i) justies the result of part (ii). An extra gain for the agent implies a
loss for the principal (not necessarily equivalent).
Part (iii) establishes that high e¤ort in both informational states is surplus superior for
any discount level. The extra gains obtained by the agent by deviating to low e¤ort in the
informed state, part (i), does not compensate for the payo¤ losses incurred by the principal,
part (ii). This is the case because the gains that the agent obtain are due to a reduction in
e¤ort, a¤ecting the generated surplus in an adverse way.
3.4 The Principal Response - Searching for Solutions
In the previous section we have intentionally limited the principals strategic role to isolate
the monitor type revelation e¤ect. We now take a step further towards more realistic
scenarios. In addition to the monitoring activities, in an attempt to correct the losses on
the principals payo¤, we consider that the principal can strengthen the agents incentives
by costly replace the monitor. Every time the monitor is replaced any learning that the
agent has acquired is lost, restoring the uncertainty about the monitor type. The agent is
then forced to revise his e¤ort choice.
In the previous section , the information structure was unimportant for the principal,
with costly replacement depending on whether she observes the realized output or not leads,
to di¤erent problems. We consider two potential situations:
(i) Public information with costly replacement, Section 3.5.
(iii) Agents private information with costly replacement, Section 3.6.
Before exploring these information structures, we consider a solution that has been
suggested in Holmström (1982) and Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), which calls for
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replacing the monitor in every period. This goal is to establish an upper bound on the
principals payo¤s with replacement strategies in the discounting region

; +

.
3.4.1 The Trivial Solution - Costless Replacement
We now discuss the case where there are no replacement costs and the principal is free to
substitute the monitors with any desired frequency. The costless replacement case is just a
particular case of more general costly structures. Nonetheless, since it corresponds to the
opposing limit situation discussed in the previous Section, it deserves exclusive treatment
in the sense that it formalizes the principals best case scenario outside the discount region
+; 1

. Because of the replacement exibility, we call the costless scenario, the trivial
solution.
Proposition 26 Independently of the monitoring informational structure and supposing
that there are no replacement costs, when  2 ; +, the best strategy for the principal is
to replace the monitor in every period and for the agent to supply high e¤ort.
Conditions (54) and (55) guarantee that

; +

is nonempty and

 ; +
  ; +.
The successive replacement of the monitor disrupts the learning process. The agent
cannot prot from the information acquired in one period because the monitor constantly
changes. He is never able to update his prior beliefs.
When   ; the agent supplies high e¤ort in all periods of the innitely repeated game.
Below , since the agent incentives are not satised, the principals optimal strategy is to
not participate. This scenario is similar to one where the monitor type is known to be E .
It is worth noticing that the repeated replacement of the monitor has the positive e¤ect
of sustaining high e¤ort in the discount region

;  

. Until now this was not possible
(see Proposition 23).
Denote vHi as the payo¤ that the principal and the agent obtain under permanent
costless replacement. Such a payo¤ can be sustained in the discount region [; 1). However,
if  2 +; 1, the market compensation is enough to sustain incentives for high e¤ort in
any informational state. In this case the principal should never replace the monitor.
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Even though the permanent replacement solution is able to discipline the agent, it
surprisingly achieves payo¤s below the reference measure.
Proposition 27 Independently of the monitoring informational structure and supposing
that there are no replacement costs, we have vH;Hi > v
H
i for all  2 (0; 1) and i 2 fa; pg :
This result highlights the negative side of replacement strategies. To understand this
result, notice that when incentives for high e¤ort are met, the tolerant monitor is preferred
by both the agent and the principal. The reason is that this type incurs less often in
mistaken punishments. The permanent replacement of the monitor provides the agent with
incentives for high e¤ort for all  2 [; 1). However, the parties cannot benet from the
extra gains associated with the potential revelation of a tolerant monitor. For that reason,
the payo¤s under permanent replacement are bounded away from the reference payo¤s.
In other words, when  2 +; 1, the market compensation is su¢ cient to provide
incentives. The principal should not replace the monitor, she can thus benet from the
potential revelation of a tolerant monitor and obtain vH;Hp .31
However, below + the agent incentives for high e¤ort in the informed state collapse.
The potential benet from the revelation of a tolerant monitor disappear. The principal is
better o¤ replacing the monitor in every period, keeping the uncertainty about the monitor
type always alive.
The results obtained until now lead us to the following conclusion about the principals
chances of recovering the losses incurred due to the revelation of a tolerant monitor when
employing replacement strategies.
Corollary 28 Independently of the monitoring structure, with replacement strategies we
have the following bounds on playerspayo¤s:
(i) vi = v
H;H
i for i 2 fa; pg ; when  2

+; 1

:
31Care should be taken when comparing vHi with v
H;H
i : The latter is a reference value and can only be
sustained in the discount region

+; 1

, otherwise incentives collapse. The former can be sustained in the
interval [; 1). Strictly speaking, these payo¤s can only be compared for  2 +; 1. In the region ; +
the value vHi can be sustained, while v
H;H
i is just a reference, see Propositions 23 and 26.
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(ii) vp 2
h
vH;Lp ; vHp
i
and va 2
h
vHa ; v
H;L
a
i
; when  2  ; + :
(iii) vp 2

vp; v
H
p

and va 2 va [
h
vHa ; v
H;L
a
i
; when  2 ;   :
In general terms in any information structure, the principal and the agent cannot obtain
a payo¤ above vHp and v
H;L
a respectively, the exception is the case  2

+; 1

. The agent
cannot get less than vHa unless the costs required to keep the agent with incentives are
so high that the principal prefers not to trade. This situation only occurs in the region
;  

because the principals choices are constrained by the need to provide the agent
with incentives at least in the uninformed state. Otherwise, for  2  ; + ; the principal
can always guarantee at least vH;Lp by never replacing the monitor.
The result reinforces the message of Proposition 27; we cannot rely on replacement
strategies to reach the most e¢ cient outcome. However, these strategies can provide a
partial solution to the monitor revelation problem in the discounting region

; +

. For
that reason they are worth studying.
Finally, we acknowledge the di¢ culty of motivating situations with permanent replace-
ment. Nonetheless, the trivial solution seems to t with the behavior of some managers in
specic situations. To be more concrete, consider a monitor that in some days presents a
good mood , similar to a type T behavior, while on others days he presents a bad mood,
similar to a type S behavior. The subordinates are then unable to identify his state on a
particular day. In this case, the manager is using a behavioral strategy, randomizing over the
mood S with probability  and the mood T with probability 1   in each period. While
intuition may support the existence of strategic behavior of this kind in principal-agent
relations, further research should verify the validity of such an assertion.
3.5 Public Monitoring with Costly Replacement
In most economic problems, the assumption of free replacement is hard to sustain. We
now consider a more interesting scenario where the principal pays a xed cost k  0 every
time she decides to replace the existing monitor. These are organizational costs due to
adaptation, learning, and/or mandatory ring costs.
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The realized output is publicly observed by both the principal and the agent. This
information structure captures situations where the principal delegates the monitoring task
but, at the same time, keeps track of the realized output. We look at the monitor task as
being more complex than simply observing output realizations, he also provides support
and assists the agent. Without the monitor no trade would be possible.
Alternatively, we can think that the monitor sends the principal a report at the end
of each period with the realized output and the action taken , i.e. the monitors personal
interpretation of the observed signal.
If the true monitor type is tolerant, the principal learns it at the same time as the
agent. For that reason it is not rational for the principal to replace the monitor before the
occurrence of a revealing signal.
A replacement strategy is then a decision to substitute the existing monitor, n =
0; 1; 2; ::: periods after a revealing signal has been observed. Intuitively, when n = 0 no
learning is possible, the monitor is replaced as soon as an informative signal is observed.
This is the highest (rational) replacement frequency and consequently the one with highest
total cost. As these costs increase, it might be better for the principal to choose n = 1, i.e.
to substitute the monitor one period after a revealing signal is observed. The total costs
decrease due to a decrease in the replacement frequency, but if  2 ; +, the agent can
benet during one period from learning that the monitor is tolerant. The extreme case is
when the monitor is never substituted, i.e. n ! 1. In this case, the principal pays no
replacement costs but the agent benets from the potential revelation of the monitor for
the rest of the relation.
The principal faces a trade o¤ between frequent replacement, i.e. right after the monitor
revelation, with larger costs but no learning, or less intensive replacement with lower costs
but allowing potential deviations from high e¤ort.
Denote v0;1i;k;n as the expected normalized value of the relation for i 2 fa; pg when the
principal replaces the monitor n 2 N0  f0; 1; 2; :::g periods after a revealing signal, paying
the cost k  0 per replacement, and the agent e¤ort choice in each informational state is
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
e0; e1
	
:
Lemma 29 Suppose that the monitoring is public, k  0, the principal replaces the monitor
n 2 N0 periods after a revealing signal, and the agent chooses

e0; e1
	
=

eH ; eL
	
. The
innitely repeated normalized expected payo¤ for player i 2 fa; pg is
vH;Li;k;n =
(1  )Hi + pEvi +  (1  ) r
 
(1  )Li + qT vi
 1 n(1 qT )n
1 (1 qT )   k (1  )D
1    1  pE   (1  ) r  1  n (1  qT )n +k (1  ) ;
(57)
where D  1    1  pE   (1  ) r, and with k = 0 when i = a.
The replacement cost k is exclusively incurred by the principal, for that reason when
i = a we must set k = 0.
The expression (57) incorporates the agents optimal strategic behavior (best response)
for a given principal replacement choice n. Such a construction reduces the computation of
the sequential equilibrium of the innitely repeated game to an optimization problem from
the principals point of view.
The following properties of expression (57) are worth to notice. When n!1 we obtain
the expression vH;Li of Lemma 21, i.e.
vH;Li;k;n ! vH;Li =
(1  )Hi + pEvi
D
+  (1  ) r
D
(1  )Li + qT vi
1   (1  qT ) : (58)
This is the no replacement case. Similarly when n = 0, we obtain
vH;Li;k;0 =
(1  )Hi + pEvi   k (1  ) (1  ) r
1   (1  pE) ; (59)
which for k = 0 equals expression vHi . Notice that with public monitoring and costless
replacement, the case where the monitor is replaced after a revealing signal and the case
where the monitor is replaced in every period are equivalent. In either situation the agent
cannot benet from learning.
Denote vH;Hi;k;n as the value of the relation when, in expression (57), we replace 
L
i and q
T
by Hi and p
T respectively, and denote vL;Li;k;n as the case where 
H
i , r and p
E are replaced by
Li , s and q
E respectively. Similar to Section 3.3, since replacement costs do not enter into
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the agents payo¤ function, the agents behavior is determined by the discount thresholds
that solve vL;La;0;n = v
H;L
a;0;n and v
H;L
a;0;n = v
H;H
a;0;n which we denote by 
 
n and 
+
n respectively.
When the principal replaces the monitor n 2 N0 periods after a revealing signal, if   +n
the agent provides high e¤ort independently of the informational state. On the other hand,
for  <  n , low e¤ort is chosen independently of the informational state. Between these two
discounting regions, i.e.  2  n ; +n , high e¤ort is chosen in the uninformed state and low
e¤ort is chosen for n periods, while the tolerant monitor is not replaced after it has been
revealed.
In order to conciliate the principal replacement choices with the agent incentives, it is
important to understand how  n and 
+
n change with n. We start with the latter.
In the neighborhood of +n , the agent has a dominant strategy to supply high e¤ort
while uninformed. The question is, how does his behavior in the informed state change
with n. The larger n is, the more it increases the agents gains in the informed state; since
the monitor is tolerant, the relation is expected to last for a larger number of periods. Low
e¤ort in this state increases the immediate expected gains but reduces the life expectancy
of the relation due to a higher exposure to punishment. As n gets larger the latter e¤ect
becomes more important than the former, favoring high e¤ort behavior. Consequently, we
must have +n+1  +n for all n 2 N; or more generally
+ = +1  ::::::  +n+1  +n  :::  +1 : (60)
The cut-o¤ value +n is always above 
+ for all n 2 N.32 This observation supports
the results obtained in the previous Sections; when the agent discounts more than +, the
principal is better o¤ never replacing the monitor.
To understand the behavior of  n with respect to n, we start by noticing that in the
neighborhood of  n , low e¤ort in the informed state is a dominant strategy for the agent.
What is not clear is how the agents behavior in the uninformed state changes with n.
A deviation to low e¤ort in the uninformed state increases the likelihood of punishment,
32Notice also that when n = 0, there is no informed state; for that reason +0 is not dened.
107
but it also accelerates the potential revelation of a tolerant monitor, because s > r. The
latter e¤ect is stronger the larger n is due to the larger "revelation prize" in the informed
state. The former e¤ect is not a¤ected by variations in n. Consequently, a decrease in n
reduces the importance of the latter e¤ect by reducing the "revelation prize", which makes
for impatient agents with less incentives to deviate in the uninformed state. Then, we must
have  n   n+1 for all n 2 N0, i.e.
 =  0  :::   n   n+1  :::   1 =  : (61)
The two extreme values of this sequence can be derived using the limit cases (58) and (59)
for i = a and k = 0, or as in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. For  < , the payo¤s of the
rst periods of the relation become more important and, for that reason, low e¤ort becomes
a dominant strategy, disregarding the increased punishment likelihood.
As a summary of the preceding discussion, we have the following relation between sets
 ; +
   n ; +n   [; 1) for all n 2 N0.33
Lemma 29 characterizes the agents strategic behavior as a function of the principal
replacement choice n. We now need to nd the principals optimal replacement strategy
that maximizes her payo¤ constrained by the associated costs and the agents incentives,
which vary with  and n.
Denote kPCn as the cut-o¤ cost value below which the principals participation is guar-
anteed when she replaces the monitor n periods after the observation of a revealing public
signal and  2 ;  . Let kcut be a reference threshold cost that solves vH;Lp;k;n = vH;Lp;k;n+1.
Unconstrained by any incentives, when k < kcut, n = 0 is optimal because vH;Lp;k;n > v
H;L
p;k;n+1
for all n. Otherwise n!1 is the optimal choice. In the discount region  ; + the value
kcut = kRC is the replacement threshold above which the principal prefers to never replace
the monitor. Recall that when the agent discounts on this region, the principal always has
the option of never replacing the monitor, thus securing a payo¤ of vH;Lp > vp.
33When n gets large we obtain higher order polynomials. The problem becomes untractable and the
discount thresholds  n and 
+
n have to be computed numerically. However, since we know how 
 
n and 
+
n
vary with n, this is enough for our proposes.
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Proposition 30 Suppose that the information is public and k  0; the principals best
strategy:
(i) When  2  ; + ; is to choose n = 0 for k 2 0; kcut and n!1 for k 2 kcut;1.
Where
kcut  
H
p   vp
1   (1  pT   r) : (62)
(ii) When  2  n ;  n+1  ;   ; is to choose n = 0 for k 2 0; kcut, n for
k 2 kcut; kPCn, and no trade otherwise. Where
kPCn  
H
p   vp
 (1  ) rn (1  qT )n : (63)
When the replacement costs are su¢ ciently low, the principals best strategy is to replace
the monitor after a revealing signal, not allowing the agent to learn. This is true providing
k < kcut and  2 ; + : The choice n = 0 guarantees high e¤ort in both informational
states. On the other hand, if replacement costs are large, i.e. k  kcut and  2  ; +, it is
better to never replace the monitor, i.e. n!1. However, when  2  n ;  n+1  ;  
and kcut  k < kPCn, in order to keep the agent with incentives for high e¤ort in the
uninformed state, the principal must replace the monitor n periods after a revealing signal.
In other words, to keep the agent with incentives in the uninformed state the principal must
allow the agent to benet from learning during n periods. However, such a demand might
be too costly for the principal, i.e. k  kPCn, in which case she prefers to not trade and
get the outside option.
Recall that the optimal behavior for  2 +; 1 by Proposition 23 is to choose n!1.
From (62) we can see that a choice n = 0 is favoured; when the di¤erence between
the principals stage game gains and the outside option is larger, when the agent is more
patient or the punishment and learning probabilities are lower. The e¤ect of these variables
is intuitive and not surprising. The value of kPCn in (63) is a¤ected in the same way by these
variables, but also increases; the larger n becomes, the smaller the proportion of tolerant
monitors becomes or larger the punishment probability of a tolerant monitor in the case of
low e¤ort.
In the limit, as n!1, we obtain expression (50) as a particular case of (57). This choice
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cannot improve the principals payo¤. The strategic limited setting of Section 3.3 provides
a lower bound on the payo¤s that the principal can obtain, i.e. vH;Lp for  2

 ; +

and vp
for  2 ;  . When the optimal choice takes a nite number of periods and the principal
wants to trade, it must be because the replacement costs are su¢ ciently small and allows
for payo¤ improvements. The following result formalizes this intuition.
Corollary 31 Suppose that the information is public and k  0. If  2  ; + and the
optimal choice is n = 0 the principal improves her payo¤s w.r.t. vH;Lp . If  2

;  

, the
optimal choice n is nite and there is trade, then the principal improves her payo¤s w.r.t.
vp:
The principals payo¤ losses associated with the revelation of the monitor type can be
partially recovered when the replacement costs are not too high. These strategies are par-
ticularly powerful under public monitoring because the principal enjoys a great replacement
precision. However, these strategies require some extra destruction of value due to the re-
placement costs;34 consequently, the principals expected payo¤ is bounded from vHp in
the interval

; +

; see Corollary 28. The higher the replacement costs, further down the
principals payo¤ is pushed.
Figure 10 illustrates the value of vH;Lp;k;n for the cases where k = 1 and k = 30 when
 2  ; +. Since kcut = 20:24, in the former case, n = 0 is optimal, while in the latter
n!1 is the optimal replacement choice. Notice also, how both functions converge to vH;Lp
as n!1. The value of vHp and the reference value vH;Hp are also shown.
3.5.1 Public Information with Compensation Incentives
We complete this section by discussing the potential of compensation schemes as an instru-
ment to strengthen the agents incentives for high e¤ort.
It is common in the incentives literature, under the usual constraints, to allow the prin-
cipal to freely set the compensation. Translated to our setting, the principal would choose
a compensation in the informed state and a compensation in the uninformed state. This
34Recall that there is also destruction of value due to mistaken punishments on the equilibrium path.
Value burned due to replacement cost represents an extra layer in terms of loss in value.
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Figure 10: Principals payo¤s under public monitoring for di¤erent replacement costs.
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case is particularly penalizing for the agent. Since the incentives for high e¤ort in both
informational states are related, the principal would nd it optimal to o¤er a low compen-
sation w0 < w in the uninformed state, retaining a larger fraction of the surplus in the
initial periods ("exploitation" state) of the relation, in exchange for a higher compensation
w1 > w after a revealing signal ("reward" state).35
Since players discount the future, the initial larger gains become more relevant; for that
reason we might observe not only a payo¤ improvement above the value vHp , but also above
the reference value vH;Hp . Since the total surplus remains constant, such improvements are
made at the agents expense. (see Footnote 37 below)
For this mechanism to work as described, the wage has to be su¢ ciently exible. Situa-
tions like this one might require some intervention in favor of the agent. Wage restrictions,
as we shall discuss, may provide a partial remedy to the problem.
Consider a more realistic scenario where compensations below the market value w cannot
be o¤ered.36 The lower bound restriction w limits the principals exploitation of the agent
in the uninformed state.
To be more concrete, suppose that both the agent and the principal discount the future
according to some  2  ; +. In this case the principal can o¤er a higher compensation in
the informed state w1 > w, moving + down towards , providing the agent with incentives
for high e¤ort in this state.37 More impatient agents would require a higher w1 but there
is a bound on the compensation that the principal can o¤er, i.e. beH   w1  vp; otherwise
the principal would prefer not to trade. However, she will still be able to sustain high e¤ort
35 It represents an alternative explanation that justies why young employees tend to work harder in the
rst period of their careers, relaxing later. See Medo¤ and Abraham (1981) for some early empirical evidence
supporting this fact. Paradoxically it is also in the early stages of an individual career that compensations
tend to be lower. See also Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
36See Taylor (1980) for early empirical observations about wage stickiness. Wage stickiness is particularly
strong, even in periods of recession, see Bewley (1999).
37There is a second e¤ect. Higher compensation in the informed state helps on the provision of incentives
in the uninformed state, since the potential losses associated with an increase in the likelihood of punishment
due to a deviation in this stage becomes more important. Consequently, the principal has higher freedom
to o¤er a lower compensation in the uninformed state w0 < w, increasing   up to . However, this e¤ect
will not be available since the principal is restricted to w0  w. Notice also that if players are very patient,
i.e.   +, we observe w1  w. Independently of the informational state, the more patient players are, the
more surplus the principal appropriates.
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in the uninformed state by o¤ering w0  w, pushing   down towards .
The increasing compensation path w0  w1 has empirical support. During a workers
career the salaries tend to increase above the market reference value. In our setting such
an event is caused by the perverse e¤ect associated with the agents learning.
When high e¤ort is always played in equilibrium, we obtain the same total surplus as in
the reference scenario. Compensation schemes as described are transfers of value from the
principal to the agent. For that reason, it is not clear whether compensation schemes are
payo¤ superior from the principals perspective to replacement strategies, in particular when
the agent is su¢ ciently impatient.38 Improvements over the reference value are impossible
for the principal, it is the agent that benets from the higher compensation. Nonetheless,
improvements over the payo¤ vHp are possible when the agent is su¢ ciently patient.
In a multiagent situation, replacement strategies have an amplifying e¤ect. Typically,
the same monitor interacts with multiple agents and a specic noisy signal of each agent
e¤ort is observed.39 In this case, once one of the agents has learned that the monitor is
tolerant, the principal either decides to increase his compensation or allows him to benet
from his learning. The latter solution leads to relaxation in his performance. The former
case leads to a situation where one individual with the same average performance and the
same qualications is paid more than his colleagues. This situation might bring discontent-
ment and a sense of unfairness among the other workers. Moreover, there is also the risk
that the monitor type becomes common knowledge due to communication between workers.
In order to reestablish the incentives, the principal has to increase the compensation to all
the other workers, this solution might be extremely expensive.
Another possibility would be to suggest the replacement of that specic agent or even
the whole group. The latter solution seems extremely expensive. In the former case, ring
38A clear answer to this questions depends not only on  but also on the cost k associated with the
replacement of the monitor.
39This setting is distinct from the one studied in the Seminal work of Holmström (1982b) with moral-
hazard-in-teams, where only the team aggregate e¤ort measure is observed. Here, a signal of each agent
e¤ort is observed.
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without justication is usually more costly than ring when there is evidence of low per-
formance which can be shown in a court of law. Moreover, a sense of injustice may also
emerge among the group members.
The preceding example involves behavioral considerations that go beyond the scope
of the present paper. However, it might rationalize, for example, why in some sporting
activities, after a sequence of bad results, it is the coach that is replaced not the whole
team.
3.6 Agents Private Monitoring with Costly Replacement
We now consider the possibility that the agent and the monitor observe the realized output
while the principal does not.
This situation is typical in large corporations where the management and the monitoring
functions are separated. The principal only observes an aggregate measure of the full output
produced by a particular department or by the whole rm. This measure includes the
contributions of all the individuals involved in the production process. The principal cannot
disentangle the output of a particular agent from that of the other individuals.40 It is then
the responsibility of lower rank managers (the monitor in our case) to take decisions about
a particular individual. The monitor has an informational advantage, for that reason the
principal fully delegates the monitoring task.41 The monitor then reports to the principal
when a relevant event has occurred, i.e. an interpretation of low e¤ort.
Since the principal is informed about a punishment event we are able to keep the re-
cursive structure of the problem. To be precise, the setting of this Section is one of private
monitoring with communication.42
40 If the principal were able to observe the payo¤s associated with the e¤ort choices of a particular agent,
she would be able to infer the agent noise signal by looking at her own payo¤.
41That does not mean that the monitors work is not object of monitoring. We can assume that a higher
hierarchy monitor veries if the monitor is performing his work according to the standards dened by the
corporation. This issue is related with the rms organization design and boundaries. We refer the reader
to Rahman (2009), which suggests some interesting answers to the question; who monitors the monitor?
42Kandori (2002) presents a description of the challenges associated with private monitoring. Early folk-
theorems for private monitoring with communication were obtained by Compte (1998) and Kandori and
Matsushima (1998). In our setting we allow for mistaken punishments and we do not consider transfers
of value among the players, for that reason we are always bounded far from full e¢ ciency. More recently,
Obara (2009) and Zheng (2008) relaxed some of the assumptions of the early contributions.
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Unlike in the public monitoring case, since the principal does not observe the noisy
measure of the agent e¤ort, she misses the monitors revelation process. To be more concrete,
suppose the true monitor type is tolerant and the agent receives a revealing signal and
consequently supplies low e¤ort. The principal does not know in which moment in time (or
even if) this revelation has occurred. Unlike in Section 3.5, this "reference moment" is not
available.
Nonetheless, the principal knows the model and all the associated parameters; moreover,
she knows what payo¤s are due in case of low and high e¤ort. Given her knowledge about
the whole problem, the principal has to design a replacement scheme that is optimal given
her "blind" position.
For that reason, her replacement choices are always limited, either because they are
premature, in the sense that the agent was still uninformed incurring in an unnecessary
cost, or because they are late, in the sense that the monitor type was already revealed
and the agent is providing low e¤ort. These imprecisions weaken the e¤ectiveness of re-
placement strategies in private monitoring contexts.43 However, that does not imply that
improvements over the strategic restricted payo¤ vH;Lp are not possible.
As mentioned in the introductory Section, auditing companies and nancial supervision
authorities experience a problem with a similar information structure. Auditing companies
(the principal) rotate the external auditors (the monitor) on a regular basis.44 This practice
attempts to eliminate what is known in the accounting/auditing jargon as the "familiarity
threat" between the client (the agent) and the auditor.45 Through repeated interaction,
the auditor reveals professional and personal characteristics to the client. Learning issues
43The same weakness would be present in any other incentives scheme, the di¢ culty is in the information
structure.
44The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (enacted on July 30, 2002) in Section 203, requires the lead audit partner and
audit review partner (or concurring reviewer) to be rotated every ve years on public company audits as
well as on audits of issuers.
45Most of the literature on incentives studies this practice as a remedy to the breakout of collusive arrange-
ments. Tirole (1986) points out that when the monitoring task is delegated to a third party, problems related
with the monitors conicting interests might arise. See La¤ont and Tirole (1991) and Kofman and Lawarree
(1993) for further developments and extensions. In this paper we are not so concerned with delegation e¤ects
of this kind.
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of this kind favor the occurrence of strategic behaviour from the client.46
The auditing company is hardly aware of these facts but knows that they are likely
to occur. Given the information structure and the agents strategic behavior; with which
frequency should the auditing company rotate its external auditors? This Section provides
an answer to this question.
Now, n is the number of periods a given monitor stays in charge, after being hired and
after the rst signal realization. (n + 1 is the actual number of periods that the monitor
is employed) For example n = 0 means that the monitor is replaced every period, i.e. is
employed for a single period, while n = 1 means that the monitor is replaced every second
period and so on. Notice the di¤erence in the interpretation of n with respect to the public
monitor case of Section 3.5.
Denote ev0;1i;k;n as the expected normalized value of the relation for i 2 fa; pg when the
principal replaces the monitor n 2 N0 periods after have hiring him, paying the replacement
cost k  0 every time, and the agent e¤ort choice in each informational state is e0; e1	 :
Lemma 32 Suppose that the information is the agents private monitoring, k  0, the
principal replaces the monitor n 2 N0 periods after hiring him and the agent chooses
e0; e1
	
=

eH ; eL
	
. The innitely repeated normalized expected payo¤ for player i 2 fa; pg
is
evH;Li;k;n = Hi 1 
n+1zn+1
1 z + y
L
i
(z x)(1 nzn) x(zn xn)n(1 z)
(z x)(1 x)(1 z)   k (1  )
1  n+1 (z x)zn+1+y(zn+1 xn+1)z x
+ k (1  ) ; (64)
where x  1   qT ; y  (1  ) r; z  1   pT   r; Hi  (1  )Hi + pEvi and Li 
(1  )Li + qT vi. When i = a we have k = 0.
Expression (64) has the following asymptotic properties. When we let n!1 we obtain
vH;Li as expression (58) in the previous Section. While, if n = 0, we obtain
evH;Li;k;0 = (1  )Hi + pEvi   k (1  )
 
1  pE
1   (1  pE) : (65)
46The "familiarity threat" may also be caused by collusion between the agent and the monitor, but even
in this case some prior learning has to occur. A rational dishonest client would not bribe an external auditor
without a prior observation of his personal character traits, otherwise he could place himself in a worse
situation.
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When k = 0 we get the expression vHi .
Since 1   pE > (1  ) r, the principals payo¤ in (65) is smaller than in (59). The
di¤erence in payo¤s reects the loss in precision of replacement strategies under private
monitoring. In other words, in Section 3.5, the replacement of the monitor was only an
issue after the arrival of a revealing signal which was publicly observed, while under the
agents private monitoring, replacement is a possibility from the rst period of the relation.
As in Section 3.5, we focus our attention on the discounting interval

; +

. In particu-
lar, in discounting region

;  

, we have a sequence of  n ordered as in (61) of Section 3.5
(for the intuition, the reader is referred to the discussion in that Section). However, under
private monitoring  n is smaller. This is because the interpretation of n under private and
public monitoring are di¤erent. With public monitoring, n is the number of periods that
the tolerant monitor remains in charge after a revealing signal, while under private moni-
toring, n is the number of periods that a given monitor stays in charge after the rst signal.
Consequently, for the same n, replacement is more frequent under private than under public
monitoring, justifying the di¤erence of  n under the di¤erent information structures.47
To better distinguish between both information structures, suppose that a revealing
signal occurs at time t  1. When the signals are public, the monitor stays in charge for a
total of t+n repetitions of the stage game. While, if monitoring is private, the monitor stays
in charge for a total of 1 + n repetitions of the stage game, and we might have t ? n+ 1:
Rotation of the monitor under public information is more accurate but the replacement
cycle t+n is stochastic. This is the case because the reference (revelation) period t is random,
unknown ex-ante but observed ex-post. Replacement strategies under private monitoring
are less accurate, since t is random and not known by the principal even ex-post. For that
reason, the replacement cycle n is dened and known ex-ante.
Denote kn;n+1 as the cut-o¤ point which, innitesimally below n, is an optimal choice
for the principal and, innitesimally above n + 1, is optimal. It is a transition threshold
47On the other hand, +n under private monitoring is larger than 
+
n under public monitoring. Which is
consistent with the observation made about  n : An equal ordered sequence of 
+
n as in (60) is obtained.
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between replacement choices. For xed k, when kn 1;n  k  kn;n+1, n is an unconstrained
optimal choice. Let k1  limn!1 kn;n+1 be the value above which the principals optimal
unconstrained choice is to never replace the monitor. We say unconstrained because we are
not considering any incentives constraint.
For  2  ; +, let kRCn denote the per replacement cost threshold below which the
principals optimal choice can be n. When kRC1  k; the choice n!1 must be optimal.
Similarly, for  2 ;   ; let kPCn denote the participation condition below which n can
be optimal. To keep the text clean, the functional form of each of these objects can be
found in the Proof of the following result.
Proposition 33 Suppose that the information is the agents private monitoring and k  0.
Let  denote the principal optimal choice.
(i) For  2  ; + : If k < k1, then  = inf n; n+ 1; ::: : k < kRC	. Otherwise, i.e.
k1 = kRC1  k;  !1.
(ii) For  2  m;  m+1  ;   and n  m : If k < k1; then  = inf n; n+ 1; :::;m : k < kPC	 ;
while if k1  k < kPCm; then  = m: Otherwise, i.e. k  kPCm; there is no trade.
(iii) For  2  m;  m+1  ;   and n > m : If k < kPCm; then  = m. Otherwise,
i.e. k  kPCm; there is no trade.
The principal participation and consequent employment of replacement strategies is
guaranteed when evH;Lp;k;n > vp for  2 ;   and evH;Lp;k;n > vH;Lp for  2  ; + : The agent
incentives for high e¤ort in the uninformed state are guaranteed for    n . When we join
together these restrictions with the unconstrained optimal choice we obtain the equilibrium
strategies for the agent and the principal.
The agent is rational and knows the replacement cycle. Consequently, when the principal
replaces the monitor, the agent also shifts from low to high e¤ort. Then he waits for the
occurrence of a potential revealing signal before the next monitor replacement, in order to
enjoy the remaining period providing low e¤ort. The principals strategy takes into account
this strategic behavior.
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In the discounting region

 ; +

the principals best replacement strategy is no longer
an exclusive choice between n = 0 and n ! 1, as we found in Proposition 30. Now the
equilibrium is more sensitive to the value k. In fact any n can be optimal, for that reason
high e¤ort in any informational state is only possible for k < k0;1.48 The reason is the
trade-o¤ between more frequent replacement, more costly but less likely to allow the agent
to learn, and less frequent replacement, cheaper but with a higher probability that the
principals payo¤s will be penalized by the revelation of a tolerant monitor.
When  2  m;  m+1  ;   and the unconstrained optimal choice n  m; the
principal can choose n if k < kPCn. Otherwise, since kPCn is strictly increasing with n, she
has to move way from the optimum in the direction of m. However, it might still happen
that k  kPCm, in which case the principal should not trade because replacement costs are
too high. A choice above m is cheaper but does not provide the agent with incentives.
When  2  m;  m+1  ;   and the unconstrained optimal choice n > m; the
principal must increase the replacement frequency, moving way from the optimum, down
towards m to provide the agent with incentives in the uninformed state. However, if k 
kPCm the provision of incentives is too costly and the principal should not enter into the
relation.
When n!1 we obtain expression (58) as a particular case of (64). It is better to allow
the agent to provide low e¤ort in the informed state than to make any costly replacement,
see Corollary 28. Nonetheless, for su¢ ciently low replacement costs, it is possible to make
a payo¤ improvement using replacement strategies even without observing the realized
output. The following result is in everything similar to Corollary 31.
Corollary 34 Any equilibrium of Proposition 33 with a nite choice n and trade, improves
the principals payo¤ evH;Lp;k;n over the payo¤s associated with Proposition 23, i.e. vH;Lp for
 2  ; + and vp for  2 ;   :
For  2 ;   we require evH;Lp;k;n > vp; which is the participation or a replacement con-
straint that can only be satised if n is nite. When n!1 no trade is an equilibrium. For
48 It can be shown that k0;1 is a very small positive number.
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Figure 11: Principals payo¤s under private monitoring for di¤erent replacement costs.
 2  ; + we require that evH;Lp;k;n > vH;Lp ; which is only possible if replacement strategies
are employed.49 If n ! 1 we have evH;Lp;k;n ! vH;Lp , i.e. the worst case scenario for the
principal, that she can always guarantee by not replacing the monitor.
Figure 11 illustrates the value of evH;Lp;k;n for the cases where k = 1 and k = 30 when
 2  ; +. In the former case k13;14 = 0:93 < k14;15 = 1:04 and kRC14 = 2:89, then
n = 14 is the optimal choice. Since k1 = 20:24 when k = 30, n ! 1 is optimal. Both
functions converge to vH;Lp as n!1.
3.6.1 Agents Private Information with Compensation Incentives
We now comment on the possibility of compensation based incentives. As in Subsection
3.5.1 we assume that the agent will not accept to work for less than the market wage. The
49For that reason we call it a replacement constraint. Since vH;Lp is always larger than vp we cannot talk
about a participation constraint in the strict sense.
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principal is allowed to raise the compensation if she considers it convenient but cannot
decrease it.
To understand how compensation incentives can be used in a private monitor setting,
consider the following strategy. During the rst n 2 N0 periods of the relation, the principal
pays the compensation w0  w. In the following periods, she switches to the compensation
w1  w; with w0 < w1. The idea is to o¤er a lower compensation su¢ cient to provides
the agent with incentives for high e¤ort in the early periods, where it is less likely that the
monitor type has been revealed to be tolerant, and then adjust to a higher compensation
when it is more likely that the monitor has been revealed.
Now, together with the uninformed and the informed states of the relation, we have the
low compensation stage and the high compensation stage. A strategy for the principal is a
choice of w0, w1 and the stage separating period n. Again we might have n = 0, i.e. the
relation starts in the high compensation stage, or n ! 1, i.e. the relation remains in the
low compensation stage forever, or an optimal intermediate choice of n; i.e. the relation
passes through both stages.
The informational disadvantage of the principal with respect to the agent will necessarily
reects in a lower payo¤ for the former when compared with the case where the realized
output is publicly monitored. Again, we expect mixed superiority of replacement strategies
with respect to compensation incentives. The latter must be stronger when the agent is
more patient and/or replacement costs are su¢ ciently large.
The two stage compensation scheme discussed here is similar to the existing one in the
public sector. There is a distance, not only physical but also in monitoring terms, between
the central authority and the lower hierarchical levels. The performance evaluation and
the functioning of the associated public o¢ ce is usually based on general reports. For
that reason promotions, measured in compensation benets, are usually independent of the
performance but rather depend on years accumulated in service.
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3.7 Final Comments
In many economic situations of interest managers have the necessity to delegate some of their
tasks - in this model, the monitoring activities, which are crucial for the regular functioning
and expansion of their businesses. The degree of delegation in some sense determines the
subsequent information structure. Full delegation leads to an information structure similar
to the agent private monitoring case discussed in this paper. Partial delegation is closer to
public monitoring information structures. The present paper provides some results, about
the optimal strategic behavior from the principals perspective, for dealing with the negative
e¤ects associated with the revelation of specic organizational aspect which might be the
object of adverse strategic behavior. We choose the monitor type to be the unknown piece
of information that a potentially strategic agent might take advantage of once informed,
but the spectrum of situations with similar characteristics is larger.
The principal usually has more freedom in the choice of the incentives schemes, in this
paper we focus on replacement strategies. As mentioned before, the revelation of the players
type through repeated interaction is not a new nding. However, the way such a problem
is modeled in this paper is novel.
Many questions are left open. For example, a clearer connection with the existing
theories in multiple and common agency, renegotiation-proof, incomplete contacts, private
evaluations, information sharing, etc. Compensation incentives were discussed but not
formalized.
We also did not cover all potential information structures, for example the possibility of
the realized output being exclusively observed by the principal (and/or the monitor) or when
the principal holds prior private information about the monitor type. These cases capture
situations where the principal has access to relevant information that for some reason,
intentionally or not, it is blocked to the agent. We expect the principals informational
advantage to help her in achieving higher payo¤s. In the former possibility, the principal
can be more e¢ cient in her replacement choices, in particular if the tolerant type is preferred.
However, the principal cannot replace the monitor successively until a tolerant type appears
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because that behavior would reveal the monitor type to the agent. There is here a trade o¤
between replacement costs and payo¤ gains with a tolerant monitor. An optimal strategy
for the principal must require some degree of randomization between replacement choices.
The contrast between the agent and monitor replacement is also an interesting point.
Another possibility is to allow the monitor to play a strategic role or even to remove him
and consider a strategic principal with an unknown type to the agent. This lead us to
dynamic incentive problems of incomplete information, typically harder to handle but very
rich in strategic terms.
Also interesting, but from a di¤erent perspective, is the introduction of new ingredients
into the problem, and more empirical and experimental work on the subject are the next
steps towards a better understanding of this type of revelation problems. Such research
should also provide us with recommendations on how we could implement the proposed
solutions in our organizations.
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3.9 Appendix - Proofs of Lemmas, Propositions and Corol-
laries
The proof of the various Lemmas makes extensive use of the dynamic programming methods
developed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990).
Proof of Lemma 21. Consider player i = a. Suppose that in the beginning of the
game, i.e. state 0, the agent selects an e¤ort eH ; receiving an expected payo¤ Ha . In the
end of the rst period, if a low output is observed, the game enters in the punishment stage
with expected payo¤ va= (1  ). This event occur with probability pE . If a high output
is observed, it might be uninformative in which case the value of the game for the agent
associated with action eH is vH;La = (1  ). Notice that we have a recursive pattern here,
this case is equivalent to a repetition of the initial game one period later. This event occur
with probability 1  pE   (1  ) r.
With probability (1  ) r the signal might be revealing, in which case the agent adjust
his e¤ort accordingly to eL, obtaining an expected payo¤ of La for the following period. In
this case there is no more learning, and we have a simple recursive structure. With proba-
bility qT the agent is punished in the following period and with the remaining probability
he obtains the value v:;La = (1  ).
Formally we have two recursive patterns, they are respectively
vH;La = (1  )Ha + 

pEva + (1  ) rv:;La +
 
1  pE   (1  ) r vH;La  ;
and
v:;La = (1  )La + 

qT va +
 
1  qT  v:;La  ;
which can be solved for vH;La to obtain (50). Reasoning in a similar way we obtain expression
(50) for the principal. Employing the substitution suggested in the text we obtain the payo¤s
vL;Li and v
H;H
i for i 2 fa; pg.
Proof of Proposition 23. First we search for the condition  < +. After observing
an informative signal the agent chooses eL if v:;Ha < v
:;L
a . Where
v:;Ha 
(1  )Ha + pT va
1   (1  pT ) and v
:;L
a 
(1  )La + qT va
1   (1  qT ) ; (66)
128
with v:;Ha being the value of the innitely repeated state 1 subgame for the informed agent
when he chooses eH and v:;La has a similar interpretation but with the agent choosing eL.
Rearranging for  we obtain
 <
La   Ha
(La   Ha ) + qT (Ha   va)  pT (La   va)
 +: (67)
Since La > 
H
a and if q
T
 
Ha   va

> pT
 
La   va

, i.e. condition (54) holds, we have
0 < + < 1.
The agent innitely repeated game expected payo¤ when he supplies eH while unin-
formed and eL in the state 1 is vH;La , and given by (50), the innitely repeated game
expected payo¤ when supplying eL in any informational state is denoted and given by
vL;La 
(1  )La + qEva
DL
+  (1  ) s
DL
(1  )La + qT va
1   (1  qT ) ; (68)
where DL  1     1  qE   (1  ) s. Solving vH;La  vL;La for  with equality we obtain
the expression for  . To guarantee the nonemptiness of the interval

 ; +

, i.e. + >  ,
we plug + in vH;La and v
L;L
a . After some algebra simplications the inequality relation
vH;La > v
L;L
a becomes
r
 
Ha   La
  
qT
 
Ha   va
  pT  La   va
r (La   Ha )  pT (Ha   va) + qT (Ha   va)
>
s
 
Ha   La
  
qT
 
Ha   va
  pT  La   va
s (La   Ha )  pT (La   va) + qT (La   va)
;
further manipulations lead us to
s
(La   Ha ) s+ (La   va) (qT   pT )
  r
(La   Ha ) r + (Ha   va) (qT   pT )

  La   Ha   qT  Ha   va  pT  La   va > 0:
From which we require conditions (54) and (55) to hold simultaneously. Since La > 
H
a >
va, it is easy to show that 
  > 0: Putting all together conditions (54) and (55) guarantee
that 0 <   < + < 1.
Proof of Corollary 25. The reference payo¤ vH;Hi is given by (56). The expression
for vH;Li is given by (50) in Lemma 21.
(i) The conditions of Proposition 23 establish that vH;La > v
H;H
a for  < + where +
solves vH;La = v
H;H
a .
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(ii) Solving vH;Lp  vH;Hp for  and using the fact that Lp = vp we obtain
  1
1 + qT
 ref : (69)
It enough to show that +  ref ; it lead us to the following condition
0   La   va  qT   pT  ;
which is satised with strict inequality, since the right-hand side is strictly positive, i.e.
La > va and q
T > pT . Then vH;Lp < v
H;H
p for all  < +.
(iii) Solving vH;Ha + v
H;H
p > v
H;L
a + v
H;L
p for  we obtain three roots  > 0,  < 1 and
 >
 
Hp   vp
   La   Ha  
Ha + 
H
p   vp

(1  qT )  La (1  pT ) + va (qT   pT )
:
The third root is larger than one if
qT
 
Ha   va

+ qT
 
Hp   vp

> pT
 
La   va

;
which is guaranteed by condition (54).
Proof of Proposition 26. The problem is equivalent to a innitely repeated game
without learning and the monitor type known to be E . In this case the players payo¤s are
simply
vHi =
(1  )Hi + pEvi
1   (1  pE) and v
L
i =
(1  )Li + qEvi
1   (1  qE) ; (70)
when the agent provides high and low e¤ort respectively and i 2 fa; pg. The recursive
structure is simple; the agent supplies a given e¤ort and with probability pE or qE he
is punished or with the remaining probabilities the same pattern is repeated. Solving
vHa  vLa for  we obtain
  
L
a   Ha
(La   Ha ) + (Ha   va) qE   (La   va) pE
 :
Then  2 (0; 1) if qE  Ha   va > pE  La   va, which is a general version of condition
(54) for all  2 (0; 1). Since pE and qE depends linearly on ; and the sum of (54) and (55)
gives qS
 
Ha   va

> pS
 
La   va

, the lowest di¤erence qE
 
Ha   va
  pE  La   va must
be reached at  ! 0 by condition (55). This di¤erence is always positive. The value of +
is given by (67) and is larger than  when (55) holds.
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To show that  <  , just replace  for  in vH;La  vL;La and rearrange to obtain
(1  )  La   Ha 2  s  Ha   va  r  La   va  qE  Ha   va  pE  La   va > 0;
which, following the previous argument, is satised when both (54) and (55) hold.
Proof of Proposition 27. Manipulate the inequality vH;Hi > v
H
i ; which the expres-
sions are given by (56) and (70) respectively, we obtain
r (1  )  pE   pT   Hi   vi (1  ) 2 > 0;
which is clearly larger than zero for all  2 (0; 1), since pE = pT + r > pT ; Hi > vi for
i 2 fa; pg and  2 (0; 1). Participation is guaranteed if vHi  vi.
Proof of Corollary 28. Lets start noticing that replacement cost are only incurred
by the principal. (i) For  2 +; 1 the market compensation is su¢ cient to keep the agent
with incentives. The principal never replaces the monitor.
(ii) By Proposition 26, without replacement costs and with full freedom in the monitor
replacement the principal cannot obtain more than vHp then she must not be able to do
more if we introduce replacement costs. In this case the agent obtain vHa as his worst
payo¤. On the other hand if costs are too high and in consequence payo¤s are expected to
fall bellow vH;Lp , then principal has always the option to never replace the monitor, as in
Proposition 23, guaranteeing at least a payo¤ of vH;Lp . In this case the agent benet from
the principal replacement passivity and obtain the payo¤ vH;La .
(iii) Without replacement strategies both player would obtain vp and va. Costless re-
placement strategies expand the discount region to . If replacement strategies improve
over vL;Lp = vp then the principal must obtain a payo¤ of at most v
H
p . When replacement
cost needed to provide the agent with incentives are too expensive, i.e. vp  vp, the prin-
cipal sticks to her outside option. The agent cannot get less than vHa when the principal
employs replacement strategies. Only if the principal nds optimal to not participate, in
this case he obtains va. Providing that the replacement costs are not too high the principal
will employ replacement strategies. In order to keep the principal with incentives the agent
has to provide high e¤ort at least when uninformed, in the best scenario he would obtain
vH;La .
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Proof of Lemma 29. Consider the case where the principal change the monitor as
soon as an informative signal is observed, that is vH;Li;k;0. Using a similarly reasoning used to
prove Lemma 21, we obtain the following recursive payo¤s for the case where i = p,
vH;Lp;k;0 = (1  )
 
Hp   k

+ 
h
pEvp + (1  ) rvH;Lp;k;0 +
 
1  pE   (1  ) r vH;Lp;0;0i ;
and
vH;Lp;0;0  (1  )Hp + 
h
pEvp + (1  ) rvH;Lp;k;0 +
 
1  pE   (1  ) r vH;Lp;0;0i :
The rst expression vH;Lp;k;0 is the value of the repeated game that starts with a costly replace-
ment of the monitor. The agent starts providing high e¤ort, then in the following period
he is punished with probability pE . A revealing signal occurs with probability (1  ) r;
in which case we the principal replace immediately the monitor and we have a recursive
structure. With probability the 1  pE   (1  ) r none of these events occur and the mon-
itor is not replaced. The second expression vH;Lp;0;0 is the value of the relation in this case,
which has a recursive structure. Solving recursively these two expression for vH;Lp;k;0 we obtain
expression (57) for the case where n = 0. Notice that we are solving the recursion assuming
that there is a replacement cost in the beginning of the game. This simplies the recursion,
to correct it in the end we add k (1  ).
Consider now the case where the principal replace the monitor one period after a re-
vealing signal is observed, in this case we have the following system of equations
vH;Lp;k;1 = (1  )
 
Hp   k

+ 
h
pEvp + (1  ) rv:;Lp;0;1 +
 
1  pE   (1  ) r vH;Lp;0;1i ;
vH;Lp;0;1  (1  )Hp + 
h
pEvp + (1  ) rv:;Lp;0;1 +
 
1  pE   (1  ) r vH;Lp;0;1i ;
v:;Lp;0;1  (1  )Lp + 
h
qT vp +
 
1  qT  vH;Lp;k;1i :
Notice that now we have a third equation, that is due to the fact that the agent is allowed
to enjoy the benet of learning for one period. After we have solve for vH;Lp;k;1 and added
k (1  ) we obtain expression (57) for the case where n = 1 . For general n, in the previous
system of equations replace the value vH;Lp;k;1 for v
H;L
p;k;n, v
H;L
p;0;1 for v
H;L
p;0;n and v
:;L
p;0;1 for v
:;L
p;0;n in
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the two rst equations and substitute the third equation by
v:;Lp;0;n =
 
(1  )Lp + qT vp
 n 1X
l=0
l(1  qT )l + n  1  qT n vH;Lp;k;n: (71)
Solve the system for vH;Lp;k;n, using the fact that
Pn 1
l=0 x
l = (1  xn) = (1  x) and adding the
term k (1  ), we obtain expression (57). A similar reasoning is done when i = a with
k = 0.
Proof of Proposition 30. First we show that n = 0 is an optimal choice when
vH;Lp;k;n > v
H;L
p;k;n+1, i.e. k < k
cut; and n!1 is optimal if vH;Lp;k;n  vH;Lp;k;n+1, i.e. k  kcut. The
value kcut is the value of k that solves vH;Lp;k;n = v
H;L
p;k;n+1. Using (57) for n and n+ 1, setting
Lp = vp, after some algebraic manipulation we obtain k
cut given in (62). Notice that kcut is
independent of n. Clearly kcut > 0 since both the numerator and denominator are strictly
positive. Then vH;Lp;k;0 is the supremum of
n
vH;Lp;k;0; v
H;L
p;k;1; :::
o
when k < kcut and vH;Lp;k;1 is the
supremum when k  kcut.
Lets rst look at the case where  2  ; +. In order for n = 0 to be optimal
the principal must obtain a payo¤ larger than vH;Lp = v
H;L
p;k;1. This is not a participation
constraint, but a condition for the monitor replacement. Solving vH;Lp;k;n > v
H;L
p for k, we
again obtain (62). Then n = 0 is optimal if k 2 0; kcut ; otherwise n!1 is optimal, i.e.
for k  kcut. The agent incentives are guaranteed by Proposition 23 and since  ; + =
 1; 
+
1
   0 ; +0  by (60) and (61).
In order to nd the principal optimal strategy for  2 ;   both the principal and the
agent must have incentives in participate. Recall that Lp = vp, imposes a lower bound on
low e¤ort, see (53). The principal participation for this discounting region is guaranteed if
vH;Lp;k;n > v
L;L
p = vp. Solving the inequality for k we obtain k < k
PCn; where kPCn is given by
(63). Moreover, kPCn is a strictly positive and increasing function of n since 
 
1  qT  < 1
and Hp > vp, i.e. 0 < k
PCn < kPCn+1 for all n 2 N0. To show that kPCn > kcut, notice
that kPCn reach its lowest value when n = 0: It is then the hardest to satisfy scenario, but
in this case 1    1  pT   r > 0, implying that kcut < kPCn for all n 2 N0.
Recall that when k < kcut; the principal participation is guaranteed for all n and n = 0 is
the optimal replacement choice, this is also true for  2 ;  . The ordering of sequence
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(61) guarantees that the agent incentives for eH in any uninformed state are satised.
Consider now that k  kcut; in this case the principals optimal choice has to guarantee
that the agent incentives to provide at least high e¤ort in the uninformed state are satised.
When  2  n ;  n+1  ;   the principal optimal choice must be n. A choice of n 1 is
payo¤ inferior for the principal since k  kcut, a choice n+1 does not provide the agent with
incentives. Finally the principal participation has also to be guaranteed, i.e. k < kPCn,
otherwise vH;Lp;k;n  vp and no trade is optimal.
Proof of Corollary 31. Since in Proposition 30 the principal participation constraints
are on same time replacement constraints any nite optimal choice that allows for trade
must allow a payo¤ improvement, the proof of this result can be found on the proof of
Proposition 30. See also the proof of Corollary 28.
Proof of Lemma 32. The proof is identical to the proofs of Lemmas 21 and 29. We
look rst for evH;Lp;k;0, i.e. the case where the agent is substituted in every period. Let i = p,
we obtain the following recursive payo¤
evH;Lp;k;0 = (1  )  Hp   k+  hpEvp + (1  ) revH;Lp;k;0 +  1  pE   (1  ) r evH;Lp;k;0i ;
which can be solved for evH;Lp;k;0 and nally add k (1  ). Consider now the case where n = 1,
in this case we obtain the following system of equations
evH;Lp;k;1 = (1  )  Hp   k+  hpEvp + (1  ) rev:;Lp;0;1 +  1  pE   (1  ) r evH;:p;0;1i ;
ev:;Lp;0;1 = (1  )Lp + qT vp +   1  qT  evH;Lp;k;1;
evH;:p;0;1 = (1  )Hp + pEvp +   1  pE evH;Lp;k;1;
which is solved for evH;Lp;k;1 and nally adding k (1  ). In this case the agent is substituted
after two periods. The rst equation is the value of the repeated game that starts with
a costly selection of a monitor. The agent starts providing high e¤ort. In the end of the
rst period he is punished with probability pE , otherwise either a revealing signal occurs
with probability (1  ) r or he stays uninformed with probability 1 pE   (1  ) r: In the
former case he enjoys the benets from learning during on period after which he is replaced
in case that is not punished. The repeated game restarts again with a costly replacement of
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the monitor. This is the second equation which is the value of the relation in the case where
the agent gets informed and supplies with low e¤ort for one period. The third expression
has a similar interpretation as the second one, but for the case where the game remains in
the uninformed state, the agent start by supplying high e¤ort. If no punishment occurs,
with probability 1  pE the repeated game is restarted again.
Consider now the general case n, in this case we have 2n+ 1 equations,
evH;Lp;k;n = (1  )  Hp   k+  hpEvp + (1  ) rev:;Lp;0;n +  1  pE   (1  ) r evH;:p;0;ni ;
ev:;Lp;0;n =  (1  )Lp + qT vp n 1X
k=0
k
 
1  qT k + n  1  qT n evH;Lp;k;n;
evH;:p;0;n = (1  )Hp +  hpEvp + (1  ) rev:;Lp;0;n 1 +  1  pE   (1  ) r evH;:p;0;n 1i ;
:::
ev:;Lp;0;2 = ev0;20p =  (1  )Lp + qT vp  1 +   1  qT + 2  1  qT 2 evH;Lp;k;n;
evH;:p;0;2 = ev0;2p = (1  )Hp +  hpEvp + (1  ) rev:;Lp;0;1 +  1  pE   (1  ) r evH;:p;0;1i ;
ev:;Lp;0;1 = (1  )Lp + qT vp +   1  qT  evH;Lp;k;n;
evH;:p;0;1 == (1  )Hp + pEvp +   1  pE evH;Lp;k;n;
which can be solved recursively for evH;Lp;k;n to obtain, after adding k (1  ), the expression
evH;Lp;k;n = ((1 )Hp +pEvp)
nP
k=0
kzk+((1 )Lp+qT vp)
nP
r=1
yzr 1
n rP
k=0
k+rxk k(1 )
1 n+1

zn+1+
nP
k=0
xn kyzk
 + k (1  ) ; (72)
which equals expression (64) after all the summations have been solved. Similar reasoning
is employed when i = a with k = 0.
When required to shorten in notation we use the following denitions; x  1   qT ,
y  (1  ) r and z  1  pE   (1  ) r = 1  pT   r.
Proof of Proposition 33. Suppose that evH;Lp;k;n has a unique global maximum in N0.
Then evH;Lp;k;n given by (64) reach its maximum value at n if evH;Lp;k;n 1  evH;Lp;k;n and evH;Lp;k;n evH;Lp;k;n+1: Let kn;n+1 be the value k that solves evH;Lp;k;n = evH;Lp;k;n+1 for n = 0; 1; 2:::. Consider
Lp = vp, after some algebraic manipulation we obtain
kn;n+1 =
 
Hp   vp

y

zn+1 (1  z)  xn+1 (1  x) + zn+1xn+1n+1 (z   x) 
(1  z) [zn+1 (1  z) (z + y   x)  xn+1y (1  x)] ;
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Notice that k 1;0 = 0. The expression for kn;n+1 is increasing in n if
y  (x  z)
 
1  n+1zn+1
n+1 (xn+1   zn+1) : (73)
Independently of the relation between x and z, the right-hand side is monotonically increas-
ing in n, converging to 1 when n ! 1 and to (1  z) = when n ! 0. The latter it is
the lowest value and for that reason the hardest to satisfy. Then substituting y  (1  ) r
and z  1   pT   r and solving for  we obtain   1=  1  pT   r, which is always
satised because its larger than 1. Then the optimal replacement choice n has to satisfy
evH;Lp;k;n 1  evH;Lp;k;n and evH;Lp;k;n  evH;Lp;k;n+1, or equivalently kn 1;n  k  kn;n+1.
Now, let n!1 in the expression for kn;n+1. If x  z, i.e. r  qT   pT , then we obtain
k1 =
Hp   vp
1  z =
Hp   vp
1   (1  pT   r) ;
which is expression (62). When x < z, i.e. r < qT   pT , we obtain
k1 =
Hp   vp
1  z
y
z + y   x =
Hp   vp
1   (1  pT   r)
(1  ) r
qT   pT   r ;
where the second ratio on the right-hand side is smaller than one. Also, since pT + r =
pS < 1, we have k1 > 0 always. In resume for any  2 ; + and k 2 [0; k1) ; when
unrestricted the principal prefers to replace the monitor after a nite number of periods,
while if k  k1 he must choose n!1.
We need now to verify when the principal prefers to employ replacement strategies. For
this evH;Lp;k;n  vp when  2 ;   and evH;Lp;k;n  vH;Lp when  2  ; +. Lets look rst to
the former case. Solve evH;Lp;k;n = vp for k to obtain the participation condition in terms of
replacement costs, denote it by kPCn and is given by
kPCn =
 
Hp   vp

(x  z)  1  n+1zn+1
[(xn+1   zn+1) y + zn+1 (x  z)] (1  z) :
Independently of the relation between x and z, the function kPCn is strictly increases in n.
Formally it is enough to show that kPCn < kPCn+1, that is
y >   (x  z) z
n+1 (1  z)
(xn+1   zn+1)   (xn+2   zn+2) +  (x  z) n+1xn+1zn+1 : (74)
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The right-hand side is always negative, since
 
xn+1   zn+1 >  xn+2   zn+2 when x > z
and the reverse when z > x. The numerator and denominator always have the same signal.
Then kPC1 is the largest cost and takes the value 1 when n!1.
Consider now the case  2 ;   ; and solve evH;Lp;k;n = vH;Lp for k to obtain the replace-
ment condition
kRCn =
 
Hp   vp

y
 
xn+1   zn+1
[(xn+1   zn+1) y + (x  z) zn+1] (1  z) :
Taking the limit n ! 1 we found that kRCn ! k1 whether x  z or x < z. Moreover
kRCn is strictly increasing with n. In order for kRCn > kn;n+1, the same condition (73)
must be strictly satised, which we have shown above to be always the case. Moreover,
since vH;Lp > vp then k
PCn > kRCn; consequently we have kPCn > kn;n+1 for all n 2 N0:
Now we consider the agent incentives to place high e¤ort in the uniformed state, given
a replacement choice. (i) For  2  ; + ; since for all n,  n    the agent incentives to
provide high e¤ort while uninformed are always satised. The principal choose some nite
n if k 2 [0; k1) and n!1 otherwise. However if k  kRCn, she must choose the smallest
 larger than n such that the inequality is reversed, i.e. k < kRC . The monitor has to be
replaced less often in order to increase the replacement condition bound kRC . However,
if such it is not possible, i.e. k  kRC1 = k1; the principal should choose n ! 1. Since
kPC1 =1, participation is always guaranteed.
Now suppose that  2  m;  m+1  ;  . Then we have two possibilities. (ii) The
unconstrained optimal n  m, in this case the choice n is optimal if k < kPCn < k1, since
the principal and agent incentives are met. However, if kPCn  k < k1, the principal has
to choose the lowest  2 fn+ 1; :::;mg such that k < kPC . The principal cannot choose
a replacement frequency above m because in this case the agent would not have incentives
to provide e¤ort in the uninformed state. Similarly, when k > k1, she must choose m
if k < kPCm. It might happen that k  kPCm then the principal should not participate
because the replacement costs are too high and for any replacement frequency above m the
agent has no incentives. (iii) Second, if the unconstrained optimal n > m; to keep the agent
with incentives, it is optimal to choose m, but such is only the case if k < kPCm. Otherwise,
trade is not possible, because it is too costly for the principal to provide the agent with
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incentives.
Proof of Proposition 34. The argument is similar to the one used in the Proof of
Corollary 31. In Proposition 33 the principal participation constraints are on same time
replacement constraints. Then any nite optimal choice that allows for trade must allow
a payo¤ improvement, the proof of this result can be found along the proof of Proposition
33.
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